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Summary 
 
This study attempted to discover the role of internal auditors in the professional 
development of audit committee members, leading to enhanced performance, 
through the provision of induction programmes and professional development 
opportunities to committee members, with due regard for the principles of good 
governance and international best practices.  A secondary aim of this study was 
to propose methods to improve the relationship between the internal audit 
activity and audit committees in providing additional support to its members.  
The audit committee’s needs and requirements were assessed by using the 
audit committee charter as the basis in identifying the responsibilities of the 
committee and the professional development needs of committee members in 
an organisation.  It was found that a framework for the induction and 
professional development of audit committee members would be most useful to 
internal auditors to assist audit committees to meet their requirements and 
improve their performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
PROBLEM FORMULATION, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.1 Preamble 
 
Several recent significant business failures, in South Africa (SA) and 
internationally, have led to an increased demand for regulation in the business 
environment (Verschoor 2002:4), especially with regard to governance, 
transparency and accountability.  This increased demand for regulation and 
guidance are reflected in the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002, known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United 
States of America (USA) and the King Report on Corporate Governance of 
2002 in South Africa (King II Report). The additional regulations increased the 
responsibilities and expectations of the audit committee.  This study focused on 
the role of the internal auditor activity in the professional development of the 
audit committee members in order to meet their increased responsibilities.   
 
Today’s business environment also contains many new challenges and 
complexities, such as an increase in global competition, significant levels of 
litigation, corporate re-engineering as well as rapid advances in technology, all 
which have a significant effect on business risk which might to some extent be 
mitigated by more knowledgeable members on audit committees (Arthur 
Andersen 1998:2; Howard 1998:1; ICAEW 2004:2).  
 
“Real knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance.” 
 
 (Confucius in Quoteland.com 2005) 
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Worldwide changes that impacted on corporate governance, such as the 
uncertain and rapidly changing regulatory environment, the activism of 
shareholders and additional reporting requirements such as sustainability 
reporting, have created an increased focus on the role of audit committee 
members, as the protectors of shareholders’ interests, in providing assurance 
with regard to the quality of financial reporting (Braiotta 2004:xv; Terrell & Reed 
2003a:63, 2003b:1).  
 
In order to address the increased demand for good corporate governance and 
accountability (Braiotta 2004:xv) and to effectively control business risks (Burke 
& Guy 2002:131), businesses need to ensure, inter alia, that proper and well-
functioning audit committees are in place.  It is therefore imperative that audit 
committee members should be properly trained to enable them to fulfil their 
oversight responsibilities (Steinberg & Bromilow 2000a:41). Audit committees 
have attained higher visibility and more is expected of them than was previously 
the case, and therefore their members require better training and more 
commitment than before (Terrell & Reed 2003a:63, 2003b:1). 
 
These increased training requirements are also highlighted by Steinberg and 
Bromilow (2000a:41), as the Blue Ribbon Committee’s (BRC) recommendations 
in 1999 indicated that audit committee members should recognise the 
significance of their responsibilities and should be willing to undertake relevant 
training and professional development. 
 
The risk of not staying abreast of the latest requirements was described by 
Richard Thornburgh, a former United States Attorney General and Worldcom 
investigator (Thornburgh 2002), who expressed the view that “the failure of 
Worldcom was partly due to a number of deficiencies in the performance of the 
audit committee as well as the internal audit activity”.   
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Educating audit committee members properly, might improve their effectiveness 
and therefore contribute towards the prevention of future company failures.  
Although there are many role players in the professional development of audit 
committee members, there are still too few experienced and properly qualified 
people appointed to the boards of directors, who are responsible for dealing 
with complex issues like equal employment, racial and sexual discrimination 
and environmental matters. (Burke & Guy 2002:5; Hattingh 2000:2).  
 
Angela Oosthuizen (2004:11), the head of director development at the Institute 
of Directors in Southern Africa, has indicated that over the next ten years, board 
leadership in South Africa is going to change radically in terms of culture, 
ethnicity and gender.  New board members taking over from the existing 
leadership that was weaned on isolation, sanctions, apartheid, and a pariah 
state will need very different skills at both the local and the international level.  
They will also need to be much more prepared for their duties and 
responsibilities than their predecessors.  
 
There is thus a need in South Africa to properly educate members of audit 
committees and specifically non-executive board members, regarding their 
functions and duties in the specific companies in which they are appointed.  
 
According to Bishop et al (2000:51), the following conclusion (adapted from the 
Institute of Internal Auditors’ (IIA’s) definition of internal auditing) regarding audit 
committees was noted in the report of the National Association of Corporate 
Directors’ (NACD) Blue Ribbon Commission on audit committees: 
 
The audit committee can look to today’s internal auditing function to 
provide independent, objective assurance and consulting services 
designed to add value and improve an organisation’s operations.  It 
helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, 
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disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control and governance processes. 
 
Consulting services are defined as follows in the glossary to the Standards for 
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (IIA 2004c:26-27): 
 
Advisory and related client service activities, the nature and scope of which 
are agreed with the client and which are intended to add value and improve 
an organisation’s governance, risk management, and control processes 
without the internal auditor assuming management responsibilities.  Examples 
include counsel, advice, facilitation, and training. 
 
From the two preceding quotations it is clear that the internal auditor can also 
act as a training facilitator or a provider of relevant information.  The following 
three aspects should however be considered in determining the role of the 
internal audit activity in the professional development and education of audit 
committee members, namely – 
• adding value 
• the impact on the independence and objectivity of the internal auditor 
• the impact on the internal audit activity’s normal time commitments and 
performance 
 
1.1.2 Adding value 
 
In the glossary to the Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal 
Auditing (IIA 2004c:25), “add value” is defined as follows:  
 
Value is provided by improving opportunities to achieve organisational 
objectives, identifying operational improvement, and/or reducing risk exposure 
through both assurance and consulting services. 
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When an internal audit activity performs a consulting engagement in respect of 
the governance processes of the organisation, Standard 2130.C1 (IIA 
2004c:17) also requires that “the consulting engagement objectives should be 
consistent with the overall values and goals of the organization”. 
 
Sawyer, Dittenhofer and Scheiner (2003:1341) comment that if the internal 
auditors are to assist and support audit committees, they will have to “take the 
initiative in educating the committees on what internal auditing can offer the 
organisation”.  This opportunity for training or education could take the form of a 
consulting service with the sole aim of supporting the audit committee, providing 
information and improving their effectiveness. 
 
1.1.3 The impact on the independence and objectivity of the internal 
auditor 
 
The Institute of Internal Auditors recommends that organisations go beyond the 
current regulations and that “internal auditors should be involved in the 
orientation process for new audit committee members and ongoing education of 
the board and executive management with regard to internal control, risk 
management, and compliance with new laws and regulations” (IIA 2004b:2). 
 
Using the internal auditor as a training facilitator might, however pose another 
problem, namely that acting as a training facilitator may affect the internal 
auditor’s independence or give rise to a conflict of interest.  
 
With regard to conflict of interest, Practice Advisory 1000.C1-1 (IIA 2004c:37) 
states that the board (and audit committee) should empower the internal audit 
activity to perform additional services where they do not represent a conflict of 
interest or detract from the internal audit activity’s obligation to the audit 
committee.   
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Conflict of interest is defined in the Standards (IIA 2004c:26) as “any 
relationship that is or appears to be not in the best interest of the organization. 
A conflict of interest would prejudice an individual's ability to perform his or her 
duties and responsibilities objectively”.  With regard to objectivity, the IIA’s Code 
of Ethics (IIA 2004c:xxxi) prohibits internal auditors from participating “in any 
activity or relationship that may impair or be presumed to impair their unbiased 
assessment”. 
 
Consulting services may, however, enhance the internal auditor’s 
understanding of business processes or issues related to an assurance 
engagement and would not necessarily impair the internal auditor’s or the 
internal audit activity’s objectivity (IIA 2004c:37).  Acting as a training facilitator 
need not therefore affect an internal auditor’s independence. 
 
1.1.4 The impact on the internal audit activity’s time commitments and 
performance 
 
Care should be exercised to ensure that additional consulting services 
undertaken by the internal audit activity do not encroach on the time needed for 
its main objective - the provision of assurance services. 
 
The internal audit activity can, however, provide the following services to audit 
committees as part of their consulting services, but at the same time as a useful 
adjunct to their assurance services (Adamec, Leinicke, Ostrosky, & Rexroad 
2005:43-44; Richards 2001:2; Wagner 2000:1-5): 
 
• Suggesting guidelines for the selection of new audit committee members. 
• Providing induction and professional development programmes to audit 
committee members. 
• Assisting the audit committee in the self-assessment process. 
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• Assisting the audit committee in developing a charter. 
• Providing the audit committee with required information. 
• Assisting the audit committee in setting up agendas. 
• Assisting in supervising and overseeing the external auditors. 
 
The study focuses on the role of the internal audit activity in the professional 
development of audit committee members as it may add value; it may not 
necessary compromise its independence and it may not have a detrimental 
effect on its normal activities.  The study also focused on the development of a 
framework for educating audit committee members per se, to improve the 
effectiveness of their oversight of financial reporting and corporate governance. 
 
 
1.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION  
 
1.2.1 Unavailability of sufficiently skilled people to serve on audit 
committees 
 
Many organisations, such as Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat, failed partly due 
to a lack of corporate governance together with an inability to be sustainable in 
the current competitive economic environment (Munzig 2003:1).  Most 
organisations are trying their utmost to optimise all their activities, including 
those activities performed by internal auditors and audit committees.  There are 
numerous factors (of which only a few will be described below) affecting the 
performance of audit committees that need to be addressed in order to optimise 
their effectiveness. 
 
Brodsky, Grochowski, Baker and Huber (2003:1) state with regard to the new 
role of audit committees that “the audit committee plays a key role, standing at 
the intersection of management, independent auditors, internal auditors, and 
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the board of directors”.  The proliferation of corporate scandals, new legislation 
and stock exchange rules have created critical new roles and responsibilities for 
audit committees, over and above assuring financial integrity, which include 
overseeing risk management, control, compliance and ethics, governance and 
also special investigations (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:xi-xiii; Burke & Guy 2002:4). 
 
Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), states that effective oversight of the financial reporting process depends 
to a large extent on strong audit committees, and that qualified, committed, 
independent and tough-minded audit committees represent the most reliable 
guardians of the public interest (Braiotta 2004:11; Levitt 1998:6).  In view of the 
added responsibilities that are falling to audit committees, these characteristics 
have become even more important. 
 
Marks (2003:42) recognises that “although committee members need not be 
experts in every area, they do need sufficient knowledge to be able to access 
pertinent information, ask the right questions, and assess the answers they 
receive”. 
 
In South Africa, many audit committee members do not possess the necessary 
skills, knowledge and experience to act as audit committee members and 
perform their duties optimally (Cascarino & Van Esch 2005:179; Hattingh 
2000:2; Njunga 2000:8).  There is also an apparent lack of available non-
executive directors with the required business acumen who are willing to serve 
on audit committees (Wixley & Everingham 2002:20).  Mike Bourne (Business 
Day 2005:2), professional practice director of national audits at Ernst & Young, 
states that it is difficult to find people with the required skills, experience and 
time to make audit committees work effectively.  According to Temkin (2006:1), 
there are approximately 1400 audit committee positions to be filled in about 685 
listed companies on the JSE Securities Exchange.  The South African 
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Government has proposed that the audit committees of listed companies should 
consist only of independent non-executive directors under the new Corporate 
Laws Amendment Bill, and the audit committees of widely owned public 
companies must have at least two members who are non-executive directors 
and who must act independently (National Treasury 2006:s 269A), which is 
similar to the recommendation in the King II Report, which speaks of “a majority 
of independent non-executive directors” (Temkin 2006:1).   
 
Gumede (2001:38-39) suggests that some organisations select non-executive 
members as “token” appointments or on the basis of their political alignment 
simply to fill vacant positions, and that this affects their ability to add value.  
However, research conducted by Ahwireng-Obeng, Mariano and Viedge 
(2005:11) and reported on in the “Influences on the performance effectiveness 
of non-executive directors in South Africa” has indicated that only 16% of the 
respondents mentioned token appointments of black non-executive directors as 
one of the factors that influence the effectiveness of non-executive directors.   
 
Ahwireng-Obeng, Mariano and Viedge (2005:11) also reflect other factors cited 
as having an effect on the performance of audit committees, with the frequency 
of the factors given as a percentage: 
 
• Diversity of non-executive directors (43%). 
• Work overload of non-executive directors (33%). 
• The need to transform (26%). 
• Matching expectations of the company with those of the non-executive 
director (16%).  
 
Some organisations use representatives from stakeholders such as labour 
unions to be appointed as audit committee members. However, these members 
might not have received any financial or organisational management training.  
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Furthermore, they are often regarded as only “part-time participants in the 
company” (Bishop et al 2000:51).  
 
It is evident therefore that the unavailability of skilled people to serve on audit 
committees is a problem that needs to be addressed. 
 
1.2.2 Increased accountability of audit committees 
 
Njunga (2000:8) comments that audit committees are now also expected to 
oversee the management of operational risks and that they are accountable to a 
wider spectrum of stakeholders than simply shareholders.  The stakeholders 
involved might be government, customers, suppliers, employees, insurance 
companies, regulators, legislators, potential investors or the labour unions that 
need assurance that audit committees are effective in performing their oversight 
responsibilities (Vincenti 2005:4). 
 
“The board of directors is ultimately accountable to the shareholders for the 
long-term successful economic performance of the corporation consistent with 
its underlying public purpose” (Braiotta 2004:4).  The audit committee as a 
subcommittee of the board “assists the board of directors in fulfilling its 
oversight responsibilities for the financial reporting process, the system of 
internal control, the audit process, and the company’s process for monitoring 
compliance with laws and regulations and the code of conduct” (Sawyer et al 
2003:1328).  Therefore the audit committee should not assume a decision-
making responsibility but merely acts in an advisory capacity by making 
recommendations to the board of directors (Braiotta 2004:30). 
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The figure below shows the audit committee’s accountability relationship and 
indicates the audit committee’s position in an organisation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The audit committee’s accountability relationship  
(Braiotta 2004:31) 
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According to Braiotta (2004:4-5) and Metz (1993:4), accountability is imposed 
on directors in a number of ways, – including the following: 
 
• Through markets: That is, the impact of consumer dissatisfaction with 
products and services.  Financial markets reflect their evaluation of the 
quality of accountability through the price of equity and debt. 
• Through a body of law, statutory and court-made: Directors can also be 
held personally liable, without limitations, if found guilty of violating their 
duties. 
• Through statutes and regulations enacted by governmental bodies. 
• Through election of directors by shareholders at the company’s annual 
meeting, thereby expecting the long-term success of the company and 
the required accountability.  
• Through the expectations of the general public regarding corporate 
performance, managed by directors, on social and ethical issues.  
 
Since greater accountability is expected from directors and therefore from audit 
committees, it can therefore be argued that the professional development of the 
members of such committees (in order for them to be able to comply with the 
increased demands) becomes imperative. 
 
1.2.3 Personal liability of audit committee members 
 
Increased corporate accountability and the additional rules and regulations 
affecting the responsibilities of audit committees may affect the willingness of 
people to serve on audit committees (Payne 2005).  An international survey 
conducted by KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute (ACI) in 2005/2006 among ACI 
members in the Americas, Europe, South Africa, Asia, Australia and other 
unspecified countries revealed that in South Africa four out of ten respondents 
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indicated that the legal and financial exposure of audit committee members was 
“significantly greater” than for other board members (KPMG 2006b:13).   
 
In particular, directors of larger organisations or “publicly hel[d] corporations 
may be more vulnerable to lawsuits as well as to the increased risk of personal 
liability for any lack of due diligence” (Applegate 2004:66), and therefore “many 
qualified persons may be reluctant to accept a position on a board of directors” 
(Braiotta 2004:9).  According to Applegate (2004:66), there is also a “significant 
risk for lost customers and investors, and also reputation damage”. 
 
Although the board of directors “is ultimately accountable and responsible for 
the performance and affairs of the company”, delegating their authority to the 
audit committee does not mitigate the board’s responsibility (Institute of 
Directors 2002:23).  However, as reflected by the Caremark International case, 
the audit committee needs to demonstrate proactive performance and due 
diligence in the discharge of its oversight responsibilities (Braiotta 2004:400-
401). 
 
The increased liability of audit committee members is a problem that may be 
partly resolved through a proper professional development programme for audit 
committee members. 
  
1.2.4 Unavailability of sufficient induction and professional 
development opportunities for audit committee members 
 
Serving on an audit committee requires a high degree of financial literacy as 
well as competence in the corporate business environment.  Audit committee 
members, and especially newly appointed members, therefore feel the need for 
an induction programme or specific in-house training within the organisations 
they are appointed to (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:79-85).  According to Martinelli 
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(2000:72) and Apostolou and Jeffords (1990:31), no matter how well structured 
the induction programme for new members may be, it usually takes a year or 
even more for them to gain a working knowledge of the organisation’s financial 
reporting system and internal control environment.  In the Fall 2003 issue of 
KPMG’s Audit Committee Quarterly, Marks (2003:42) stated that “while audit 
committee members value the depth and breadth of myriad external programs 
and seminars available, an increasing number of audit committee members are 
also asking for tailored in-house programs”. 
 
The importance of training audit committee members is highlighted by the 
Conference Board Commission of Public Trust and Private Enterprise 
Recommendations (2003:11) which indicated that there should be an induction 
programme for each member of the audit committee, and that existing members 
should participate regularly in continuing education programmes (Burke & Guy 
2002:78; Institute of Directors 2002:63).  In addition, Ernst & Young (2005:9) 
concluded from the results of their audit committee benchmarking survey that 
only half of the respondents provided new audit committee members with a 
comprehensive induction programme, and that 60% of the respondents have 
some form of continuing education.  These committee members predominantly 
use “practical experience for example during meetings”.  Other methods used in 
educating committee members are in-person training sessions with external 
service providers, in-person training with internal resources or training material 
provided via mail.   
 
The results of the survey conducted by Ernst & Young suggest that continuing 
education for audit committee members in South Africa “is an area that needs 
significant improvement if they are to stay in line with best practice and keep up-
to-date with technical developments”.  Another significant concern raised from 
this research that needs to be addressed was that audit committees might not 
have had recent education with regard to International Financial Reporting 
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Standards (IFRS) or the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill. (Ernst & Young 
2005:9.) 
 
Audit committee training can be provided by either an individual or a group of 
training providers.  The training providers could be the external or internal 
auditors, the company secretary, senior management, the executive board 
members or external consultants who could provide the required information.  
However, it is the author’s opinion that, owing to the diversity of training needs 
and information to be dealt with in a changing environment, a specific individual 
or group of individuals cannot attend to all the induction, education and 
development requirements of audit committee members.  It is therefore strongly 
suggested by the author that a combination of training providers would be more 
effective. 
 
According to Terrell and Reed (2003a:66), a well-defined framework should 
allow the audit committee members to receive relevant information, at the right 
time, from the right individual and in the right context, to provide effective 
oversight opportunities. 
 
There is a considerable amount of literature available on best practices for audit 
committees, but according to KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute (KPMG 
2003b:2), “the dynamics of each company, board and audit committee are 
unique - one size does not fit all”.  A generic framework could be suitable for all 
audit committees but individual frameworks should be developed and adapted 
within each organisation to accommodate the unique dynamics and 
environment of the organisation. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that a proper framework for the professional 
development of audit committee members has become a necessity, and 
according to Thayer (2004:2) would be welcomed by most audit committee 
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members, to ensure that they receive appropriate training to help them meet the 
demands placed on modern audit committees. 
 
1.2.5 Increased focus on corporate governance  
 
As the revised Companies Amendment Act 20 of 2004 embraces many of the 
international regulations such as the IFRS, specifically with regard to 
governance and the role of the audit committee, dual-listed South African 
companies, such as Sasol Ltd., Sappi Ltd., Harmony Gold Mining Company 
Ltd., Telkom SA Ltd. and Anglogold Ashanti Ltd, will be required to comply with 
additional regulations such as the recently passed Auditing Profession Bill and 
the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (JSE 2005).    
 
According to the IIA Research Foundation (2004:iii), no event in recent years 
has had a greater effect on audit committee charters, practices and schedules 
than the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  Audit committees are 
required to take on new responsibilities, and therefore they require new types of 
information and services from all parties, including the internal auditors (IIA 
Research Foundation 2004:iii). 
  
The King II Report (2002) on Corporate Governance in South Africa has also 
had a significant impact on the role of the audit committee.  In an interview with 
Mervyn King, Barrier (2003:71) asked him about the criticism in the United 
States of the King II Report.  King emphasised that he considers principles 
more effective than rules as people can circumvent rules more easily and 
recommends that companies need to set a standard at the top for the 
employees to follow.  King also said that “board members need to ask 
‘intelligently naive’ questions, because it helps those who are better informed, to 
think again”. (Barrier 2003:71.)    
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The author is concerned, however, that audit committee members will not know 
what questions to ask if they are not sufficiently knowledgeable about the 
company, the relevant regulations or statutes or about regulatory changes.  The 
increased focus on corporate governance therefore makes proper education of 
audit committee members an imperative. 
 
1.2.6 Time limitation on audit committee members to perform their 
function optimally 
 
“Directors see a clear link between effective boards and directors who make a 
significant commitment of time and energy” (Steinberg 2000:4). 
 
Owing to the increased responsibilities of audit committees, members meet 
more frequently and for longer periods and advanced preparation is required 
(Verschoor 2002:1).  Audit committee members have less time available for 
long formal professional development sessions and, therefore, customised in-
house training programmes could be an ideal means of addressing specific 
professional development needs.  
 
1.2.7 Summary of problems identified 
 
In summary, the main problems to be addressed in this study are: 
• The unavailability of sufficiently skilled people to serve on audit 
committees. 
• The increased accountability of audit committees. 
• The personal liability of audit committee members. 
• The unavailability of sufficient induction and professional development 
opportunities for audit committee members. 
• The increased focus on corporate governance.  
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• The time limitation on audit committee members to perform their function 
optimally. 
 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS STUDY    
 
The overall objective of this study is to identify different ways in which internal 
auditors can add value to their organisations by becoming involved in the 
selection, induction and professional development of audit committee members 
in order for them to better fulfil their responsibilities, to improve their 
performance and to address the problems identified in par 1.2.7.   
 
The overall objective is achieved in accomplishing two secondary objectives: 
Firstly, to determine the ideal personal attributes of audit committee members 
and to suggest a recruitment and selection process, emphasising the role 
internal auditors will play in this process. 
Secondly, to develop a framework for the induction and professional 
development of both new and existing audit committee members, emphasising 
the role that internal auditors will play in this process.   
 
 
1.4 WHO COULD BENEFIT FROM THIS STUDY?    
 
The results of this study improve corporate governance and the ethics and 
reputation of the corporate environment at large.  However, those who would 
benefit directly are organisations, audit committees and internal auditors. 
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1.4.1 Organisations 
 
According to Wagner (2000:3) “in many companies, internal auditing is 
underutilized.  It would be to everyone’s benefit if senior management, boards, 
and audit committees took the time to learn about the value internal auditing 
can bring to the organization and to fully utilize the internal auditing skill sets to 
help achieve organizational objectives”. 
 
Former IIA President, the late William G Bishop III (IIA 2004b:1), stated with 
regard to the internal audit activity: “integral to the organization, but independent 
of the activities they audit, internal auditors are well positioned to provide 
assurance and support to management and the board in helping meet 
organizational goals and objectives”.  These organisational goals and objectives 
need not only be operational or financial, but may include risk management and 
governance.  A strong internal audit activity, with clearly understood roles, is in 
the ideal position to help improve the effectiveness of audit committees (Bishop 
1998:15). 
 
1.4.2 Audit committees 
 
All audit committee members and internal auditors who are prepared to 
recognise the advantages of extending and expanding their relationships and 
interaction with each other could benefit from this study.   Better education of 
audit committees could help improve the performance of audit committee 
members and improved relationships between the audit committee and the 
internal auditors could enhance the quality of corporate governance and 
strengthen the organisational infrastructure (Bishop et al 2000:51).   
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Enhanced professional development will open new horizons for audit committee 
members as they will be empowered with the relevant information and the 
education they need in order to conduct their duties effectively and proactively.   
 
Wagner (2000:1) commented that effective audit committees are deeply 
committed to their role and well-trained audit committee members understand 
that they need to know what is going on.  They continually ask good questions 
and provide good suggestions, and they acknowledge and utilise the invaluable 
contribution that internal auditing provides. 
 
1.4.3 Internal audit activities 
 
As far back as April 2000, Bishop et al (2000:47) suggested that internal 
auditors should step up support and provide broader business experience to 
help audit committee members attain maximum effectiveness.  If the internal 
auditors adapt their assurance and consulting services to include the 
professional development of audit committee members they will be 
acknowledged by audit committees as a powerful source of information.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that the organisation, the audit committee 
members and the internal audit activity can all benefit from the provision of 
additional services by the internal auditors to the audit committee. 
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1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
It should be acknowledged that the internal auditor cannot address all aspects 
with regard to the audit committee’s induction and professional development, 
and that other sources can also make a valuable contribution. 
 
The scope of this study will be limited to the role of the internal audit activity in 
assisting the audit committee to identify and address the professional 
development requirements of its members in order to better fulfil their 
responsibilities and improve their performance. 
 
The developed framework only pertains to the training that will be provided by 
the internal audit activity even though there are many other training providers.   
 
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
A literature review was conducted that focused on the oversight responsibilities 
of audit committees and the professional development they need to comply with 
that responsibility.  International sources were mostly used and the sources 
consulted included published books, articles, professional guidelines and other 
research publications.  Relevant dissertations and theses were also consulted. 
 
The literature study is supplemented by an empirical study whereby a 
questionnaire was completed by audit committee members, chief audit 
executives and the internal auditors (Addendum C) in South Africa in order to 
establish the professional development needs of audit committee members and 
the role the internal audit activity can play in this regard.  Through the empirical 
study, using a qualitative research approach, the author also endeavoured to 
establish the current composition, qualifications and experience of audit 
24 
 
committees in South Africa. The research design and the approach followed 
and the research report are set out in Addendum C. 
 
  
1.7 THE LAYOUT OF THE STUDY 
 
The study consists of six chapters, structured as follows: 
 
In chapter 1 the research problem is formulated and the scope, objectives and 
methodology of the study are described.  This chapter also provides an 
overview of the lay-out of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the historical development, internationally and 
locally, of the audit committee concept. The chapter describes the specific 
functions and responsibilities of audit committees and indicates the ideal 
composition and structure of the committee to ensure optimal performance.  
This is based on the regulatory requirements of the King II Report on Corporate 
Governance in South Africa (2002), the Companies Amendment Act 20 of 2004, 
the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill (2006), the JSE Securities Exchange 
requirements, the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 2001, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee Report (1999) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the 
United States.  The contributing factors enhancing the performance of audit 
committees are considered by examining formal guidelines and requirements, 
as well as international best practices and principles of good governance.  The 
effect of performance measurement and access to adequate resources on the 
improvement of audit committee performance is also considered.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the qualities and personal attributes of audit committee 
members and the recruitment and selection process.  The chapter provides 
insight into the importance of selecting audit committee members who are 
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professional, properly qualified, independent, experienced, informed and able to 
make a valuable contribution to the company they are appointed to.  The 
recruitment of audit committee members and the process by which they are 
appointed are addressed.  The contributions of proper recruitment and selection 
processes towards easing the professional development of audit committee 
members are demonstrated.  The outcomes of the empirical study (Addendum 
C) are analysed to obtain information with regard to the current composition of 
audit committees and the qualifications and experience of committee members. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the role and responsibilities of internal audit activities in 
providing assistance to audit committees and the methods that internal auditors 
can apply in order to assist audit committees. A practical guideline or general 
framework (Addendum D) is developed to assist internal auditors in providing 
value-added services to audit committees.   
 
Chapter 5 researches the induction and professional development 
requirements of audit committee members.  The outcomes of the empirical 
study (Addendum C) are analysed to obtain information with regard to the 
following:   
• Whether audit committees in South Africa have an induction and/or 
professional development programme in place and who facilitates such 
programmes.  
• What the professional development needs of audit committees in South 
Africa are. 
The role of the internal audit activity in providing induction and professional 
development services are explored in order to develop a framework (Addendum 
D) to be used by the internal audit activity in providing consulting services to the 
audit committee.  
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Chapter 6 summarises the study conducted, with conclusions, 
recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
 
 
1.8 REFERENCE TECHNIQUE 
 
The reference technique is based on the Harvard method as described in 
Burger (1992:21-76).  Note that direct quotations longer than five lines are 
indented with the use of a smaller font to distinguish them from summaries. 
 
 
1.9 DEFINITION OF THE WORDS AND PHRASES FREQUENTLY USED 
IN THE STUDY 
  
1.9.1  The audit committee 
 
An audit committee is a standing committee of the board of directors created to 
provide an oversight function on behalf of the board with regard to the financial 
reporting process, the system of internal control, the audit process, risk 
management and governance process, and the company’s process for 
monitoring compliance with laws and regulations and the code of conduct 
(Sawyer et al 2003:1328). 
 
1.9.2  The Board 
 
Except where otherwise stated, “the Board” refers to the board of directors, the 
audit committees of such board, the head of an agency or legislative body to 
whom internal auditors report, the board of governors or trustees of a nonprofit 
organisation, or any other designated governing bodies or organisations (IIA 
2004c:25). 
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1.9.3 The internal audit activity 
 
The internal audit activity is a department, division or section established within 
an organisation, or externally contracted consultants.  The role and 
responsibility of the internal audit activity is contained in the definition of internal 
auditing, in that they provide independent, objective assurance and consulting 
services designed to add value and improve an organisation’s operations.  It 
helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, 
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control and governance processes. (IIA 2004c:8.) 
 
1.9.4 Professional Practice Framework, Internal Auditing Standards and 
Code of Ethics 
 
The Professional Practices Framework (PPF) was approved by the Institute of 
Internal Auditor's Board of Directors in June 1999. This framework provides a 
fundamental guide of how a body of knowledge and practical guidance can be 
integrated.  The framework contains the definition of internal auditing, the Code 
of Ethics and the Standards. The Institute of Internal Auditors’ (IIA) International 
Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards) 
represent the practice of internal auditing as it should be; the Code of Ethics 
sets forth standards of conduct for IIA members. 
 
Compliance with all the elements in the framework is mandatory for all the 
members of the Institute of Internal Auditors. The public sector in South Africa is 
required by the Public Finance and Management Act to comply with the 
standards described in this Framework. (Unisa 2005:14-16.) 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORY, RESPONSIBILITIES AND BEST PRACTICES OF AUDIT 
COMMITTEES 
 
 
 
“The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in 
moments of comfort, but where he stands at times of challenge and 
controversy.” 
 (Martin Luther King, Jr in Quoteland.com 2005) 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Before the study can identify the professional development needs of audit 
committee members it is important to consider the historical development of 
audit committees, to gain a proper understanding of the requirements of audit 
committees. 
 
Audit committees have evolved over the last ten years from an informal 
committee with few defined responsibilities to a more critically important 
committee with growing responsibilities (Soltani 2005:19).  The overview of the 
history of the audit committee concept described in this chapter will reflect this 
evolution. 
 
Many audit committees are seen to operationalise their new responsibilities by 
asking more questions, having more meetings, insisting on more education, and 
often, receiving more “homework”, as reflected by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) (2005:i-ii).  Although an audit committee is defined by Burke and Guy 
(2002:4) as “a standing committee of the board of directors that is charged, at a 
minimum, with overseeing the integrity of the company’s financial reporting 
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processes”, Braiotta (2004:44) comments that the role and responsibilities of 
audit committees in most companies are expanding because of their valuable 
contribution to the board of directors and to management.  Audit committees will 
therefore need to be more alert to the specific changes impacting their oversight 
functions and responsibilities.  Also, audit committees need to meet the 
challenges of constantly changing business conditions, where “every action is 
scrutinized and every decision has consequences” (Deloitte 2004:2).  
 
In determining what role the internal audit activity should play in the induction 
and professional development of audit committee members, this chapter will 
furthermore examine and explore the specific functions and responsibilities of 
the audit committee within an organisation.   
 
As the audit committee charter or terms of reference is considered to be the 
“heart of an audit committee” (IIA 2005:3), it will be used as the basis in 
identifying the responsibilities of a specific audit committee in an organisation.  
By using the charter as a reference, the internal audit activity could assess the 
audit committee’s needs and requirements and consequently be able to 
address their need for information and/or training.  The principles of good 
governance and international best practices are considered and examined to 
discover the audit committee’s role in ensuring a transparent and objective 
governance process within its organisation.   
 
In performing their diligent oversight function and discharging their 
responsibilities, audit committees also need to assess and improve their own 
performance.  They should be empowered with the authority and necessary 
resources to protect stakeholder interests and, in effect, contribute to reliable 
financial reporting, effective internal controls, risk management and governance 
processes (DeZoort 2002:2).  The chapter will therefore examine the audit 
committee’s access to resources in order to function optimally.   
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This chapter also discusses the factors that might help to enhance the 
performance of audit committees and achieve the objectives reflected in their 
audit committee charter.  The need for a framework is further explored in 
establishing best practices and adopting good governance principles within all 
organisations in South Africa. 
 
 
2.2 HISTORY OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE CONCEPT 
 
The concept of establishing audit committees started in 1939, when a report 
from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) suggested that, “where applicable, 
the selection of the [independent] auditors by a special committee composed of 
directors who are not officers of the company seems desirable”. (Sawyer et al 
2003:1323).  In 1940 the NYSE endorsed the audit committee concept.  Shortly 
afterwards the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as a result of the 
investigation of McKesson & Robbins, Inc., recommended that outside 
members of the board of directors nominate the external auditors and, in turn, 
the shareholders elect the public accounting firm. (Burke & Guy 2002:17.) 
 
In 1967 the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) also 
recommended that all publicly held companies form audit committees consisting 
of outside directors to nominate the external auditor and to discuss the auditor’s 
work (Burke & Guy 2002:17). 
 
Since 1970 the role of the audit committee has received more attention, as a 
result of the Watergate investigation, corporate scandals and bankruptcies, 
which have placed greater emphasis on corporate accountability to increase 
public confidence in the quality of financial reporting (Braiotta 2004:438). 
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In Canada, the Business Corporation Act of 1970 made it obligatory for the 
directors of a corporation offering securities to the public to establish audit 
committees composed of no fewer than three directors, with a majority of 
outside directors (Sawyer et al 2003:1323). 
 
Then, in 1972, the SEC also required that all publicly held companies should 
establish audit committees composed of outside directors, and in 1974 
amended the proxy disclosure requirements to mandate that companies should 
identify the names of the members of their audit committees or otherwise 
indicate that no such committee existed.  In 1978 this requirement was 
expanded to include a description of the audit committee’s function. (Burke & 
Guy 2002:9-17.) 
 
In January 1977, the NYSE adopted an “Audit Committee Policy Statement”, 
which stated that, “each domestic company with common stock listed on the 
Exchange, as a condition of listing and continued listing of its securities on the 
Exchange, shall establish no later than June 30, 1978 and maintain thereafter 
an audit committee comprised solely of directors independent of management 
and free from any relation that, in the opinion of the board of directors, would 
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member” 
(Sawyer et al 2003:1324).  In the United Kingdom the Cadbury Committee 
Report of 1992 also recommended that all companies should establish and 
maintain an audit committee (Cadbury Report 1992:4.35; Van der Nest 
2005:76).  
 
Important research has been conducted by Marx (1992) on the development 
and functioning of the audit committee in South Africa as well as Van der Merwe 
(1996) on the influence of the audit committee on the external audit process.  In 
another development in South Africa, the King Report on Corporate 
Governance of 1994 recommended that audit committees should be 
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established for all companies. The King Report focused on the independence of 
the audit committee and indicated the value of a strong internal audit function. 
(Van der Nest 2005:76.)  The JSE Securities Exchange also requires that all 
listed companies should appoint an audit committee (Cascarino & Van Esch 
2007:190; JSE 2003:21.6).  This is similarly required of public entities by the 
Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (SA 1999:s 38).  The second King 
Report (King II) of 2002 emphasised the fact that the audit committee is an 
important committee of the board with increased responsibility in its oversight of 
the control and risk management systems (Van der Nest 2005:76). 
 
In 2001, however, the Institute of Directors in their commentary on the draft 
King II Report, expressed a concern with regard to a possible overload on the 
audit committee in terms of the increased delegation of responsibilities from the 
board of directors (Van der Nest 2005:76).  In this regard Richards (2001:2) 
commented that “traditionally the audit committee has focused on history 
through its reviews of financial statements, results of audits, and annual 
disclosures.  The paradigm shift for the audit committee comes when it focuses 
on the future by being attuned to organizational changes that can affect the 
overall control and risk management processes.”   The appointment of an audit 
committee was only a recommendation of the King II Report, but it is currently a 
statutory requirement since the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill (2006) requires 
that companies that are able to offer their shares to the public (widely held 
companies), including but not limited to public listed companies, will be obliged 
to appoint audit committees (National Treasury 2006:s 269A).  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, however, prescribed additional 
responsibilities for audit committees and specifically for the chief audit 
executives (CAEs). The Act also requires audit committees to be responsible for 
the appointment, compensation, independence and oversight of the outside 
independent auditor. The Act further requires that audit committee members 
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should be independent, and at least one member should be considered a 
“financial expert”.  If no member is a financial expert, the company should 
disclose the reason for this. (Sawyer et al 2003:1325-1326.)  Designating 
someone as the audit committee’s financial expert does not impose any 
additional duties, obligation or liability other than those of the other audit 
committee members, nor does it affect the duties, obligations, or liability of the 
audit committee members not designated as the audit committee financial 
expert (PWC 2004:12). 
 
The Corporate Laws Amendment Bill (2006) requires, however, that companies 
that are able to offer their shares to the public (widely held companies), 
including but not limited to public listed companies, will be obliged to appoint 
audit committees. The role and function of the audit committee is stated in Sec 
269A as “a committee of the board of directors primarily established to provide 
additional assurance regarding the quality and reliability of both the financial 
information used by the board, and the financial statements issued by the 
company”. (National Treasury 2006:s 269A.) 
 
 
2.3 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUDIT COMMITTEES  
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
As previously noted, appointing an audit committee is a requirement of the JSE 
Securities Exchange for all listed companies (Cascarino & Van Esch 2007:190; 
JSE 2003:21.6) as well as the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) for 
public entities (SA 1999:s 38).   
 
Even though the recommendations of the King II Report on Corporate 
Governance are voluntary, the JSE Securities Exchange requires listed 
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companies to adhere to the recommendations, or otherwise indicate the extent 
to which they have been deviated from (Wixley & Everingham 2002:8).  The 
Public Finance Management Act, however stipulates that all the organisations in 
the public sector must comply with the recommendations of the King II Report 
(Wixley & Everingham 2002:8). 
 
It is therefore recommended that all South African companies should consider 
applying the Code of Corporate Practice and Conduct as far as it is relevant to 
their organisation, although essentially the Code is mandatory for the following 
organisations, termed as “affected companies” (Jackson & Stent 2007:4/7; 
Wixley & Everingham 2002:8): 
 
• Companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange. 
• Banks, financial and insurance institutions.  
• Public sector enterprises falling under the Public Finance Management 
Act and the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Act, 
including any state departments acting in terms of the Constitution or 
legislation. 
 
The King II Report’s model terms of reference for board committees (Institute of 
Directors 2002:186) requires that audit committees should at a minimum “assist 
the board in discharging its duties relating to the safeguarding of assets, the 
operation of adequate systems, control processes and the preparation of 
accurate financial reporting and statements in compliance with all applicable 
legal requirements and accounting standards”.   
 
In order for audit committees to achieve their objectives and meet the 
expectations of all stakeholders it is imperative that they adhere to the principles 
of good governance.  The specific responsibilities of audit committees differ 
from organisation to organisation and are depicted in the audit committee 
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charter (Addendum A provides the Model Audit Committee Charter as published 
on the website of the Institute of Internal Auditors). 
 
According to Cascarino and Van Esch (2005:179), creating and sustaining an 
effective audit committee could be beneficial to the organisation and its 
management by – 
 
• improving the effectiveness of communication and increasing the 
contact and understanding between management, internal auditors and 
external auditors; 
• reviewing the performance of internal and external auditors, thus 
increasing independence and accountability in terms of engagement  
services; 
• facilitating the imposition of discipline, risk management and control, 
thus reducing the existence and opportunity for fraud and errors; and 
• strengthening the objectivity and credibility of the financial reporting 
process, risk management, governance processes and control. 
 
2.3.2 Principles of good governance affecting the role and purpose of 
audit committees 
 
“Governance is the system or process by which an organisation’s executive 
management governs and controls the organisation in achieving its objectives in 
a sustainable manner within an environment of accountability to its 
stakeholders.  It is leadership with integrity” (Soltani 2005:5).  Good corporate 
governance is the ability of an organisation to balance the needs of all the 
identified stakeholders in that organisation through sound financial, social, 
ethical and environmental business practices (Unisa 2007:41).  
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Figure 2.1: The corporate governance table depicts corporate governance as a 
table standing on four legs that represent the board of directors, executive 
management, the external auditors and the internal auditors.  This depiction 
implies that all four parties are considered equally important in contributing to 
the success of corporate governance and furthermore that they are all 
necessary if the “table” is not to collapse.  It further suggests that these four 
parties should work together in achieving the overall objectives of the 
organisation and at the same time exercise good governance principles.  One of 
the primary objectives of an audit committee is to promote good governance in 
an organisation. 
 
Figure 2.1: The corporate governance table  
(Adamec et al 2005:43) 
 
The above depiction of corporate governance suggests that when all four 
parties are working together with a healthy interdependence, internal controls 
are strong, reporting is accurate, ethics are maintained, oversight is effective, 
risks are mitigated, and investments are protected. “Good governance is simply 
good business.” (IIA 2003:2.) 
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The Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees (Blue Ribbon Report 1999:20) acknowledges that “good 
governance promotes relationships of accountability among the primary 
corporate participants to enhance corporate performance and that it holds 
management accountable to the board and the board accountable to the 
shareholders.  The oversight function is typically delegated by the full board to 
the audit committee”.  According to Soltani (2005:5), “the audit committee is 
created as part of the corporate governance process, a process that is the 
cornerstone of shareholder protection”.  Even though good corporate 
governance cannot guarantee success or even prevent failure, it should ensure 
proper control and risk management processes, accountability and 
transparency, thus serving the best interests of the shareholders (Wixley & 
Everingham 2002:6). 
 
Mervyn King (Barrier 2003:71) considers a set of rules less effective than 
guiding principles, and therefore, in South Africa, the King II Report of 2002 was 
adopted as a Code of Corporate Practice and Conduct to guide companies in 
exercising good corporate governance.   
 
The King ll Report (2002:11-12) identifies seven characteristics of good 
corporate governance that should also in effect be adopted by the 
organisation’s audit committee and describes them as follows: 
 
• Discipline 
 
Corporate discipline is a commitment by a company’s senior management to 
adhere to behaviour in a way that is universally recognised and accepted be to 
correct and proper. This encompasses a company’s awareness of and 
commitment to the underlying principles of good governance, particularly at 
senior management level. 
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• Transparency  
 
Transparency is the ease with which an outsider is able to make a meaningful 
analysis of a company’s actions, its economic fundamentals and the non-
financial aspects pertinent to that business. This is a measure of how 
successful management is at making information available in a candid, accurate 
and timely manner - not only the audit data but also general reports and press 
releases. It reflects whether or not investors obtain a true picture of what is 
happening inside the company. 
 
• Independence  
 
Independence is the extent to which mechanisms have been put in place to 
minimise or avoid potential conflicts of interest that may exist, such as the 
dominance of a strong chief executive or large shareowner. These mechanisms 
range from the composition of the board, to appointments to committees of the 
board, and external parties such as the auditors.  The decisions made, and 
internal processes established, should be objective and not allow for undue 
influences. 
 
• Accountability 
 
Individuals or groups in a company, who make decisions and take actions on 
specific issues, need to be accountable for their decisions and actions.  
Mechanisms must exist and be effective to allow for accountability.  These 
mechanisms provide investors with the means to query and assess the actions 
of the board and its committees. 
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• Responsibility  
 
With regard to management, responsibility pertains to behaviour that allows for 
corrective action and for penalising mismanagement.  Responsible 
management would, when necessary, put measures in place to set the 
company on the right path.  While the board is accountable to the company, it 
must act responsively to and with responsibility towards all stakeholders of the 
company. 
 
• Fairness 
 
The systems that exist within the company must be balanced in taking into 
account all those who have an interest in the company and its future. The rights 
of various groups have to be acknowledged and respected. For example, 
minority shareowner interests must receive equal consideration to those of the 
dominant shareowner(s). 
 
• Social responsibility 
 
A well-managed company will be aware of, and respond to, social issues, 
placing a high priority on ethical standards. A good corporate citizen is 
increasingly being seen as one who is non-discriminatory, non-exploitative, and 
responsible with regard to environmental and human rights issues.  A company 
is likely to experience indirect economic benefits such as improved productivity 
and corporate reputation by taking those factors into consideration. 
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Taking the above into consideration and to further ensure good governance, the 
following governance principles specifically with regard to audit committees 
were acknowledged and promoted by the Blue Ribbon Committee (KPMG 
2003a:3) and the Institute of Directors and KPMG’s Audit Committee Forum 
(ACF 2006b:1) and should also be acknowledged when designing a 
professional development programme for the audit committee: 
 
• Recognize that the dynamics of each company, board and audit committee 
are unique – one size does not fit all. 
• The board must ensure that the audit committee comprises the “right” 
individuals to provide independent and objective oversight. 
• The board and audit committee must continually assert that, and assess 
whether, the “tone at the top” embodies insistence on integrity and accuracy 
in financial reporting. 
• The audit committee must demand and continually reinforce the “direct 
responsibility” of the external auditor to the board and audit committee as 
representatives of the shareholders (as is now required by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act). 
• Audit committees must implement a process that supports their 
understanding and monitoring of the: 
 Specific role and effectiveness of the audit committee in relation to the 
specific roles of the other participant in the financial reporting process 
(oversight); 
 Critical financial reporting (and related) risks; 
 Effectiveness of financial reporting and other internal controls; 
 Independence, accountability and effectiveness of the external and 
internal auditor 
 Transparency of financial reporting and disclosure.  
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The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX 2003:11) recognises the corporate 
governance principles listed below.  A company should – 
 
• recognise and publish the respective roles and responsibilities in order to 
lay a solid foundation for management and board oversight in a charter 
• structure the board in having an effective composition, size and 
commitment to add value and adequately discharge its responsibilities 
and duties 
• actively promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
• have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the 
company’s financial reporting 
• promote timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters 
concerning the company 
• respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of 
those rights 
• establish a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal 
control 
• fairly review and actively encourage enhanced board and management 
effectiveness 
• ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and 
reasonable and that its relationship to corporate and individual 
performance is defined 
• recognise legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders. 
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Taking the preceding good governance principles into consideration the author 
suggests the following checklist for audit committees to determine whether they 
are complying with the principles of good governance: 
 
• The audit committee members should accept the role of the audit 
committee within the dynamics of the organisation and its uniqueness 
and reveal discipline and a commitment to execute the oversight 
responsibility of the committee according to a formal charter. 
• The audit committee should be so structured that it is a balanced 
committee comprising independent individuals with an adequate level of 
knowledge, skills and experience; furthermore the committee should be 
of the right size to add value and discharge its responsibilities effectively. 
• The audit committee should promote ethical behaviour within the 
organisation and the audit committee itself and continuously maintain the 
tone at top to guarantee the integrity and accuracy of financial reporting. 
• The audit committee should commit to performance based remuneration 
and the performance of individuals as well as of the committee itself 
should be regularly reviewed to enhance effectiveness. 
• The audit committee should acknowledge their accountability and 
recognise their legal and other obligations to all stakeholders and respect 
the rights of shareholders. 
• The audit committee should promote transparency by encouraging the 
timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters. 
• The audit committee should promote responsible decision-making by 
using a risk-based oversight approach and establishing sound 
management and internal control systems. 
 
The following section explores the audit committee charter in detail to ensure a 
better understanding of the scope and extent of the responsibilities of audit 
committees.  
   45 
 
2.3.3 Specific functions and responsibilities of audit committees depicted 
in the audit committee charter 
 
It is important for audit committee members to have a guideline or reference 
with regard to their duties and responsibilities so that they are able to perform 
their duties well.  This guideline should provide a roadmap for the actual work to 
be performed.  A good audit committee charter or terms of reference organises 
the committee members' responsibilities, providing a systematic structure for 
discussions between the committee and management, the external auditor and 
others. (Bean 1999:1.)  It is therefore important for any audit committee to 
establish a formal written charter that clearly sets out guidelines for the duties of 
the committee versus those of the full board.  The charter must be approved by 
the board of directors and should be reviewed and assessed annually to reflect 
any changes that may affect the audit committee’s responsibilities (Burke & Guy 
2002:68; ACF 2006a:3).  Leading practices also suggest that the audit 
committee charter should be disclosed on the company’s website in order to 
give all stakeholders ready access to the information (Bromilow & Berlin 
2005:101). 
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee recommendation (Blue Ribbon Report 1999:26-27) 
with regard to board committee charters identified: 
 
“a key attribute of a good board as its own diligence in defining the board’s role, 
responsibilities, structure, and processes.  An effective board is self-aware and 
determines how best to carry out its important tasks.  Likewise, a 
wellfunctioning audit committee will be concerned about and spend a significant 
amount of time defining the scope of its oversight responsibilities and how it 
discharges its duties.  Just as good boards often adopt formal guidelines on 
how they should operate a good audit committee should memorialize its 
understanding of its role, responsibilities, and processes in a charter. In 
focusing its activities on oversight of the entire reporting process, the committee 
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will be more likely to recognize those duties better left to management, 
including the internal auditor and the outside auditors …”  
 
According to Brodsky, Grochowski, Baker and Huber (2003:3) and Weber 
(2004:4), a carefully constructed audit committee charter should – 
 
• delineate responsibilities of the board and those of the audit committee 
• serve as a guideline in setting the audit committee’s meeting agendas 
• cover important areas such as the audit committee structure, processes 
and membership requirements incorporate new legal and exchange 
requirements 
• assert the committee’s authority to hire and fire internal auditors and 
external advisers to the audit committee 
• serve as a basis for the audit committee’s self-evaluation process 
• be regularly reviewed and updated, usually on an annual basis to ensure 
that the committee’s objectives are met, and 
• be disclosed to shareholders to promote transparency. 
  
The charter should not include unnecessary information; or items should be 
limited to the actual role and responsibilities the audit committee should execute 
and their objectives should be achievable, not to subject members to future 
liability (KPMG 2006a:3). 
 
According to the SEC (Burke & Guy 2002:68; Lundelius 2003:1-2), the audit 
committee charter must specify the following: 
 
• The purpose of the audit committee and its authority in relation to the 
board of directors. 
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• The scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities, and how it carries out 
those activities and responsibilities, including the structure, processes, 
and composition requirements of the committee. 
• That the external and internal auditor is ultimately accountable to the 
board of directors and the audit committee. 
• That the board of directors and the audit committee have the authority 
and responsibility to select, evaluate and replace the external auditor. 
• That the audit committee is responsible for ensuring the auditor submits 
a formal written statement regarding relationships and services which 
may affect objectivity and independence. 
• That the audit committee is responsible for actively engaging in a 
dialogue with the external auditor about the above disclosure that may 
affect the independence of the auditor and for recommending that the 
board take appropriate action to ensure the auditor’s independence. 
 
The sample audit committee charter provided by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (Inc) (Addendum A) is an extensive document that captures many of 
the responsibilities and best practices used by audit committees today. Of 
course, no sample charter encompasses all activities that might be appropriate 
to a particular audit committee, nor will all activities identified in a sample 
charter be relevant to every committee.  Accordingly, this charter must be 
tailored to each organisation’s needs and governing rules. 
 
A sample audit committee charter as adopted from the IIA is presented in 
Addendum A. 
 
In addition to adhering to corporate governance principles and achieving the 
objectives as set out in the audit committee charter, the committee needs to 
ensure that they function optimally and also continuously improve their 
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performance.  The next section will therefore deal with factors that could 
enhance audit committee effectiveness. 
 
 
2.4 BEST PRACTICES AFFECTING THE ENHANCEMENT OF AUDIT 
COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
The audit committee needs to benchmark their performance against leading 
best practices and global trends in order to enhance their performance and also 
need to consider their current composition and structure and decide whether 
they have access to adequate resources to perform their function.  
Benchmarking the audit committee performance and the composition and 
structure of the audit committee are contributory factors to the enhancement of 
audit committee effectiveness.    
 
2.4.2 Performance measurement 
 
In order to improve the performance of audit committees and to identify 
inefficiency as well as opportunities to enhance effectiveness, global best 
practices should be adopted by audit committees in meeting their financial 
oversight and governance responsibilities (Leblanc Diagnostics 2005:6). The 
effectiveness of audit committees could be improved by benchmarking their 
performance against best practices of other audit committees.  Benchmarking is 
defined as a continuous process of comparing or measuring performance and 
practices against the performance of organisations in a similar industry or 
organisations that are recognised as industry leaders (Harvey 2004).  
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After comparing the audit committee’s performance with best practices of other 
audit committees, input could also be obtained from the chairperson of the 
board of directors, senior management, the chief audit executive and the 
external auditor with regard to the committee’s efficiency and effectiveness.  
Burke and Guy (2002:246) state that the main purpose of obtaining this 
information with regard to the audit committee’s performance is to –  
 
1. appraise the current status and performance of the audit committee in 
terms of their duties, responsibilities and activities as reflected in their 
charter 
2. ascertain where the audit committee should be, after comparison with 
leading best practices, with reference to the charter.  Also indicate the 
resources needed to achieve the objectives and execute the functions of 
the audit committee 
3. identify any shortcomings or obstacles in getting from their current 
performance (1) to the required performance (2) 
4. develop a proposed action or strategic plan and set a timetable for the 
required changes as well as the persons responsible for each activity 
5. present these findings and recommendations with regard to the 
improvement of audit committee performance to the board of directors. 
 
Although the conduct of performance evaluations is generally considered to be 
difficult, the process has the following benefits, as identified by Wilkinson 
(2006:12): 
 
• It is the most effective way of making performance expectations clear. 
• It clarifies whether audit committee composition is appropriate. 
• It improves the relations between the board, audit committee and 
management. 
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• It prevents powerful personalities from exercising overall control and 
evading checks and balances. 
• It identifies strengths and weaknesses. 
• It identifies shortcoming in professional development and education. 
 
Audit committee performance is, however, also dependent on other factors, 
such as the committee’s composition, systems and structure and the feedback 
received through performance assessments and training provided (Epstein, 
Jones & Roy 2002:16).  Bromilow and Berlin (2005:103) state that most 
effective audit committees also evaluate the performance of individual 
committee members by assessing their “objectivity and independence, insight, 
tenacity, judgment, communication skills, understanding of the company’s 
business, understanding of and commitment to the duties and responsibilities of 
the audit committee, willingness to devote the time necessary to prepare for and 
participate in the committee’s deliberations, and attendance at meetings”.  
 
From the individual audit committee appraisals, any shortcomings with regard to 
the composition of the committee in terms of knowledge and skills, 
independence or diversity could be determined.  New members could either be 
recruited or existing members could be counselled or even replaced.  Any 
additional professional development requirements or resources needed could 
also be identified and corrective action taken (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:103-104). 
The following schematic representation in figure 2.2, “Determinants of audit 
committee performance”, shows the effect of these factors on the audit 
committee’s performance and eventually the company’s overall performance.  It 
demonstrates the importance of inputs and processes as well as adequate 
feedback information in order to improve the audit committee‘s effectiveness. 
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Figure 2.2: Determinants of audit committee performance 
(Adapted from Epstein et al 2002:6) 
 
The critical success factors or keys with regard to the “input” or audit committee 
composition consist of the following (Epstein et al 2002:16): 
 
• Independence. 
• Ethics. 
• Knowledge, skills and experience. 
• Personal attributes of individual members. 
• Selection process for new audit committee members. 
 
These factors as they relate to individual audit committee members will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
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The keys with regard to the “processes” or the audit committee structure and 
systems consist of the following (Epstein et al 2002:16): 
 
• Audit committee chairman. 
• Non-executive directors. 
• Diversity of skills and knowledge. 
• Size of the audit committee. 
• Rotation of members. 
 
The keys with regard to the “processes” or the audit committee systems consist 
of the following (Epstein et al 2002:16): 
 
• Productive meetings. 
• Adequate induction and professional development process. 
• Information or resource availability. 
• Effective succession planning. 
• Open communication and reporting systems. 
• Effective performance evaluation systems. 
 
The output or the result will then be the audit committee’s effectiveness in 
performing this oversight function and the ultimate effect on the organisation’s 
performance.  In order to enhance or improve the committee’s performance, 
there should be a comprehensive assessment as well as an adequate feedback 
process to ensure that inefficiencies can be addressed either through training or 
by changing the composition of the audit committee and also to lay a foundation 
for future improvement (AICPA 2004:103). 
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Ernst & Young (2005:1) stated that there are currently adequate global 
benchmarks and measures available for measuring audit committee 
performance and progress.  However, in South Africa, the effects and 
implementation of the King II Report on audit committee performance have not 
been clearly measured or the results reported.  Mahadeva (2005:8) indicates 
that formal board evaluations, which used to be a rarity in most companies, are 
increasingly being made a requirement in the United States and United 
Kingdom corporate arena.  However, the regulatory bodies have provided little 
guidance on how these evaluations should be performed.  He suggests that this 
process should be customised for individual companies and that it cannot be a 
case of “one size fits all”. (Mahadeva 2005:8.) 
 
In a recent survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2005:2), it was indicated by 
more than half of the respondents that the compensation paid to audit 
committee members in South Africa is proportionate to their responsibilities and 
the associated risk involved with their position.  It is however recommended by 
the King II Report (2002:27, 29) that a substantial portion of executive directors’ 
compensation should be performance based and that evaluation of 
performance should be done at least annually through self-assessment.  It is 
further suggested that share options be granted to non-executive directors, 
subject to prior approval by the shareholders. International recommendations 
reflect a preference towards the granting of shares rather than share options.  
However, the assessment should not just be a checklist for compliance with 
rules and regulations; instead it should focus on evaluating the effectiveness of 
the committee and the individual audit committee members (ACF 2006b:1).   
 
KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute (KPMG 2003a:2) recommends a well-
thought-out evaluation process, to be conducted in an open and constructive 
manner, in order to allow all the stakeholders to benefit from the individual and 
collective insight, knowledge, and experience of all the audit committee 
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members.  The process should also determine how effectively and faithfully 
individuals have carried out their roles and responsibility (Mahadeva 2005:8). 
 
Research recently conducted by Ernst & Young through an Audit Committee 
Benchmarking Survey indicated that one-third of the audit committees in South 
Africa do not evaluate their effectiveness.  The remaining two-thirds of the 
respondents indicated that they used a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative means of measurement. (Monteiro 2005:2.)  The empirical study 
(Addendum C) reflected that only 34.8% of the respondents are subjected to 
periodic performance evaluations, and of these respondents 66.7% undergo 
annual evaluations, 16.7% bi-annual evaluations and 16.7% were uncertain.  
Performance evaluation methods used in these instances are surveys, self-
evaluations and external evaluations.    
 
KPMG’s Audit Committee Forum (ACF 2006b:1) suggests that a structured and 
formal assessment can help to ensure that the audit committee delivers on its 
mandate or charter and continuously enhances its contribution to the 
functioning of the board.  The following methods, singly or in combination, could 
be used to evaluate audit committee performance: 
 
• Obtain formal feedback from the board, CEO, CFO, compliance officer, 
internal and external auditors (Auditnet 2006:1). 
• Compare audit committee activities against the committee’s charter or 
formal written procedures (Monteiro 2005:2). 
• Completing self-assessment surveys (Auditnet 2006:1). 
• Peer review or peer comparisons (Monteiro 2005:2). 
• Obtain an assessment of the contributions and performance of individual 
audit committee members by the chairperson of the audit committee 
(Auditnet 2006:1). 
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• Compare audit committee’s activities against leading best practices 
(bench-marking) (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:101). 
• Assessments by the governance or nominating committee of the board 
(ACF 2006b:1). 
• Compare current practices against a review of current literature on audit 
committee best practices (Richards 2001:2). 
• Balanced scorecard approach (Epstein et al 2002:3). 
 
Certain areas for assessment were extracted from the recommendations made 
by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) with regard 
to the audit committee’s effectiveness.  These reports emphasised that boards 
of directors are expected to evaluate the following factors or areas for 
assessment in terms of audit committee performance. (Bromilow & Berlin 
2005:103; IIA 2005:3; PWC 2005:14; Wixley & Everingham 2002:51.): 
 
• Independence of the audit committee from executive management and 
the organisation. 
• The audit committee’s key role in the areas of comprehension, 
communication and oversight regarding the financial statements, risk 
management, internal controls, compliance, ethics, management, 
internal auditing, external auditing, resources and special investigations. 
• Independent communication and information flow between the audit 
committee and the internal auditor – especially in relation to internal 
controls. 
• Independent communication and information flow between the audit 
committee and the external auditor – free from any threats to the 
auditor’s objectivity. 
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• The audit committee’s understanding of the committee’s mission, roles 
and responsibilities, and the committee direction as outlined in the 
charter.  
• The audit committee’s understanding and acceptance of the specific role 
and responsibilities of the committee in relation to the board. 
• The audit committee’s composition includes a proper mix of financial, 
legal and other relevant experience, or otherwise recruits the appropriate 
talent to strengthen the composition. 
• New audit committee members are provided with a comprehensive 
induction programme. 
• A relationship of mutual trust and respect exists between the audit 
committee and all other relevant parties, while at the same time a spirit of 
healthy scepticism is maintained. 
• The audit committee’s interaction and involvement with the external 
auditors, internal auditors and management. 
• The audit committee’s interaction with key members of financial 
management, including the CFO and the chief accounting officer. 
• The audit committee raises the right questions and pursues the answers 
with management and the auditors, including questions that indicate an 
understanding of critical accounting policies and judgmental accounting 
estimates. 
• The audit committee’s responsiveness to the issues raised by the 
internal and external auditors. 
• The audit committee members receive adequate training and education 
by appropriate parties to enable them to stay current on all business, 
financial, operational and regulatory matters. 
• The audit committee receives notice of meetings well in advance, with 
complete, clear and concise agendas and supporting materials.  
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• All audit committee members have adequate opportunities to discuss 
issues of importance and to ask probing or challenging questions of 
relevant parties. 
• The audit committee is kept informed of significant matters, whether they 
are operational, financial or regulatory, that affect the organisation. 
• The audit committee maintains an appropriate balance between meeting 
time, preparation time and discussions on issues. 
• The audit committee reports meaningful results to the board in a clear, 
concise and timely manner. 
• Executive sessions with management, the internal audit, and the external 
audit are kept confidential by all audit committee members. 
• The outcome of previous self-assessments and the stage of maturity of 
the audit committee. 
• The overall performance of the audit committee members in terms of 
their terms of reference is satisfactory. 
 
Epstein et al (2002:3-4) suggest that the balanced scorecard approach, 
illustrated in figure 2.3, is an effective method of measuring and managing 
corporate performance and could be used in the same way in evaluating board 
or audit committee performance.  The balanced scorecard is useful in 
“developing the objectives, goals, systems, and metrics to help align strategy, 
actions, and performance” with regard to the audit committee’s role and 
responsibilities.  This will in effect ensure accountability to the various 
stakeholders and improved corporate governance and transparency.  In order to 
implement a successful performance measurement system, strategic objectives 
and critical success factors need to be identified in advance. 
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According to Epstein et al (2002:20-21), the above schematic representation 
represents the four dimensions of the audit committee’s responsibility with 
regard to the core values of the organisation, which are the – 
 
• financial dimension 
• stakeholder dimension 
• internal business processes dimension 
• learning and growth dimension 
 
For each of these dimensions of the balanced score card the audit committee 
should identify strategic objectives, measures to accomplish these objectives, 
targets and the key performance indicators or drivers to achieve the objectives.  
Ernst & Young (2004:9) suggest that the audit committee’s value-adding 
activities could be assessed by measuring their performance against expected 
results, namely by – 
 
• identifying specific decisions/dimensions deemed to be vital to the audit 
committee’s success in contributing to organisational performance  
• identifying expected behaviours necessary to maintain constructive 
teamwork and sufficient balance between control and collaboration  
• setting target Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
• measuring both the individual audit committee member’s performance 
and the team’s performance and progress against KPIs  
• providing feedback on progress and the results of assessment to ensure 
learning and improvement 
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Figure 2.4: The causal relationships in the audit committee’s balanced 
scorecard 
(Adapted from Epstein et al 2002:22) 
 
The strategic objectives and performance drivers reflected in the above 
presentation could be incorporated in figure 2.3, the balanced scorecard 
framework for evaluating audit committee performance. 
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The assessment process should be formalised and KPMG’s Audit Committee 
Forum (ACF 2006b:2) suggests the following steps with regard to the audit 
committee performance assessment approach: 
 
• Discuss the performance evaluation process that will be adopted, decide 
who will coordinate the process, and create the assessment form that is 
accepted by all members. 
• Determine who will participate in providing initial input to the audit 
committee – this will include the audit committee members and 
chairperson and might also include the chairperson of the board, the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), the chairpersons of other board committees, the 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), the chief audit executive (CAE), the external 
auditor, the company secretary, in-house counsel and others who interact 
with the audit committee. 
• Provide the assessment forms to all the participants and return them to 
the process coordinator for analyses and compilation. 
• Use the compiled reports that reflect each response and the average 
rating, possibly reflecting – 
 the overall average, 
 the averages of the audit committee members (without losing sight 
of strongly conflicting views), and 
 other participants  
 as the basis of a conversation concerning the audit committee's 
effectiveness and areas for improvement.  
• Compile a report to the board of directors on recommendations for 
improvement, if any, in its charter or membership. 
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Figure 2.5 depicts the elements of audit committee oversight, reflected as a 
pyramid, representing the suggested flow of information in the oversight 
function of the audit committee to ensure that their objectives could be 
achieved.  It illustrates how their performance could be improved through self-
evaluation and education, while at the same time adhering to the principles of 
corporate governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Elements of audit committee oversight 
(Adapted from KPMG 2003c:5) 
“Working together, these elements should allow the audit committee to receive 
the right information, at the right time, from the right individuals, and in the right 
context to provide effective oversight” (KPMG 2003c:5). 
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2.4.3 Composition of the audit committee 
 
In order to protect the shareholders’ interests audit committees should 
sometimes adopt a probing attitude, questioning management’s judgment, and 
therefore, the composition of audit committees is very important (McMullen & 
Raghunandan 1996:80).  According to Bromilow and Berlin (2005:67), “an audit 
committee’s composition is a key driver of its effectiveness”, as indicated by the 
determinants of audit committee performance (see figure 2.2 in par 2.4.2).   The 
ideal audit committee composition for a company should be determined and 
regularly reviewed to identify any necessary changes in membership.  Term 
limits should also be addressed.  Evident strengths and skills gaps in the 
composition should then be identified and corrective action undertaken. (IIA 
2005:2.) 
 
To ensure effective and efficient audit committee performance, the formation, 
reporting structure, size and makeup of the audit committee should firstly be 
established and formalised to maintain the committee’s independence.  If the 
company is to go forward, the required qualifications, independence, skills sets, 
personal attributes and available time of individual committee members should 
thus be considered, identified and formalised.  The requirements for individual 
audit committee members will be dealt with in chapter 3. 
 
Organisations are undergoing considerable changes in an effort to keep pace 
with the competition and, therefore, board membership might also need to 
change as a result of changes in company size, structures, markets, suppliers 
and customers (Soltani 2005:19).  The Tyson Report (2003:1) comments on 
other factors which are also important determinants of its non-executive director 
requirements such as the company’s age, the makeup of its customer and 
employee base, the extent of its participation in global markets, its future 
strategies, and its current board membership.  Possible opportunities and future 
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challenges for the company might also affect the desired composition 
(Griesedieck & Nahas 2005:5-6). 
 
Another important requirement relating to composition is that people from 
“diverse and complementary backgrounds” (Ernest & Young 2003:6) be 
selected to the audit committee, which could be a combination of a diversity of 
experience, gender, race, age and even nationality (Gregory 2000:12). 
 
The most important requirement according to the author, and also as reflected 
in the work of Gregory (2000:12), is that the audit committee should be 
composed of qualified and competent individuals.  Members should also meet 
the independence requirements and reflect specific characteristics or attributes 
to ensure optimal effectiveness in the execution of their functions.  The 
independence requirement is mainly based on the stipulation that audit 
committees should primarily consist of non-executive or non-management 
directors (Braiotta 2004:43). 
 
2.4.4 Structure of the audit committee 
 
2.4.4.1 Introduction 
The audit committee is normally created by board resolution, with appointments 
made by the board on the recommendation of the nomination committee 
(KPMG 2006a:4).  As reflected in figure 1.1, the audit committee functions as a 
subcommittee of the board of directors and acts in an advisory capacity, being 
directly accountable for its actions to the board of directors (Braiotta 2004:30). It 
is required that the chairperson of the audit committee should be an 
independent, non-executive director and should not be the chairman of the 
board of directors.  According to the King II Report, the audit committee should 
preferably consist of a majority of independent, non-executive members, with 
the majority of the members being financially literate. (Institute of Directors 
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2002:39.)  Section 269A of the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill 2006, however, 
requires that the audit committee have at least two members and consist of only 
non-executive directors of the company who must act independently. (National 
Treasury 2006:s 269A).  The size of the audit committee should however 
depend on the size of the company and other relevant factors and the term of 
office should be defined (Braiotta 2004:42-43; Burke & Guy 2002:65-67). 
 
2.4.4.2 Non-executive directors 
 
As previously noted, it is recommended by the King II Report that audit 
committees consist of independent, non-executive directors. The “non-executive 
directors should be individuals of calibre and credibility, and have the necessary 
skill and experience to bring judgment to bear independent of management, on 
issues of strategy, performance, resources, transformation, diversity and 
employment equity, standards of conduct, and evaluation of performance”. 
(Institute of Directors 2002:59.) 
 
Sawyer et al (2003:1337) indicate that “audit committees composed of directors 
from within the organisation may be affected by their direct involvement with the 
matters reported”.  Therefore, to ensure the independence of audit committees, 
it was stipulated by the AICPA (AICPA 1978:4; Braiotta 2004:43) that “an audit 
committee should be organized as a standing committee of the board 
composed mainly of non-officer directors” or outside directors, that is non-
executive directors. 
 
The above definition was reaffirmed by the US Congress through the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002:s 2(a)(3)) which defines the audit committee as “a committee 
(or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of directors of an 
issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting 
processes of the issuer and audits of financial statements of the issuer”.  
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According to the King II Report (2002:60), a “non-executive director is an 
individual not involved in the day-to-day management and not a full-time 
salaried employee of the company or its subsidiaries.  An individual in the full-
time employment of the holding company or of its subsidiaries, other than the 
company concerned, would also be considered to be a non-executive director 
unless such individual by his/her conduct or executive authority could be 
construed to be directing the day-to-day management of the company and its 
subsidiaries”. 
 
The King II Report (2002:60) further states that an independent director is a 
non-executive director who – 
(i) is not a representative of a shareowner who has the ability to control or 
significantly influence management; 
(ii) has not been employed by the company or the group of which it 
currently forms part, in any executive capacity for the preceding three 
financial years; 
(iii) is not a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has 
been in any of the past three financial years, employed by the company 
or the group in an executive capacity; 
(iv) is not a professional advisor to the company or the group, other than in 
a director capacity; 
(v) is not a significant supplier to, or customer of the company or group; 
(vi) has no significant contractual relationship with the company or group; 
and 
(vii) is free from any business or other relationship which could be seen to 
materially interfere with the individual’s capacity to act in an independent 
manner. 
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2.4.4.3 Independence of the audit committee 
 
The independence of the audit committee is primarily affected by the structure 
of the board and the audit committee, the balance between executive and non-
executive directors, the chairperson of the audit committee and the integrity and 
independence of individual committee members. 
 
The author recommends that the independence requirements of audit 
committees and the individual members of such committees should be the most 
important requirement and the first consideration when recruiting new audit 
committee members.  The ideal skills and competence requirements and mix 
for the specific organisation should then be considered and finally, the general 
characteristics or attributes of individual members should be taken into account. 
 
Independence is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary Online (2007, s.v. 
‘independence’) as freedom from subjection or the control or influence of 
another or others and by the AICPA (2005b:1) as the ability to act with integrity 
and at the same time to exercise objectivity and professional scepticism.  
Independence is defined by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA 2004c:28) as 
“the freedom from conditions that threaten objectivity or the appearance of 
objectivity”.  When this definition is applied to the audit committee it reflects on 
the audit committee’s ability to challenge management decisions, evaluate 
corporate performance and exercise judgment freely and objectively in order to 
properly carry out their responsibilities (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:75; ACF 
2006a:2). 
 
Objectivity is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary Online (2007, s.v. 
‘objectivity’) as the ability to consider or present facts or information or to 
exercise judgment without being influenced by personal feelings or opinions.  
However, the definition adopted by the IIA is “an unbiased mental attitude that 
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allows an internal auditor to perform engagements in such manner that they 
have an honest belief in their work product and that no significant quality 
compromises are made”.  Although this definition relates specifically to the 
internal audit profession it could be equally acknowledged by the audit 
committee members as such.  The IIA further requires that a member’s 
judgment should not be subordinated to that of others. The individual objectivity 
of internal auditors also requires that they should have “an impartial, unbiased 
attitude and avoid conflict of interest”. (IIA 2004c:29, 63.)  This aspect will be 
dealt with in chapter 3 under section 3.2.3 on the independence of individual 
audit committee members. 
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee Report (1999:22) states that “independence is 
critical to ensuring that the board fulfils its objective oversight role and holds 
management accountable to shareholders”.  In order to achieve this Matraia 
(2005:35) reiterates the statement made by SEC Chairman William H 
Donaldson that “an important element of strengthened corporate governance is 
not only a stronger, more active board of directors, but also a board that is 
independent of management in both appearance and in reality”.  This is equally 
applicable to audit committee members, who form a subcommittee of the board. 
 
Terrell (2001:3) suggested another test of independence that can be introduced.  
This is a test based on the “appearance” from a reasonable investor’s 
perspective.  According to O’Kelly (2003:3), this implies that members of the 
audit committee should be free to act upon what they see and the information 
they receive and then render a professional judgment. 
 
Independence allows committee members to be objective in their decision-
making and it also suggests a willingness to challenge management’s decisions 
and evaluate overall corporate performance from a completely free and 
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objective perspective, without undue influence from management (Burke & Guy 
2002:74; Gregory 2000:6; Rock 1996:8). 
 
According to the IIA, relationships that could impair the objectivity of an audit 
committee member “may include, but are not limited to, large customers, client 
relationships (e.g. attorney/client), management, interlocking board 
membership, and major shareholders” (Bishop 1998:3).  Other factors affecting 
audit committee members’ independence are creditors’ demands for audit 
committee independence, non-executive shareholders’ participation on the audit 
committee as well as members’ fees (Soltani 2005:22-25). 
 
On the other hand, a director may be independent but have a conflict of interest 
regarding a given matter that may impair his or her objectivity on that matter. He 
should therefore disclose the conflict of interest, after which he should not 
participate in the discussion of the matter (Burke & Guy 2002:76). 
 
There has been a significant change to the NYSE governance rules approved 
by the SEC in 2004 with regard to director independence requirements, 
primarily relating to relationships between directors and the company’s internal 
and external auditors.  Specifically, a director is not considered independent if 
any of the following apply (NYSE 2004:s 303A): 
 
• The director or an immediate family member is a current partner of the 
company’s internal or external audit firm. 
• The director is a current employee of the company’s internal or external 
audit firm. 
• The director has an immediate family member who is a current 
employee of the internal or external audit firm and participates in the 
firm’s audit, assurance, or tax compliance (but not tax planning) 
practice. 
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• The director or an immediate family member was within the last three 
years (but is no longer) a partner or employee of the internal or external 
audit firm and personally worked on the company’s audit within that 
time. 
 
Klein (2002:1) provides “empirical evidence that audit committee independence 
is associated with certain economic factors, such as that the independence 
increases with board size and board independence and decreases with the 
firm’s growth opportunities and for firms that report consecutive losses”. 
 
Deloitte (2005a:3) suggests that although audit committee members may be 
deemed independent as of a certain point in time, it is important to reassess this 
determination periodically, if not on an ongoing basis by means of 
questionnaires or interviews.  These are normally conducted through self-
assessments, and the internal auditor’s role in this process will be further 
explored in this study. 
 
2.4.4.4 Diversity of skills 
 
According to O’Kelly (2003:4), “strong and objective independence is enhanced 
by a deep knowledge of key issues”.  The skills of individual audit committee 
members as well as the diversity of skills in the audit committee are therefore 
considered by the author to be another very important attribute of an effective 
committee. 
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee Report (1999:25) states that “a well-balanced and 
effective board should have directors with an array of talent, experience and 
expertise which bear on different aspects of the company’s activities.  Because 
of the audit committee’s responsibility for overseeing the corporate accounting 
and financial controls and reporting, this committee clearly has a more 
recognizable need for members with accounting and/or related financial 
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expertise”.    
 
Diversity in the backgrounds, skills, and experience of specifically non-executive 
directors enhances a committee’s effectiveness by providing a wider range of 
perspectives and knowledge to oversee company performance, strategy and 
risk.  “Diversity of skills and background among audit committee members is 
also likely to provide the broad mix of relevant experience and to foster the 
independence of mind, the probing, challenging attitude, and the sound 
judgement characteristics of effective boardroom cultures and performance.” 
(Tyson 2003:7.) 
 
According to the Tyson Report (2003:7), the benefits of having a diverse board 
of qualified individuals are: 
 
• An enhancement of a company’s sensitivity to a wider range of 
possible risks to its reputation. 
• It can send a positive signal to customers, shareholders and 
employees, and can contribute to a better understanding of the 
company’s leadership of the diverse constituencies that underpin its 
commercial success. 
• It can help a company build its reputation as a responsible corporate 
citizen that understands its community and deserves its trust. 
 
From the empirical study that formed part of this research (Addendum C) which 
involved the completion of a questionnaire by 31 audit committee members and 
internal auditors, the diversity of skills of members of the audit committee 
reflected seemed more than adequate.   
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As depicted in the above chart, the participants also reflected an array of 
professional and academic qualifications, with most of them (51.7%) having a 
CIA qualification, CA(SA) (44.8%), other professional qualifications (FCMA, 
CCSA, CISM, GIA, IAC) (34.5%) and CFA/CPA’s (3.4%).  The higher 
percentage of CA(SA) and CIA qualifications reflected is a result of 45.2% of the 
respondents being designated as audit committee financial experts (ACFE).   
 
The highest academic qualifications indicated by the respondents reflected that 
one respondent’s highest qualification is a diploma, seven of the respondents’ 
highest qualification is an undergraduate qualification, of which most were 
BCom degrees and twenty-two of the respondents’ highest qualification is a 
postgraduate qualification, of which most were BCom (Hons) degrees and the 
highest was a DCom degree. Other qualifications listed were BA(LLB), BCom, 
B(Acc), MBA, BSC(Eng) Pr. Eng, MBL, PhD in Accounting and MCom.  
Furthermore, the research indicated that on average the respondents had eight 
years’ experience of serving on an audit committee, one year being the least 
experience and 25 years the most. Nevertheless, 29% of the respondents 
indicated that there are not enough skilled/qualified members serving on the 
audit committee. 
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2.4.4.5 Size of the audit committee 
 
For larger companies, audit committees are required to comprise between three 
and six members (Burke & Guy 2002:65), where three is the minimum and nine 
members is the maximum (Beavers 2003:2).  A less prescriptive guideline is 
given by KPMG and the Institute of Director’s Audit Committee Forum (ACF 
2006a:3) namely that the “committee should be large enough to represent a 
balance of views and experience, but small enough to operate efficiently”.  The 
global survey of KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute (ACI) among ACI members 
in the Americas, Europe, South Africa, Asia, Australia and other unspecified 
countries, reflected that South Africa has the largest average audit committee 
membership, namely five members.  It is interesting to note, however, that the 
same survey indicated that South Africa is the least satisfied that the audit 
committee devotes appropriate time and attention to its duties. (KPMG 2006b:4-
10.) Larger numbers therefore does not necessarily suggest greater 
effectiveness.   
 
The actual size of the audit committee as well as the number of financial 
experts on the committee depends upon the size and complexity of the 
structure and business of the organisation, the risk profile and its culture 
(Beavers 2003:201; Burke & Guy 2002:65).   
 
Other factors affecting the size are the responsibilities delegated by the board of 
directors, the size of the board, and the qualifications, experience and time of 
those available for membership of the committee (Beavers 2003:201; Burke & 
Guy 2002:65; Deloitte 2003:4). 
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2.4.4.6 Rotation of audit committee members 
 
Although audit committee members benefit from experience gained over time, 
members who are no longer interested or committed need to be replaced.  It is 
therefore very important that each audit committee member should undergo an 
annual assessment in order for the board to identify and make necessary 
replacements (Burke & Guy 2002:67).  When deciding upon the committee 
members’ term of office, it is important that boards should balance the need for 
continuity against the advantages of adding fresh perspective to the committee.  
The term of office should preferably be reflected in the audit committee charter. 
(ACF 2006a:3.) 
 
The King II Report’s Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct states that 
“board continuity, subject to performance and eligibility for re-election, is 
imperative.  A programme ensuring a staggered rotation of directors should also 
be put in place by the board to the extent that this is not already regulated”. 
(Institute of Directors 2002:24.) 
 
2.4.5 Access to support and information  
 
Audit committees should execute their basic responsibilities and exercise their 
authority in a manner they reasonably believe is in the best interests of the 
organisation’s shareholders.  In order to achieve this, audit committees should 
have an adequate number of members serving on the committee as well as 
adequate support from relevant parties in order to achieve their objectives and 
be able to function optimally. (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:61; DeZoort 2002:2.) 
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Audit committee members need sufficient access to management, the external 
auditors and the internal auditors.  They also require administrative assistance, 
which is usually provided by the company secretary, the finance department or 
the internal audit activity. “Administrative support includes scheduling of 
meetings, developing agendas, distributing advance materials before meetings, 
producing drafts of minutes, and interfacing with members of management as 
needed to respond to the committee’s questions.” (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:61.)  
 
The audit committee also needs access to relevant information in terms of 
financial, legal and other professional advice in order to make informed 
decisions (ACF 2006a:4).  The King II Report indicates that the information 
needs of the board should be well defined and regularly monitored (Institute of 
Directors 2002:22).  It is important, however, that the board or the audit 
committee should guard against an overload of information. 
 
Authority exists and was legislated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for audit 
committees to engage external advisers or legal counsel in particular for special 
investigations (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:61). 
 
When considering the use of outside experts or advice, however, the audit 
committee should consider the following (AICPA 2004:39): 
 
• The expert/adviser should have the competence and experience to 
perform the requested service.  Preferences should be checked with 
other clients of the service provider. 
• The expert/adviser should have no conflict of interest with respect to the 
company.  Such a conflict might arise if the expert/adviser has a 
relationship with the external auditor, or if they provide service to a 
competitor. Depending on the nature of the service to be offered, a 
conflict could arise if the expert/adviser has a relationship with a member 
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of the board of directors, or a member of the company’s management.  
There should not be any potential conflicts of interest that may distract, 
or undermine, the work to be done. 
• The expert/adviser should have sufficient resources to perform the work 
in the time frame specified by the audit committee. 
• The scope of work to be performed and other issues, including the 
proposed plan for payment of fees and expenses should be formalised. 
• All parties (including management and the expert/adviser) should 
understand that the audit committee is the owner of the service 
relationship. Management must understand that the expert/adviser is 
working on behalf of the audit committee and the audit committee 
expects management to be fully cooperative and forthcoming with 
respect to any information that may be requested. 
• The criteria that will be used to measure the expert’s/adviser’s work 
should be agreed and documented in an agreement with the service 
provider. 
 
The above aspects should also be considered by audit committees when 
utilising the internal auditors in providing any of the additional value-added 
services suggested by this study. 
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2.5 SUMMARY 
 
Chapter two gives an overview of the history of the audit committee concept 
which originated as early as 1939 and eventually led to legislatory requirements 
for South Africa in 1999 and 2006. 
 
The chapter also considered the responsibilities of audit committees, derived 
from good governance principles and the audit committee charter and described 
best practices that have an effect on the performance of audit committees.  The 
fact that the responsibilities of audit committees differ from organisation to 
organisation, based on the size, structure, nature and requirements imposed by 
the board of the organisation, is acknowledged.  One charter, therefore doesn’t 
suit all audit committees.  The audit committee charter, developed by the IIA 
(Addendum A) contains a comprehensive list of audit committee responsibilities 
but should be customised to suit individual audit committees. 
 
The effectiveness of audit committees may be influenced by several factors, 
such as performance measurement, diversity of skills, size, rotation of members 
and access to support and information.  Best practices in all of these areas 
should be considered and applied to aid the audit committee in the effective 
performance of its responsibilities. 
 
Chapter 3 will focus on the recruitment of audit committees and attributes of 
members that would contribute to the formation of effective audit committees.  
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Qualities and attributes expected from audit committee members and the 
recruitment process to facilitate the establishment of effective audit 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
QUALITIES AND ATTRIBUTES EXPECTED FROM AUDIT COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS AND THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS TO FACILITATE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE AUDIT COMMITTEES 
 
 
“New knowledge is the most valuable commodity on earth.  The 
more truth we have to work with, the richer we become.” 
 (Kurt Vonnegut in Quoteland.com 2005) 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Steinberg and Bromilow (2000a:33) comment that there is continuous pressure 
from all stakeholders for improved audit committee performance, as is also 
reflected in the previous chapter.  In order to perform their oversight function 
and be efficient and effective at the same time, the composition of the audit 
committee is critically important in meeting the needs of all stakeholders within 
organisations.   
 
Back in 1978 the AICPA stated that having diligent audit committee members 
could have the following advantages (AICPA 1978:2):  
 
• It can be instrumental in improving a company’s financial reporting, risk 
management and governance processes. 
• It can enhance the independence of the company’s internal and external 
auditors as well as provide assurance with regard to the effective use of 
their services. 
• It can initiate needed or desirable changes in a company’s system of 
internal control and risk management processes. 
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• It can enable the board of directors to execute its responsibilities in terms 
of financial reporting, risk management, control and governance to the 
shareholders in an effective and efficient manner. 
 
In order to be effective in their oversight function, audit committee members 
need to be both qualified and competent.  According to Thayer (2004:2), there 
is currently a debate on whether a “standard” should be introduced for non-
executive board members in terms of their qualifications, such as a requirement 
that they possess a professional qualification similar to a chartered accountant 
qualification.  She further comments that a curriculum is already being 
developed in conjunction with the Institute of Directors (South Africa). 
 
The previous chapter gave an overview of the history of the audit committee 
concept and described the role and responsibilities of audit committees within 
organisations.  It also described how best practices affect audit committee 
performance.  
 
In this chapter the focus is on the attributes of the audit committee members 
and the recruitment process.  Insight is provided into the importance of selecting 
audit committee members who are professional, properly qualified, 
independent, experienced, informed, and able to make a valuable contribution, 
right from the early stages of the discharge of their responsibilities to the 
committee.  The recruitment of audit committee members and the process by 
which audit committees are appointed will be addressed and the contribution of 
proper recruitment, selection and due diligence reviews towards easing the 
professional development of audit committee members will be demonstrated. 
 
The internal auditor’s role of ensuring a formal, transparent, objective and 
effective process in the recruitment and selection of new audit committee 
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members, as required by the King II Report (2002:24), is also considered and 
explored. 
 
Before embarking on a detailed description of recruiting, selection and induction 
processes, it is necessary to explore the qualities and personal attributes audit 
committee members should possess.   
 
 
3.2 REQUIRED QUALITIES AND PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES OF AUDIT 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 emphasised the importance of the composition and structure of the 
audit committee in ensuring that the committee effectively discharge its 
responsibilities.  It is recommended that the audit committee should be 
composed of both “financial and non-financial candidates so that the board can 
draw on members from various professional backgrounds, such as accounting, 
economics, education, psychology, and sociology” (Braiotta 2004:56).  The 
optimal combination should ensure that audit committee members complement 
each other through their unique contributions towards the attainment of the 
audit committee’s objectives and goals.  
 
“In order to widen the basis of experience on boards and improve their 
accountability and representativeness, [boards] should extend their search for 
non-executives beyond the boards of other listed companies to include 
individuals with a greater diversity of backgrounds.  International candidates, 
those with relevant experience in the public, academic or voluntary sectors, or 
at divisional level in other companies, may well fulfill this task” (Gregory 
2000:11). 
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It is, however, required by the King II Report that the demographical distribution 
of people in South Africa in relation to the composition of the boards of 
companies should be considered (Institute of Directors 2002:23). 
 
According to Apostolou and Jeffords (1990:29-30) and Bromilow and Berlin 
(2005:68-69), some excellent sources for audit committee members include: 
 
• Academicians with suitable backgrounds. 
• Bankers and investors. 
• Chartered Accountants and Certified Public Accountants (not serving the 
organisation). 
• Individuals with strong technical backgrounds appropriate to the industry 
(eg engineers, actuaries, brokers, consultants). 
• Internal auditing directors (chief audit executives) of unrelated 
organisations. 
• Lawyers (other than general counsel). 
• Retired chief executive officers. 
• Senior executives from unrelated organisations. 
 
In terms of the NYSE, National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) requirements, the following directors should 
however not be appointed to an audit committee (Burke & Guy 2002:75-76): 
 
• A current employee of the company or its affiliates (includes a 
subsidiary, sibling company, predecessor, parent company, or former 
parent company). 
• A former employee of the company/affiliate anytime during the last three 
years. 
• An immediate family member (includes a person’s spouse, parents, 
children, siblings, fathers- and mothers-in-law, sons- and daughters-in-
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law, brothers- and sisters-in-law, and anyone other than an employee 
who shares such person’s home) of an executive of the company. 
• A director/executive of another company when any of the company’s 
executives serve on the other company’s compensation committee. 
(These relationships are referred to as “cross compensation committee 
links”) 
• A partner, controlling shareholder, or executive officer of a company 
(Co. B) that has a business relationship with the company (Co. A): 
a) (NYSE) Unless the board determines in its business judgment 
that the relationship does not interfere with the individual’s 
independence. 
b) (NASD and AMEX) If a company (Co. B) makes or receives 
payments that exceed 5 percent of its consolidated gross 
revenues (of Co. A or Co. B) or $200,000, whichever is more, in 
any of the past three years. 
• A director who has a direct business relationship with the company (for 
example, a consultant): 
a) (NYSE) Unless the board determines in its business judgment 
that the relationship does not interfere with the individual’s 
independence. 
b) (NASD en AMEX) If the director receives from the 
company/affiliate in excess of $60,000 during the year, excluding 
compensation for board service, benefits under a tax-qualified 
retirement plan or non-discretionary compensation. 
 
Currently no specific qualifications or attributes have been developed for audit 
committee members.  Therefore the guidance developed in this study is useful 
in recruiting new audit committee members. 
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3.2.2 Qualifications, skills and experience requirements 
 
According to Apostolou and Jeffords (1990:27), a general management 
background combined with reasonable skill in interpreting financial statements 
are the most desirable attributes of a successful audit committee member. 
 
No formal decisions have however been made regarding the specific 
qualifications and skills expected from audit committee members.  The only 
available guidelines are those set for the financial expert.  Although the King II 
Report recommends that the majority of audit committee members should be 
financially literate, it is not required by the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill 
(Puttick & Van Esch 2007:422). 
 
According to Burke and Guy (2002:76-77), the NYSE, NASD and AMEX require 
“all members of the audit committee to be or to become financially literate, and 
it is proposed that at least one member of the audit committee should be 
financially literate or be a financial expert”.  
 
The following process is suggested by Slaughter (2003:1) as a means for 
companies to comply with the “audit committee financial expert” (ACFE) 
requirement: 
 
• The board of directors should evaluate the current audit committee 
members to determine whether or not at least one member qualifies as 
an audit committee financial expert.  If so, determine if such member is 
independent of management. 
• If the board of directors determine that none of the audit committee 
members qualify as an ACFE, they should determine if any of the other 
board members who is independent of management, qualifies as an 
ACFE.  The board should then consider rearranging the assignments to 
assign this board member to the audit committee.  Otherwise the board 
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should consider recruiting an individual to serve on the audit committee 
who is independent of management and qualifies as an audit committee 
financial expert. 
• If the organisation does not have an ACFE, it should consider 
disclosing, together with an explanation of why it does not have such an 
expert, any attributes of the ACFE definition that are satisfied by other 
existing audit committee members and, if applicable the use of outside 
advisors or experts by the audit committee. 
 
The following attributes are all considered to be essential components of the 
“financial expertise” requirement (AICPA 2004:5): 
 
• A sufficient understanding of the key accounting and financial rules 
affecting their company’s financial statements, for example, generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), IFRS and generally accepted 
auditing standards (GAAS). 
• The ability to assess the general application of such principles and 
standards in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and 
reserves. 
• Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing, or evaluating financial 
statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting 
issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by the 
organisation’s financial statements, or experience actively supervising 
(that is, direct involvement with) one or more persons engaged in such 
activities. 
• An understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial 
reporting. 
• A general understanding of nonprofit financial issues and specific 
knowledge of the not-for-profit sector (for example, health care or 
education) in which the organisation participates. 
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The AICPA (2004:5) has revised the “audit committee financial expert” definition 
to state that a person must have acquired the five necessary attributes listed 
above through any one or more of the following: 
 
• Education and experience as a principal financial officer, principal 
accounting officer, controller, public accountant or auditor or experience 
in one or more positions that involve the performance of similar 
functions; 
• Experience actively supervising a principal financial officer, principal 
accounting officer, controller, public accountant, auditor or person 
performing similar functions; 
• Experience overseeing or assessing the performance of companies or 
public accountants with respect to the preparation, auditing or evaluation 
of financial statements; or 
• Other relevant experience.  
 
The diagram in figure 3.1: Audit committee financial expert decision tree, as 
recommended by the AICPA audit committee toolkit (AICPA 2004:1) can be 
used to determine whether a candidate complies with the requirements of the 
definition of “financial expert”: 
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Figure 3.1: Audit committee financial expert decision tree 
 (AICPA 2004:1) 
Audit Committee Financial Expert 
The candidate meets 
the statutory 
requirements to          
be identified as the 
audit committee 
financial expert 
In connection with the 
education or experience, does 
the person have each of the 
following attributes: 
 
- an understanding of 
generally accepted 
accounting principles 
(GAAP) and financial 
statements; 
 
AND 
 
- the ability to assess the 
general application of such 
principles in connection with 
accounting for estimates, 
accruals and reserves; 
 
AND 
 
- experience preparing, 
auditing, analyzing or 
evaluating financial 
statements that present a 
breadth and level of 
complexity of accounting 
issues that can reasonably 
be expected to be raised by 
the company’s financial 
statements, or experience 
actively supervising one or 
more persons engaged in 
such activities; 
 
AND 
 
- an understanding of internal 
controls and procedures for 
financial reporting; 
 
AND 
 
- an understanding of audit 
committee functions? 
 
The candidate does not 
meet the requirements to be 
designated audit committee 
financial expert. 
Has the person 
completed a program 
of learning in 
accounting or auditing? 
Does the person have 
experience as a 
principle financial 
officer, principle 
accounting officer, 
controller, public 
accountant or auditor? 
Does the person have 
experience in one or 
more positions that 
involve the 
performance of similar 
functions? 
Does the person have 
experience actively 
supervising a person(s) 
performing one or more 
of these functions? 
Does the person have 
experience overseeing 
or assessing the 
performance of 
companies or public 
accountants with 
respect to the 
preparation, auditing, 
or evaluation of 
financial statements? 
 
Does the person have 
other relevant 
experience? 
No 
No 
 No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes Yes 
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As many organisations only have one member on the audit committee 
designated as the “financial expert”, and some organisations are still not 
complying with this requirement, it is important that the other members of the 
audit committee have some level of qualification or knowledge in order to 
contribute confidently to the committee’s function (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:71-
73; Burke & Guy 2002:76-77).  Other qualifications and general knowledge 
required of audit committee members to effectively fulfil their responsibilities are 
(Braiotta 2004:55; Marks 2003:41-42): 
 
• Sufficient understanding of audit committee responsibilities and 
functions, also in relation to the roles of the other participants in the risk 
management, control and governance processes (KPMG 2006b:1). 
• General understanding of the company’s industry and the social, political, 
economic, and legal forces affecting the industry. 
• Knowledge of the company with respect to its history, organisation, and 
operational policies. 
• An understanding of the fundamental problems of planning and control, 
as well as the fundamentals of the functional aspects of the company, 
how it makes money and how it monitors and measures success. 
• An understanding of the more significant risks to the company’s financial 
statements, its business and its reputation (economic, operating and 
financial risks) (Burke & Guy 2002:73). 
• Sufficient knowledge and understanding to ask the right questions and to 
assess the adequacy of the answers obtained. 
• Knowledge of risk management and the work of the external and internal 
auditors. 
• An understanding of the difference between the oversight function of the 
committee and the decision-making function of management (KPMG 
2002:2). 
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• Knowing what formal and informal communication channels, staffing 
policies, reporting relationships and reward systems exist (Swanson 
1998:2). 
 
The empirical study (Addendum C) reflected that 78.3% of audit committee 
members in South Africa have sufficient understanding of the audit committee 
responsibilities in their organisations, 17.4% have only some understanding, 
and 4.3% have little understanding.  The following chart presents the 
respondents’ understanding of the key accounting and financial rules and 
regulations affecting their company’s financial statements, in which 69.6% have 
sufficient understanding, 17.4% are not sure and 13% have some 
understanding.   
 
Chart 3.1: Understanding of accounting and financial rules and 
regulations 
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3.2.3 Independence and objectivity of the individual audit committee 
members 
 
The independence and objectivity of the individual members of the audit 
committee also affect the contribution that individual members can make 
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towards the achievement of the audit committee’s objectives.  Burke and Guy 
(2002:74) reflect that “the essence of independence is an audit committee 
member’s mental objectivity”.  As previously noted in chapter 2, with regard to 
the independence of the audit committee, individual objectivity is defined in the 
Standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors as having an “impartial, unbiased 
mental attitude and avoid[ing] conflict of interest”, which also requires that the 
individual should not subordinate his or her judgment to that of others.  
Independence is, affected by organisational status and objectivity, (IIA 
2004c:29, 63.) which is equally applicable to audit committee members. 
 
The SEC further tightened the independence requirements for audit committee 
members by applying the following two criteria (Braiotta 2004:77-78): 
 
• Audit committee members are barred from accepting any consulting, 
advisory or other compensatory fee from the issuer or any subsidiary 
thereof, other than in the member’s capacity as a member of the board 
of directors and any board committee; and 
• Audit committee members of an issuer that are not an investment 
company may not be an affiliate person of the issuer or any subsidiary 
of the issuer apart from his or her capacity as a member of the board 
and any board committee. 
 
3.2.4 Qualities and characteristics required of audit committee members 
 
3.2.4.1 The King II Report requirements 
 
In ensuring optimal performance of directors, the King II Report requires 
directors to meet certain requirements relating to their competence, 
commitment, fiduciary responsibilities and oversight.  These requirements are 
equally applicable to the audit committee members as a sub-committee of the 
board (Wixley & Everingham 2002:29).   
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Each of these requirements complemented by discussion based on the 
literature review are set out below: 
 
3.2.4.2 Competence 
 
According to the King II Report (2002:54-55), committee members should – 
 
• be qualified with a sufficient understanding of the business and the 
economy, so as to discharge their duties properly (including reliance on 
expert advice if needed);  
• be informed about the financial, industrial and social environment of the 
company; 
• be able to demonstrate a capacity to make informed and effective 
decisions by offering new perspectives and constructive suggestions and 
execute sound judgment (Steinberg & Bromilow 2000a:35); and 
• be able to demonstrate an inquiring mind and sufficient assertiveness to 
help a committee to deal effectively with management and the auditors 
(Reinstein & Luecke 2001:3).  
 
3.2.4.3 Commitment 
 
According to the King II Report (2002:54-55), committee members should –  
 
• be able to find the time and demonstrate a commitment to properly carry 
out their duties and responsibilities (Steinberg 2000:2); 
• be diligent and motivated in discharging their responsibilities by regularly 
attending meetings and contributing to the company's direction 
(Steinberg 2000:2); and 
• strive to increase shareholders' value with due regard to the interests of 
other stakeholders and the committee’s significant role. 
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3.2.4.4 Fiduciary responsibilities 
 
According to the King II Report (2002:54-55), committee members should – 
 
• exercise utmost good faith, honesty and integrity, a high level of 
ethical standards and act independently from any outside fetter or 
instruction (Burke & Guy 2002:73; KPMG 2006b:7; Steinberg 2000:2); 
• always act in the best interests of the company and not in ”sectoral” 
interests; 
• avoid conflicts of duties and interests, disclosing potential conflicts at 
the earliest possible opportunity; and 
• (if need be) disagree with colleagues on the board, including the 
chairperson and chief executive, demonstrating a strong willingness to 
both question issues and to speak out at meetings (Lanfranconi & 
Robertson 2002:3).  
 
3.2.4.5 Oversight 
 
According to the King II Report (2002:54-55), committee members should – 
 
• ensure procedures and systems are in place to act as checks and 
balances on information received, ensuring preparation of annual 
budgets and forecasts against which performance can be monitored;  
• treat confidential matters as such and not divulge them to anyone 
without authority to do so; and 
• obtain independent professional advice at the earliest opportunity, when 
necessary. 
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3.2.4.6 Other personal qualities 
 
The following list of personal qualities and characteristics derived from the 
literature review, complements the requirements set out above and may also be 
helpful in identifying possible candidates for recruitment to audit committees. 
 
Candidates to be appointed as audit committee members should – 
 
• be emotionally intelligent, confident, influential and have good interactive 
skills as well as the ability to handle conflict (KPMG 1999:1); 
• have analytical reasoning abilities, natural curiosity, a reasonable 
measure of healthy scepticism, and a willingness to devote the time  
necessary to do the job (Apostolou & Jeffords 1990:27); 
• have sound process management skills and the capacity to absorb a fair 
degree of detail (Burrage 2003:1); and 
• be vigilant and informed, with a probing mind, to ensure effective 
oversight of their responsibilities (Burke & Guy 2002:73). 
 
3.2.5 Available time and level of commitment 
 
As the demands on audit committee members increase, candidates should be 
willing to devote substantial time and energy when agreeing to audit committee 
service (Steinberg & Bromilow 2000a:34). 
 
Committee members should be willing to dedicate the time necessary to 
become familiar with the financial reporting process and review the financial 
statements.  They need to prepare for and attend meetings, and participate in 
consultation and follow-up discussions between meetings as needed.  (Lipton, 
Allen & McIntosh 2003:2; Steinberg & Bromilow 2000a:34.)  Other factors also 
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influencing the time commitment are the development of the audit committee 
charter and the available resources to perform their duties (Scarpati 2003:3). 
 
Also affecting their time commitment is the requirement that new audit 
committee members should commit to an induction or orientation programme 
and existing members to ongoing education and development in order to 
maintain and enhance their effectiveness, including education about the 
company’s business and industry (Steinberg & Bromilow 2000a:34).  
 
Steinberg and Bromilow (2000a:34) and Lipton, Allen and McIntosh (2003:2) 
suggest that the increased time commitment and the demands of their oversight 
responsibilities could force audit committee members to limit the number of 
directorships they hold to a maximum of three.  
 
The empirical study (Addendum C) reflected a range of one to fifteen for the 
number of committees on which one respondent served, with one respondent 
serving on as many as fifteen different audit committees.  The average was 
approximately four committees.  The international survey of KPMG’s Audit 
Committee Institute, reflected respondents serving on only 2.7 (the average) 
organisations, with 2.4 as the global average (KPMG 2006b:15).   Serving on 
too many audit committees could therefore affect the time commitment of 
members, especially in South Africa. 
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3.3 THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS 
 
3.3.1 The need for a formal recruitment process 
 
The need may arise to establish a new audit committee or to select new 
members to an existing committee either to replace members whose term has 
been completed, to fill a vacancy for a deceased or retiring member, to add a 
required skill set, or to expand the committee’s size (Bromilow & Berlin 
2005:67). 
 
Research conducted by SpencerStuart (2004:2) confirms the following 
additional reasons for the increased demand for audit committee members: 
 
• Additional members need to be recruited owing to the independence 
requirements.  
• Increased responsibilities and workload require expansion in 
membership. 
• New members need to be selected to meet the Sarbanes-Oxley 
definition of the required “financial expert”.  
• Turnover is increasing and directors are reducing their board 
commitments. 
 
According to C Warren Neel (KPMG 2005:3), executive director of the 
Corporate Governance Center at the University of Tennessee in the USA, the 
recruiting expense of a single director search using an external recruiting firm 
can run from $75 000 to $100 000, constituting a significant cost for small to 
medium sized companies ($500 million to $1.5 billion in annual revenue).  He 
also indicated that the time taken by the recruitment process has increased 
from three to six months in the five years prior to his report. 
 96
It is therefore very important that the recruiting process be designed as 
economically and effectively as possible and also that a transparent and 
objective process be ensured. 
 
SpencerStuart (2003:5) states that nominating committees are grappling with 
the new complexities of director selection and creating a disciplined approach to 
director recruitment owing to numerous changes.  SpencerStuart (2003:5) 
thereby suggests that this creates ideal opportunities for human resource 
executives to demonstrate their skills and expertise to help the nominating 
committee in the recruitment process.   
 
It is suggested by the author that the internal audit activity could also play a 
valuable role with regard to the selection of audit committee members because 
of their knowledge and understanding of the organisation in which they are 
employed as well as their knowledge regarding the attributes candidates should 
possess. 
 
It is proposed by Burke and Guy (2002:77) that in every public interest company 
the board of directors or its nominating (governance) committee should, for 
each financial year, appoint an audit committee consisting of not less than three 
independent non-executive directors. Most companies propose that 
independent directors or independent nominating committee members should 
appoint the audit committee members (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:67).  “Audit 
committees could also be formed by a resolution of the board of directors, and 
members are then appointed directly by the chairman of the board, or the 
chairman makes nominations and the board then approves the choices” (AICPA 
1978:4; Burke & Guy 2002:65).  It is nevertheless perfectly permissible for this 
committee to consult with the internal audit activity, for instance, to assist them 
with the recruitment, selection and induction process. 
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Figure 3.2: The selection process 
(Adapted from SpencerStuart 2003:3-5, 2006:15) 
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Figure 3.2 depicts a schematic representation of the selection process as 
suggested by SpencerStuart (2003:3-5, 2006:15): 
 
The internal auditor’s involvement in this process would not be to take over the 
role of the board or the nominating committee, but rather to make suggestions 
and advise on the optimal composition or to indicate existing skills gaps in the 
audit committee’s composition, with due regard for the internal audit activity’s 
knowledge of the organisation.  
 
The author suggests that the internal audit activity could also play a significant 
role in this process and could add value to the process, in that the internal 
auditors as a company resource are used to ensure the thoroughness and 
transparency of the recruitment process.  The role of internal audit in this regard 
will be further described in section 4.3.3. 
 
3.3.2 Proper recruiting and selection to overcome future problems with 
regard to professional development 
 
Bromilow and Berlin (2005:68) established through their research that it is 
difficult to recruit new members, or for candidates to accept an appointment to 
an audit committee, owing to concerns over the financial and professional risk 
of personal liability, the increased time commitment expected, a possible lack of 
technical capability as well as the heightened independence requirements. 
 
According to corporate law any corporate director should in all circumstances 
exercise a degree of diligence expected from a reasonable person and also a 
duty of care and loyalty (Lipton, Allen & McIntosh 2003:2).  A duty of care 
requires “that a director must (1) act in good faith, (2) use prudent judgment and 
exercise the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in similar 
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circumstances, and (3) act in the company’s best interest.  This duty requires 
that directors be informed about company matters”. (Burke & Guy 2002:359.)   
 
The New York statute indicates that the “reasonable person” requirement 
expects a person to discharge their responsibilities “in good faith and with that 
degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent [persons] would 
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions” (Braiotta 2004:144).  
Also, a director would “have a duty of loyalty to act in a manner reasonably 
believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interest of the organization” 
(Beavers 2003:1).  “Failure to meet the ‘reasonable person’ expectations could 
in theory result in liability and in reputation injury.  Board members who sustain 
such injury cannot regard it as minor, since one cannot prevent [law] suits from 
being filed after an announcement of an accounting restatement.  The only 
protection against some reputation loss is conscientious and effective 
performance.” (Lipton, Allen & McIntosh 2003:2.)   
 
Changes proposed in South African corporate law suggest that audit committee 
members should state that the financial statements of the particular company 
are in compliance with the provisions of any applicable laws and regulations, 
and that the audit committee will be held liable if they issue incomplete or non-
compliant financial reports (Monteiro 2005:1). 
 
Bromilow and Berlin (2005:69) explain that one of the problems with selecting 
members to the audit committee is that these individuals should be able to learn 
quickly about the company as well as the financial reporting process, and that, if 
there are not already enough experienced audit committee members to provide 
guidance, the committee will not be able to function optimally. 
 
It is suggested by Bromilow and Berlin (2005:69) that a written description of the 
required qualifications and also the personal attributes of audit committee 
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members should be developed to assist in the recruitment process by ensuring 
that qualified and competent members are selected.  It is also imperative that 
the recruitment and selection process be transparent and objective in order to 
overcome future problems with regard to the independence and effectiveness of 
individual audit committee members.  The recruitment and selection process 
could also significantly affect the professional development requirements of 
individuals and for that reason the author advocates the involvement of the 
internal audit activity in this process. 
 
3.3.3 Due diligence review 
 
Wilkinson (2006:9) recommends that a due diligence review should be 
performed upon the appointment of audit committee members.  He further 
indicated that a due diligence review is a two-way process, in that non-
executive directors should examine the company approaching them to accept 
an appointment to the company’s audit committee, while the company should 
satisfy itself that the person is “fit and proper” and not disqualified from being a 
director.  In terms of the Companies Amendment Act 2004, section 218 “a body 
corporate, a minor or other person under legal disability or any other person 
who is subject to any order under the Companies Act which disqualifies him/her 
from be being a director may not be appointed as a director”.  Also a 
disqualification of a director or others according to section 218 prohibits “an 
unrehabilitated insolvent or any person removed from an office of trust on 
account of misconduct, or any person who, at any time, has been convicted of 
theft, fraud, forgery or uttering a forged document, perjury, an offence under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act or any offence involving dishonesty, or any offence 
in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a company and 
has been sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine, or to a fine 
exceeding one hundred rand, unless the court gives its authority” (National 
Treasury 2004:s 218.). 
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New candidates for election as well as directors coming up for reappointment 
are also expected to submit curriculum vitae to be considered at the annual 
general meeting (Institute of Directors 2002:23).  The internal audit activity is in 
an ideal position to supply the board of directors with information regarding 
candidates who are being considered for positions on the audit committee as 
internal auditors are knowledgeable about the types of information required to 
make an informed decision about the suitability of candidates. 
  
More and more candidates for audit committees are also performing due 
diligence reviews before accepting an appointment to such a committee by 
undertaking their own thorough examination of the company in order to satisfy 
themselves that it is an organisation in which they can have faith and in which 
they will be able to make a valuable contribution (Higgs 2003:69).  This can be 
achieved by investigating company backgrounds and considering their expected 
time obligation and the risk of financial and professional liability.  The time 
obligation includes the review of material and preparation before meetings, the 
frequency of board meetings and follow-up meetings and the average number 
of hours members are expected to spend on meetings.  Candidates are also 
inquiring into the quality of financial reporting. (KPMG 2005:1; Lipton, Allen & 
McIntosh 2003:2.) 
 
Suggestions for good practice from the Higgs Report (2003:69-70) as well as 
Bromilow and Berlin (2005:69) suggest the following steps a candidate can take 
in conducting a due diligence review on a company: 
 
• Meet with the CEO and audit committee chair. 
• Meet with other audit committee members and directors. 
• Meet with management below the CEO and CFO level. 
• Meet with the external auditors. 
• Meet with chief audit executive. 
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• Consider the company’s reputation and financial condition. 
• Consider the competence and integrity of senior management. 
• Observe audit committee meetings. 
• Review recent company filings and press releases and analysts’ reports. 
• Consult with external advisers on the company’s financial statements. 
• Review company reports and accounts, and/or any listing prospectus, for 
recent years. 
• Browse the company’s internet website. 
• Research any Corporate Social Responsibility or Environmental Reports 
issued by the company. 
• Consider rating agency reports or voting services reports. 
• Consider published materials may be unlikely to reveal wrong-doing, but 
a lack of transparency may be a reason to proceed with caution in 
accepting a position to the audit committee. 
 
Some of the above information which is required to enable the candidate to 
make an informed decision could be supplied by the internal audit activity on 
request from prospective candidates. 
 
The following aspects are considered to be a helpful basis of the pre-
appointment due diligence process that all prospective audit committee 
members should undertake (Burrage 2003:3; Higgs 2003:69-70): 
 
• The company’s current financial position and its financial track record 
over the last three years. 
• The key dependencies (eg regulatory approvals, key licenses, etc). 
• The company’s position on corporate governance issues. 
• If the company is not performing particularly well, is there potential to turn 
it round and do I have the time, desire and capability to make a positive 
impact? 
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• The exact nature and extent of the company’s business activities. 
• The current executive and non-executive directors, their background and 
their record and how long have they served on the board. 
• The size and structure of the board and board committees and the 
relationships between the chairman and the board, the chief executive 
and the management team. 
• Who owns the company, that is who are the company’s main 
shareholders and how has the profile changed over recent years? What 
is the company’s attitude towards, and relationship with its shareholders? 
• Any material litigation presently being undertaken or threatened, either 
by the company or against it. 
• Is the company clear and specific about the qualities, knowledge, skills 
and experience that it needs to complement the existing board? 
• What insurance cover is available to directors and what is the company’s 
policy on indemnifying directors? 
• Do I have the necessary knowledge, skills, experience and time to make 
a positive contribution to the board of this company? 
• Is there currently an induction and professional development programme 
for new audit committee members? 
• How closely do I match the job specification and how well will I fulfil the 
board’s expectations? 
• Is there anything about the nature and extent of the company’s business 
activities that would cause me concern both in terms of risk and any 
personal ethical considerations? 
• Am I satisfied that the internal regulation of the company is sound and 
that I can operate effectively within its stated corporate governance 
framework? 
• Am I satisfied that the size, structure and make-up of the board will 
enable me to make an effective contribution? 
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• Would accepting the non-executive directorship put me in a position of 
having a conflict of interest? 
 
 
3.4 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter described the qualities and personal attributes of audit committee 
members in order to ensure efficient and effective performance of their 
oversight responsibilities.   
 
Selecting qualified members to the audit committee will not necessarily ensure 
optimal performance.  A recruitment process is suggested whereby the needs of 
the organisation should first be determined.  Various procedures are then 
followed to ensure that both the audit committee member and the organisation 
benefits optimally from the placement and that the success of the placement is 
continuously monitored.  It is suggested by the author that one can overcome 
many of the problems with regard to the professional development of audit 
committee members by ensuring a proper recruitment and selection process. 
 
The internal audit activity could play a vital role in this process by determining 
the organisation’s needs, providing information to the organisation’s leadership 
as well as possible candidates and also monitoring the performance of the audit 
committee members. 
 
Chapter 4 will describe the role of the internal audit activity in assisting audit 
committees in more depth. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO THE AUDIT COMMITTEE BY THE INTERNAL 
AUDIT ACTIVITY 
 
 
“A wise man will hear, and will increase learning; and a man of 
understanding shall attain unto wise counsels.” 
 (Bible. Proverbs 1:5) 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding chapters highlighted the importance for an organisation to select 
independent, qualified and competent members to the audit committee in order 
to ensure and enhance the effectiveness of such a committee’s performance in 
the organisation, as were the requirements for achieving audit committee 
effectiveness, as disclosed and recommended by the King II Report.  The 
effects of audit committee compensation and the evaluation of individual 
members’ performance were also considered.   
 
The professional development of board members is moving to the top of many 
corporate agendas (Deloitte 2005b:1), and “with the intricate nature of 
companies’ business activities, the complexity of accounting transactions and 
policies, and frequent changes to financial accounting standards, even the most 
experienced audit committee member can benefit from training” (Bromilow & 
Berlin 2005:xiv).   
 
Copnell (2004:1) comments considering the numerous changes affecting the 
business environment, audit committees cannot be expected to provide 
meaningful protection for company shareholders if the audit committee 
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members are not in a position to confront management’s actions and to draw 
the board of directors’ attention to questionable practices.  He further indicates 
that it has become impossible for audit committee members to effectively 
discharge their responsibilities with no more than a passing knowledge of 
finance and regulations, even without taking into consideration the significant 
changes affecting companies in the last couple of years (Copnell 2004:1). 
 
According to Deloitte (2005b:1), companies are trying to satisfy stock exchange 
requirements, and comply with applicable Acts and good corporate governance 
practices.  For this reason audit committees require timely and reliable 
information to discharge their responsibility to oversee the financial reporting 
(Apostolou & Jeffords 1990:49), risk management and governance processes.  
The internal audit activity already has a considerable role to play in supplying 
such information to the audit committee and it is suggested by the author that 
this role could be further explored and expanded. 
 
The questions that will be addressed in this chapter are whether the internal 
audit activity could make a positive contribution in the selection or professional 
development process of audit committees and whether taking on such a role 
could affect the internal auditor’s independence or even suggest a conflict of 
interest.  The methods available to the internal auditors to provide a value-
added service will be explored and considered for inclusion in the framework 
(Addendum D).  Also the different ways in which the internal audit activity and 
the chief audit executive can sell these services to the audit committee will be 
described.  The author will also consider what would be required of internal 
auditors if they are to undertake such a role in providing better services to the 
audit committee. 
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To determine the role of the internal audit activity in the selection and 
professional development process of audit committees, the relationship with the 
audit committee in an organisation also needs to be examined. 
 
 
4.2 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT 
ACTIVITY IN AN ORGANISATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
 
4.2.1 The role of the internal audit activity 
 
According to the IIA (2005:3), the audit committee and the internal audit activity 
are interdependent and should also be mutually accessible.  On the one hand, 
“the internal auditors should provide objective opinions, information, support 
and education to the audit committee and the audit committee on the other 
hand, should provide validation and oversight to the internal auditors”.  It is the 
internal audit activity’s responsibility to keep up their professional development 
in order to ensure that the audit committee is properly informed and up to date 
on the risk management, control and governance processes of the organisation.  
The chief audit executive (CAE) should also ensure that regular quality 
assurance reviews (QARs) are conducted to ensure that the internal audit 
activity’s services adhere to the International Standards for the Professional 
Practice of Internal Auditing. (IIA 2005:3.) 
 
The role of the internal audit activity is reflected in the following definition of 
internal auditing (IIA 2004c:xxvii):  
 
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity 
designed to add value and improve an organisation’s operations.  It helps an 
organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined 
   110 
 
approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, 
control and governance processes. 
 
Therefore it is a combination of audit committee efficiency, regular 
communication and training, and the value-added support of a strong internal 
audit activity that assists the audit committee to achieve their objectives with 
regard to their oversight responsibility (SpencerStuart 2005:19). 
 
The role and responsibility of internal auditors within an organisation are 
reflected as follows (IIA 2004a:2): 
 
• Participate on the project’s steering committee, providing advice and 
recommendations to the project team and monitoring progress and 
direction of the project. 
• Act as facilitator between the external auditor and management. 
• Provide existing internal audit documentation for processes under 
scope. 
• Advise management on best practices — documentation standards, 
tools, and test strategies. 
• Provide process-owners and management with training on project, risk, 
and control awareness. 
• Perform a quality assessment (QA) of process documentation and key 
controls before handoff to the external auditor.  
• Advise management regarding the design, scope and frequency of tests 
to be performed. 
• Be an independent assessor of management testing and assessment 
processes. 
• Perform tests of management’s basis for assertions. 
• Aid in identifying control gaps and review management plans for 
correcting those gaps. 
• Perform follow-up reviews to ascertain whether control gaps have been 
adequately addressed. 
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• Coordinate discussions between management and the external auditor 
regarding scope and testing plans. 
• Participate in disclosure committees to ensure that results of ongoing 
internal audit activities and other examination activities, such as external 
regulatory examinations, are brought to the committee for disclosure 
consideration. 
• Assist in ensuring that corporate initiatives are well managed and have a 
positive impact on the organisation. 
• Provide assurance to senior management, the audit committee, the 
board of directors, and other stakeholders. 
• Use a risk-based approach in planning the many possible activities 
regarding project audits, and be involved throughout the project’s life 
cycle — not just in post-implementation audits. 
 
4.2.2 Organisational status and objectivity of the internal audit activity 
 
According to the IIA (2004c:51), the independence of the internal audit activity, 
which enables them to carry out their work freely and objectively, is achieved 
through their organisational status and objectivity.  The organisational status of 
the internal audit activity is also reflected in figure 4.1. 
 
Standard 1110, referring to organisational independence, suggests that “the 
chief audit executive should report to a level within the organisation that allows 
the internal audit activity to accomplish its responsibilities”.  It is further 
recommended that the “internal auditors should have the support of senior 
management and of the board so that they can gain the cooperation of 
engagement clients and perform their work free from interference”. (IIA 
2004c:53.) 
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4.2.3 Independence of the internal auditor 
 
Even though the Institute of Internal Auditors (2004b:2) suggests that internal 
auditors could, or rather should, be involved in the induction process and 
ongoing professional development of the board and executive management, 
especially in terms of internal control, risk management, corporate governance 
and compliance with new laws and regulations, acting as a training facilitator 
may affect the internal auditor’s independence or even pose a conflict of 
interest.  
 
Practice Advisory 1000.C1-1 (IIA 2004c:37) states with reference to conflict of 
interest that the board (and audit committee) should empower the internal audit 
activity to perform additional services where they do not represent a conflict of 
interest or detract from its obligation to the audit committee.   
 
As previously noted in chapter 1, a conflict of interest is (IIA 2004c:26) “any 
relationship that is or appears to be not in the best interest of the organization. 
A conflict of interest would prejudice an individual's ability to perform his or her 
duties and responsibilities objectively”.  The internal audit profession’s Code of 
Ethics (IIA 2004c:xxxi) also prohibits internal auditors from participating “in any 
activity or relationship that may impair or be presumed to impair their unbiased 
assessment”, to address the individual’s objectivity. 
 
Taking this into account, it is suggested that accepting consulting services or 
acting as a training facilitator for the audit committee may therefore not be seen 
to affect an internal auditor’s independence and would not necessarily impair 
the internal auditor’s or the internal audit activity’s objectivity (IIA 2004c:37). 
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It is, however, of significant importance that the internal auditor does not take 
over the role of the company secretary or executive management in providing 
any induction or professional development services to the audit committee.  An 
individual internal auditor’s independence might be compromised in that he/she 
“inappropriately or unintentionally assumes management responsibilities”, 
especially when performing the consulting engagement on a continuous basis.  
Rotation of internal audit staff could be utilised in addressing this problem. 
(Sawyer et al 2003:46.) 
 
4.2.4 Reporting relationship with the audit committee 
 
It is generally recognised by audit committees as well as the Institute of Internal 
Auditors that internal auditors and audit committees have interlocking goals and 
that their functions within an organisation should be mutually supportive (IIA 
2004c:148-150).  As reflected in figure 4.1: The audit committee reporting 
relationship, the internal audit activity has a dual reporting relationship, in that it 
reports functionally to the audit committee and administratively to the managing 
director or top executive management.   
 
The following schematic representation reflects the different stakeholders of an 
organisation and the different reporting relationships within an organisation, and 
more specifically the reporting relationship between the audit committee and the 
internal audit activity. 
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4.2.5 The internal auditor’s responsibilities in terms of accepting the 
consulting services 
 
Over and above maintaining their independence in providing additional services 
or training as a consulting function, internal auditors need to ensure that they 
are up to date and understand the following aspects with regard to their 
organisation before engaging in providing other value-added services to the 
audit committee (IIA 2002:2): 
 
• Business risks affecting the organisation and the implementation of 
effective risk management techniques within the organisation.  
• Internal auditing standards, responsibilities, and the code of ethics as 
well as the implementation thereof. 
• Internal auditing’s role in corporate governance and its key relationships 
with the audit committee, board, and executive and operating 
management. 
• Leading edge internal audit department practices and global trends. 
• New technologies and audit automation tools. 
• The organisation’s control processes and the control framework adopted 
within the organisation. 
 
Rittenberg (2000:1) provides the following lessons for the internal audit activity 
to keep in mind in providing any value-added service to the audit committee: 
 
• Corporate governance is important and the corporate governance 
principles should be born in mind whenever assurance and consulting 
engagements are provided by the internal audit activity. 
• The reporting structure does matter and the internal audit activity should 
always act independently and objectively and avoid any conflict of 
interest. 
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• Accounting issues and regulations are important, and effective and 
efficient controls should be in place. 
• Risks and the risk management process are the principal framework 
within which the internal audit activity conducts its work. 
• The audit committee needs an effective information system and the 
internal audit activity is in an ideal position to provide relevant 
information. 
• Internal auditors must understand the business and organisational 
processes and keep up to date with developments and new 
technologies. 
• Internal auditors can assist in educating board and audit committee 
members concerning aspects like risk and control and could also assist 
in the audit committee’s self-evaluation process. 
• Related party transactions and complex financial instruments present 
substantial risks. 
• Reporting is a continuous process and not a once-off event. 
• The internal audit activity should commit to continuous improvement and 
undergo regular quality assurance reviews and each individual internal 
auditor should ensure his or her own continuous professional 
development. 
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4.3 ASSISTANCE THE INTERNAL AUDITOR CAN GIVE TO AUDIT 
COMMITTEES 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Bishop (2000:1) indicated that, “to help audit committee members achieve 
optimal effectiveness, the internal audit activity should already be stepping up 
their support services and providing even broader business expertise”.  
 
The internal auditor’s role should be advisory or consultative in nature and 
should be seen as a complementary or supportive function in order to contribute 
positively to the work of the audit committee.  Sawyer et al (2003:46) mentions 
that the internal audit activity is in a unique position to provide consulting 
services because of their “systematic, disciplined approach”, their experience 
and investigative skills and analytical abilities and, therefore, their ability to 
contribute to the organisational objectives and welfare of the company. 
 
As indicated by the definition of internal auditing, the consulting service should 
be “independent and objective” and “designed to add value and improve an 
organization’s operations”.  It should also help “an organization accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and 
improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance 
processes”. (IIA 2004c:xxvii.) 
 
According to Practice Advisory 1000.C1-1, “internal auditors should take extra 
precautions to determine that management and the board understand and 
agree with the concept, operating guidelines, and communications required for 
performing consulting services”.  The internal audit activity can therefore work in 
collaboration with the company secretary in establishing and designing such 
induction or professional development programmes and even co-develop and 
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maintain the services to be provided to the audit committee.  Practice Advisory 
1000.C1-1 further states that the “internal audit activity is uniquely positioned to 
perform consulting work based on its adherence to the highest standards of 
objectivity and also its breadth of knowledge about organisational processes, 
risks, and strategies”. (IIA 2004c:37-38.) 
 
Bush (2003:1-2) mentions the following basic things that audit committees 
expect and should expect from the internal audit activity in terms of the 
fundamental support provided to the audit committee, while in the process still 
maintaining the independence and objectivity of the internal auditors: 
 
• The audit committee needs to be notified about issues and problems as 
soon as they surface. They want to know what steps are being taken to 
investigate and fully comprehend the implications of problems, what 
corrective actions are being taken, and what is needed to mitigate the 
risk of future occurrences. 
• Internal auditors need to be independent and objective as well as open 
and frank in their assessments. 
• The audit committee needs to know when there are any limitations 
placed on the internal audit activity that might be standing in the way of 
their ability to conduct successful audits. Internal auditors need 
cooperation from within the company and appropriate and sufficient 
staffing in order to conduct their internal audits effectively and efficiently.  
There might be areas where they need help from the audit committee in 
getting more cooperation or appropriate resources. 
• Internal auditors that are in a position to know the organisation's 
operations well should calibrate risk for the audit committee and help 
identify critical areas of the business that also have a high risk for 
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potential problems.  A risk matrix helps the audit committee understand 
better where it should focus. 
• Audit committees also really want the internal auditors to add value by 
acting as consultants and making concrete suggestions that can help 
improve processes and avoid future problems. 
• Internal auditors must have a direct line of reporting and communication 
to the audit committee.  Audit committees need internal auditors that 
have the courage and the confidence to report any significant issues, 
even if it involves executive management. At the same time, the audit 
committee needs to protect internal auditors who report such information 
from retaliation or negative consequences. 
 
The audit committee’s oversight responsibility in terms of the internal audit 
activity is reflected in the sample charter provided in Addendum A.  
 
In order for the audit committee to recognise and acknowledge the valuable 
support they receive from the internal auditors, Sawyer et al (2003:1335) 
suggests that the internal audit activity should make sure that the audit 
committee understands, supports and reviews the assistance provided by the 
internal audit activity to the committee by – 
 
• requesting the audit committee to review and approve the internal audit 
charter on an annual basis 
• reviewing with the audit committee the functional and operational 
reporting lines of the internal audit activity to ensure and promote their 
independence and objectivity by ensuring that the organisational 
structure promotes their independence 
• incorporating in the charter for the audit committee the review of hiring 
decisions, including appointment, compensation, evaluation, retention, 
and dismissal of the chief audit executive 
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• incorporating in the internal audit charter for the audit committee to 
review and approve proposals to outsource any internal audit activities 
• assisting the audit committee in evaluating the adequacy of the internal 
audit personnel and budget, and the scope and results of the internal 
audit activities, to ensure that there are no budgetary or scope 
limitations that impede the ability of the internal audit function to execute 
its responsibilities 
• providing information on the coordination with and oversight of other 
control and monitoring functions (e.g. risk management, compliance, 
security, business continuity, legal, ethics, environmental and external 
audit) 
• reporting significant issues related to the processes for controlling the 
activities of the organization and its affiliates, including potential 
improvements to those processes, and providing information concerning 
such issues through resolution 
• providing information on the status and results of the annual audit plan 
and the sufficiency of the internal audit department resources to senior 
management and the audit committee 
• developing a flexible annual audit plan using an appropriate risk-based 
methodology including any risks or control concerns identified by 
management, and submitting that plan to the audit committee for review 
and approval as well as periodic updates 
• reporting on the implementation of the annual audit plan as approved, 
including as appropriate any special tasks or projects requested by 
management and the audit committee 
• incorporating into the internal audit charter the responsibilities for the 
internal audit department to report to the audit committee on a timely 
basis any suspected fraud involving management or employees who are 
significantly involved in the internal controls of the company.  Assist in 
the investigation of significant suspected fraudulent activities within the 
organisation and notify management and the audit committee of the 
results 
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• making the audit committee aware that quality assessment reviews of 
the internal audit activity should be done every five years in order for the 
audit activity to declare that it meets the IIA’s Standards.  Regular 
quality assessment reviews will provide assurance to the audit 
committee and to management that internal auditing activities conform 
to the Standards. 
 
It should again be emphasised that internal auditors should be mindful that they 
do not take over management’s or the board of director’s responsibilities in their 
endeavour to provide additional services to the audit committee.  The Institute 
of Internal Auditors’ President Dave Richards (Doyle 2005:1) recommends, and 
back in 2000 Hattingh (2000:14) also commented, that internal auditors should 
take a proactive approach in “selling” their services to the audit committee by 
firstly informing them of where and how internal auditors can help them and 
secondly demonstrating value by delivering relevant, comprehensive and timely 
information on the matters relevant to the audit committee’s responsibilities. 
 
Doyle (2005:2) suggests the following actions to actively promote and sell the 
internal audit activity: 
 
• Have frequent and meaningful communications with the audit committee 
and senior management. 
• Meet annually with all who report directly to the executive management 
of the organisation to find out about their goals and objectives and what 
internal auditing can do to help them achieve their goals. 
• Formally communicate on a quarterly basis with senior management, or 
more often if necessary, about what the internal audit activity has 
accomplished and plans to accomplish. Never assume that senior 
management understands the value of internal auditing. 
• Make sure that the internal audit staff are equally aware of the 
importance of internal auditing and that they too promote the profession. 
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4.3.2 The role of the chief audit executive in providing assistance to the 
audit committee 
 
Richards (2001:1) reflects that the chief audit executive (CAE) could also act in 
an advisory capacity and is already serving the audit committee in the following 
ways:  
 
• Coordinating and maintaining a planning agenda for meetings that details 
all the required activities and drafting the meeting agenda for the audit 
committee chairperson’s review. 
• Coordinating the collection and distribution of the meeting agenda and 
advance material to help audit committee members prepare for 
meetings. 
• Attending all audit committee meetings and producing minutes of the 
meetings. 
• Ensuring appropriate people are present at audit committee meetings 
and keeping an attendance list. 
• Meeting periodically with the chairperson to ascertain whether the 
materials and information provided to the committee are meeting their 
needs (Sawyer et al 2003:1334). 
• Ascertaining that the audit committee’s annual agenda covers all the 
responsibilities required by the audit committee charter and assisting the 
committee in reporting annually to the board on all the completed duties 
assigned to them (Sawyer et al 2003:1334). 
• Ensuring that the audit committee reviews and updates the audit 
committee charter at least annually or as needed and advising the 
committee whether the charter addresses all responsibilities as 
mandated from the board of directors (Sawyer et al 2003:1334). 
• Preparing reports on topics of interest to the audit committee based on 
the results of audits. 
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• Providing plans, budgets and results of internal audit department 
activities as well as the internal audit charter. 
• Ensuring that external reports are prepared for the audit committee (eg 
JSE report). 
• Meeting privately with the audit committee (without management's 
representatives in attendance) on a regular basis (Unisa 2005:172). 
• Advising the audit committee member on his or her relationship with the 
external auditors (and on how the internal and external audits are 
progressing) (Unisa 2005:172). 
• Encouraging the audit committee to conduct annual assessments of their 
activities and practices compared to leading best practices to enhance 
the committee’s performance (Sawyer et al 2003:1334). 
• Inquiring from the audit committee about the need for educational or 
informational sessions or presentations, such as the induction or training 
of new or existing members on risk management, control or governance 
issues or changes in legislation or regulations affecting the organisation 
(Sawyer et al 2003:1334). 
• Inquiring from the audit committee whether the frequency and time 
allotted to the committee for executive sessions or meetings are 
sufficient (Sawyer et al 2003:1334). 
 
4.3.3 Providing the audit committee with required information 
 
Audit committees need effective information systems to supply them with 
objective, comprehensive and comprehensible information.  The internal audit 
activity is a valuable resource in helping design such an information system in 
the organisation (Verschoor 2002:7).  Richards (2001:1) indicates that this 
information could relate to the internal control systems, risk management and 
governance processes as well as to “the integrity of the financial reporting 
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system” (Bishop et al 2000:3).  Information should include updates on relevant 
topics with regard to the audit committee’s scope of work (Richards 2001:1). 
 
4.3.4 Evaluating the audit committee  
 
The internal audit activity can help improve the effectiveness of the audit 
committee by highlighting areas in which they can improve as well as 
acknowledging areas in which they performed well.   This value-added function 
of the internal auditor can be performed during the self-assessment of the board 
and its committees which, according to the King II Report (Institute of Directors 
2002:66, 69), is a necessity (Adamec et al 2005:42). 
 
The internal audit activity can perform this function through the “use of available 
best practice studies, for example self-assessment worksheets, benchmarking 
surveys, review of current literature and also charter assessments” (Richards 
2001:2). 
 
As was stated in chapter 3, the King II Report (2002:61) further requires that a 
substantial portion of the board and committee’s remuneration should be 
performance based.  Further research is envisaged on the role of the internal 
auditor as facilitator in the assessment process of audit committee members in 
order to establish a performance base for remuneration. 
 
As a starting point, the internal audit activity could evaluate the audit 
committee’s compliance with organisational policies and determine whether 
they meet certain basic standards with regard to the discharge of their 
responsibilities, before embarking on any professional development services.  
According to Sawyer et al (2003:1083), the internal audit activity could evaluate 
the audit committee in the following manner: 
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• Observe whether the audit committee’s duties are in writing and that the 
written statement of duties defines the committee’s authority and 
responsibility and to whom they are accountable. 
• Ensure that audit committee members’ roles are definite, that they are 
not merely observers, and that their duties are clearly defined. 
• Evaluate whether the committee is large enough, contains a diversity of 
skills, gender, age and race, yet small enough to operate efficiently. 
• Enquire and observe whether the audit committee members have equal 
authority, without being dominated by individual members or the 
chairperson. 
• Enquire whether an agenda is prepared for each meeting and distributed 
to the members in advance. 
• Examine the minutes prepared for each meeting and determine if copies 
were sent to the executives to whom the audit committee reports. 
• Check the minutes to determine whether items were assigned to 
individuals for action, and if due dates were scheduled. 
• Enquire whether the audit committee chairperson follows up on the 
assigned tasks on a regular basis. 
• Evaluate whether the audit committee’s activities do not overlap with the 
activities of other board committees. 
• Enquire if there is adequate rotation of audit committee members. 
• Ensure that the audit committee’s performance is evaluated at least 
annually. 
• Determine if the organisation has a proper induction and professional 
development programme for new and existing audit committee members. 
• Ascertain whether the audit committee has a member that could be 
designated as an audit committee financial expert (ACFE). 
• Assist with regard to the self-assessment process of individual audit 
committee members. 
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Over and above the evaluation of the basic functions of the audit committee, the 
internal audit activity could provide a service to the committee and add value to 
the performance of their duties in other areas that will be described below.   
 
4.3.5 Assist in the audit committee recruitment and selection process 
 
Njunga (2000:8) indicates that audit committee members should be 
independent persons with high business acumen and knowledge of the 
industry.  He questions how audit committees can be provided with such 
people, given the shortage of skilled and experienced business people in South 
Africa.  Other qualities needed to be a proactive member of an audit committee 
(see paragraph 3.2) are experience, integrity, sound judgment, inquisitiveness, 
assertiveness, high ethical standards and financial literacy (Burke & Guy 
2002:73; Tyson 2003:5).  
 
It is important that a selection or nomination committee be responsible for 
appointing audit committee members who have the required characteristics and 
qualities to contribute positively to improving organisational performance (Burke 
& Guy 2002:77).  The chief audit executive (CAE) can assist in suggesting 
guidelines for the selection of new audit committee members, preferably with 
diverse experience and knowledge, in order to give valuable input and improve 
the specific organisation’s operations. 
 
In chapter 2 the ideal composition of an audit committee was presented, but this 
could be altered to suit a particular organisation.  It was also proposed in 
paragraph 3.3 that the internal audit activity could contribute to the selection 
and recruitment process of new audit committee members in terms of 
suggesting and advising on the process to follow and the optimal composition of 
the audit committee or even indicating existing skills gaps in the committee’s 
composition.  
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SpencerStuart (2003:5) provides the following recommendations for internal 
auditors to meet audit committee needs with regard to the selection and 
recruitment process of new committee members:  
 
• Remain up to date with regard to changes in legislation, governance, risk 
management, control, recommendations and best practices. 
• Help the nominating committee design a disciplined selection process for 
identifying the ideal audit committee candidate. 
• Research appropriate outside consultants and resources.  If desired, 
screen outside consultants for the board and recommend a search 
consultant or search firm to aid in the process. 
• Take the initiative to provide useful advice to the nominating committee 
about what other companies are doing. 
• Thoroughly vet candidates and keep the board alert to any potential 
conflict of interest. 
 
4.3.6 Assist in planning and preparing the meeting agenda 
 
It is recommended by Hattingh (2000:5) that the internal audit activity serves the 
audit committee by taking on the role of a secretariat to the committee, 
especially where there is no company secretary available.  They can assist 
audit committees in setting up agendas and meeting schedules that detail “all 
required activities, to ascertain whether they are completed and that assists the 
committee in reporting to the board annually that it has completed all assigned 
duties” (IIA 2004c:149). According to Richards (2001:1), the internal auditors 
could furthermore make the necessary materials available, provide facilitation, 
document the results of the meetings, follow up on the items for action and 
ensure that the results are achieved. 
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Hattingh (2000:5), the IIA (2005:2) and Sawyer et al (2003:1337), suggest that 
the following aspects could improve the effectiveness of audit committee 
meetings, which the internal audit activity can utilise in its endeavour to assist 
the audit committee in planning and preparing for the audit committee meetings: 
 
• Use a scheduling calendar to guarantee audit committees address all 
their responsibilities and the duties assigned to them by the board of 
directors over the course of the year. 
• Balance the workload across the meetings by using an events timetable. 
• Meet in person at least four times a year, on the understanding that most 
of the meetings will last two to four hours. 
• Screen the quality of any documents in advance before distribution to the 
audit committee. 
• Provide audit committee members and other parties that will attend the 
meeting with a detailed, written agenda and briefing materials at least ten 
days in advance of the meetings. 
• Expect the audit committee chair to facilitate the discussion, encourage 
meaningful participation and ensure that meetings are informative and 
candid. 
• Hold pre-meetings to explore important issues, and ensure that the right 
people attend. 
• Ensure that accurate minutes are kept to provide a high-level summary 
of meeting discussions (including insights on the topics and subtopics 
discussed).  
• Capture the responsibility for follow-up actions to ensure accountability 
and the dates scheduled for execution. 
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4.3.7 Assist in supervising and overseeing the external auditors 
 
Even though the internal audit activity and the external audit function should be 
mutually supportive and it is possible that the external auditors might feel 
threatened by this agreement, Adamec et al (2005:43-44) indicate the following 
reasons for the internal auditors to be the main resource to assist the audit 
committee in overseeing the duties of the external auditors: 
 
• Internal auditing reports directly to the audit committee; thus, is in a 
critical functional advisory position. 
• Internal auditors may be viewed as less biased or conflicted and, 
therefore, more independent than any other financial function in the 
organization. Because the major output of the external auditor’s work is 
an opinion on the quality of financial management’s efforts, the internal 
audit department is the most independent and knowledgeable of the 
organization’s financial functions. 
• Internal audit are present at all times.  They are on site when the 
external auditors are performing their work, when the external auditors 
meet with management, and even after the external auditors leave.  This 
makes the internal auditors an ever-present observer of how 
management and the external auditors react to one another and how 
management responds to the external auditor’s findings. 
• Internal auditors have credible auditing and accounting backgrounds, 
and many have significant experience as external auditors. Thus, 
internal auditors can provide meaningful, experienced feedback to the 
audit committee in their assessment of the external auditor’s work. 
• Internal auditors have in-depth knowledge of the organization and its 
vulnerabilities.  Thus, they can assess the suitability of the external 
auditor’s efforts in terms of the audit scope and coverage. 
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According to Adamec et al (2005:43), the following functions can be performed 
by the internal auditors to assist the audit committee in its supervision and 
oversight of the external auditors: 
 
• Performing the lead role in selecting and retaining the external auditors 
and negotiating their fees. 
• Assessing the work of the external auditors and providing an opinion of 
the external auditor’s work. 
• Providing an informed opinion on the relationship between the external 
auditors and management, such as management’s propensity to give 
due consideration and care in implementing the external auditor’s 
suggestions. 
• Providing input regarding the resolution of disputes between 
management and the external auditors over financial reporting, internal 
controls over financial reporting, and other control issues. 
• Advising on the suitability of approving management’s request to 
engage the external auditor for extra work outside the normal audit 
engagement. 
 
4.3.8 Assist in reviewing the audit committee charter 
 
Internal auditing can also, according to Wagner (2000:2), provide help and 
support to the audit committee in the committee’s own governance process of 
establishing a charter and defining the role and responsibilities of audit 
committees. 
 
The audit committee charter needs to be reviewed and updated regularly as the 
audit committees’ responsibilities might change.  The internal audit activity and 
especially the chief audit executive can act as a valuable adviser to the 
committee by assisting in the review of the charter and advising the committee 
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on shortcomings or organisational changes that affect the charter (IIA 
2004c:149). 
 
Paragraph 2.3.3 elaborates on the requirements in drafting a functional audit 
committee charter. 
 
 
4.4 NEED FOR A FRAMEWORK TO ASSIST AUDIT COMMITTEES TO 
PERFORM THEIR OVERSIGHT FUNCTION  
 
It is important for audit committees to focus on an efficient process that supports 
the effective oversight responsibility assigned to them by the board of directors.  
This requires a framework that goes beyond mere compliance with new rules, 
and which facilitates the coordination of audit committee activities.  The training 
and information provided need to support the audit committee’s understanding 
and monitoring of the company’s financial reporting, risk management, 
governance and control processes. 
 
KPMG (2003c:2) suggests that such a framework should help enable the audit 
committee to: 
 
• Effectively prioritize and address financial reporting risks and issues 
affecting the financial reporting process. 
• Ensure that key issues are addressed in depth. 
• Establish a strong relationship with the company’s internal and external 
auditors. 
• Identify, coordinate and evaluate contributions of other key participants. 
• Facilitate an effective and efficient oversight process. 
• Ensure that the organisation and relevant processes are compliant with 
applicable rules and regulations. 
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• Keep audit committee members abreast of regulatory changes and other 
emerging trends and issues. 
 
A significant contribution in terms of time, effort and resources is required from 
the audit committee to build an effective framework.  The audit committee 
members are also required to have a sufficient understanding of the 
organisation’s risk management, control and governance processes, quality 
information received from all parties, sound guidance from the audit committee 
chairperson (with the assistance of other key parties), and to remain focused on 
priority risks.  The internal audit activity is in an ideal position to develop such a 
framework and customise it for a specific organisation (KPMG 2003c:2). 
 
KPMG (2003c:2) states that fundamentally the success of the audit committee’s 
oversight efforts will rest on its ability to: 
 
• Understand, articulate, and assume its enhanced role in the new 
regulatory environment. 
• Oversee the financial reporting process without taking on management’s 
role. 
• Leverage the basic principles that are essential for audit committee 
effectiveness as set out on page 44. 
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4.5 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter described the role and responsibilities of the internal audit activity 
in an organisation and the relationship between internal auditors and the audit 
committee in an attempt to determine the value-added services the internal 
audit activity could provide to the audit committee.   
 
The organisational status and objectivity of the internal audit activity were also 
examined to determine whether it is possible for the internal auditing activity to 
accept the responsibility of providing consulting services to the audit committee. 
The consulting services available to the audit committee were researched and 
explored and consideration was also given to the possibility that this might 
affect the independence or objectivity of the internal audit activity.  The 
additional value-added services that could be provided to the audit committee 
were presented in the framework (Addendum D).   
 
The different ways in which internal auditors could sell these services to the 
board of directors and audit committees were also described. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the internal audit activity could undoubtedly 
make a positive contribution in the selection and professional development 
process of the audit committee and that it would not necessarily affect the 
internal auditor’s independence or objectivity. 
 
Chapter 5 will describe the role of the internal audit activity in providing 
induction and professional development programmes to the audit committee as 
well as the aspects that could be covered in these programmes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
INDUCTION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES FOR 
AUDIT COMMITTEES 
 
 
“Real empowerment could be achieved by helping people to acquire 
the skills, opportunities and resources that they need to compete 
successfully in a tough and competitive world.” 
 (FW de Klerk in Developing Africa 2006:7) 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapter 4 the author considered the requirements for internal auditors to 
provide additional professional development services to the audit committee 
and examined the relationship between internal auditors and the audit 
committee.  The different ways in which the internal audit activity and the chief 
audit executive can sell these services to the audit committee were described 
as well as the value-added services the internal audit activity could provide to 
the audit committee.   
 
This chapter established the professional development needs and requirements 
of the audit committee members through a literature review and a survey 
among audit committee members and internal auditors.  The role of the internal 
audit activity in providing induction and professional development services was 
explored.  In developing the framework (Addendum D) to be used by the 
internal audit activity, emphasis is placed on the fact that such a framework 
should be customised for specific organisations and tailored to meet the needs 
of individual audit committees. 
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5.2 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT ACTIVITY IN PROVIDING 
INDUCTION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES TO 
AUDIT COMMITTEES 
 
5.2.1 Motivation for the internal audit activity to provide these services 
 
The Report of the working group chaired by Daniel Bouton on promoting better 
corporate governance in listed companies (Bouton 2002:12) states that “the 
members of the committee, in addition to their existing financial management 
and/or accounting expertise, should upon appointment be informed of the 
company’s specific accounting, financial and operating features”. 
 
Although other parties such as the company secretary and senior management 
are involved in providing the members of the audit committee with an induction 
programme, the author is of the opinion that the internal audit activity is also 
well suited to providing the committee members with valuable information as 
they have a comprehensive knowledge of the organisation as a whole. 
 
New members could be trained in aspects such as the basic organisational 
structure, the business environment or industry, the risk management policies 
and other key issues (Steinberg 2000:3; Institute of Directors 2002:64).  The 
audit committee also needs to be updated regarding new legal and regulatory 
requirements, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the 
Corporate Laws Amendment Bill and the internal audit activity’s function and 
standards (IIA 2006:16). 
 
The internal audit activity can assist audit committee members in their 
professional development and induction process regarding their various duties 
and responsibilities, regarding new legislation, and regarding the latest 
developments and practices (Wagner 2000:3). 
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Marks (2003:41) states that “because internal auditors must stay current on 
trends, legislation, regulations, and risk management, they are the ideal 
organizational resource to develop and manage an education program for 
directors”.  The same education would be equally valuable for audit committee 
members to aid them in the effective and efficient performance of their oversight 
duties.  It is therefore the author’s opinion that certain aspects in terms of audit 
committee professional development and induction are best undertaken by the 
internal audit activity. 
 
Sawyer et al (2003:1341) states that “many internal audit departments have 
embarked on courses of education for audit committee members, bringing to 
the attention of new members, in particular, what the internal audit activity is 
now doing and what it is capable of doing.  The results are greater support, 
increased status, and improved effectiveness of the internal auditors and 
correspondingly greater comfort to the audit committees”.  This value-added 
role is supported by the IIA Research Foundation, which conducted a survey in 
1999 entitled “Audit committee effectiveness – what works best”, in which 
Steinberg and Bromilow (2000a:45) reflect that audit committee chairs identified 
management and external auditors as the two groups best positioned to provide 
continuing education.  However, Michael Young, an attorney in the USA who 
specialises in defending accounting firms accused of fraud, has the following to 
say in his book on Corporate Governance (Hattingh 2000:3):  
 
Even if they (audit committees) are financially sophisticated and 
independent an audit committee faces the perilous risk of not 
having enough or accurate information.   ... of three possible 
information sources – senior executives, external auditors, and 
internal auditors – the internal auditors are its best bet. 
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5.2.2 Providing an induction programme for new audit committee 
members 
 
5.2.2.1 Nature of the induction programme 
 
An introductory or induction session should be provided for new audit 
committee members to bring them up to speed with the company’s operations 
and the functions of the audit committee as soon as possible.  The survey 
results (Addendum C) indicated that almost all respondents (96.8%) considered 
an induction programme for new audit committee members a necessity and that 
51.6% of the respondents stated that the audit committees of their organisations 
had introduced an induction programme for new audit committee members.  A 
majority (83.9%) of respondents indicated that they would also agree to an 
induction programme presented to them. 
 
Wixley and Everingham (2002:22) state that the induction of non-executive 
directors in particular could include a considerable amount of information or 
relevant documentation that could be presented in the form of the audit 
committee charter, annual reports of the company, minutes of audit committee 
meetings and copies of any communication between the audit committee and 
other related parties (Burke & Guy 2002:79).  The induction process could also 
comprise actual visits to the company’s major premises and informal 
discussions with senior staff with regard to their roles in the organisation (Wixley 
& Everingham 2002:22). 
 
The role of the internal audit activity in this process is related to its normal 
function as the provider of information.  In most companies the company 
secretary generally performs this function as a recommendation of the King II 
Report (2002:30) but it is the author’s opinion that the internal audit activity can 
also make a valuable contribution in this regard. 
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An induction programme could take various forms, for example attendance of 
formal courses and conferences, internal company talks and seminars, and 
briefings by external advisers (Combined Code 2003:54).   
 
In designing an induction or orientation programme, internal auditors need to 
keep the following suggestions by Deloitte (2005b:1) in mind: 
 
• Designate a project leader and the other team members involved in the 
induction process. 
• Tailor the programme according to the company’s requirements and the 
audit committee’s needs. 
• Make the learning convenient and enjoyable for all the participants. 
• Scale the programme contents to the audience’s needs and level of 
experience and skills. 
• Make use of subject-related specialists, for example engineers, lawyers 
and external auditors to provide insight with regard to aspects in which 
the internal auditors are not experienced or knowledgeable. 
• Plan ahead and make provision if accreditation needs to be obtained. 
• Provide reading materials to all the participants in advance and also 
supply each attendee with an induction pack. 
• Supplement your customised programmes in terms of needs identified or 
aspects enquired about by participants during the programme. 
• Create a multiyear plan to provide updates on topics identified by the 
participants or anticipated changes in regulations or legislation affecting 
the organisation. 
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5.2.2.2 Scope of the induction programme 
 
It is important that the audit committee first gain an understanding of the 
organisation, its business and the process “in order to become as effective in 
their new role as soon as possible” (ICSA 2005:1).  As part of the induction 
programme the internal audit activity could create the following opportunities or 
make suggestions for the audit committee to gain knowledge about the 
company (Bromilow & Berlin 2005:2; ICSA 2005:1): 
 
• Visiting company plants and facilities and sites other than the 
headquarters, to learn about production or services and meet 
employees in an informal setting. 
• Meeting with marketing and sales management to understand the 
company’s products and markets. 
• Meeting with business unit leaders to further understand operations. 
• Meeting with finance management, internal audit, and the external 
auditors to understand new accounting and disclosure requirements and 
emerging issues. 
• Listening to management’s calls with analysts. 
• Reviewing competitor financial statements and non-financial information. 
• Reading trade journals. 
• Research the company on the internet. 
• Participate in board strategy development. “Awaydays” enable a new 
non-executive director to begin to build working relationships away from 
the formal setting of the boardroom. 
• Build an understanding of the company’s main relationships including 
meeting with the auditors and developing a knowledge of in particular: 
- who are the major customers; 
- who are the major suppliers; and 
- who are the major shareholders and what is the shareholder 
relations policy – participation in meetings with shareholders can 
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help give a first hand feel as well as letting shareholders know 
who the non-executive directors are. 
 
It is important that each company develop their own comprehensive, formal 
induction programme that is tailored to the needs and profile of the company 
and also the individual audit committee members (Combined Code 2003:63). 
 
In designing an induction programme, “a combination of the provision of 
relevant written information together with presentations, meetings and site visits 
will assist in giving the new audit committee members a balanced and real-life 
overview of the company and its operations.  Care should however, be taken 
not to overload the new committee members with too much information.  The 
new members should be given a list of all the information or an induction pack 
should be made available to them so that they may call up items if required that 
were otherwise provided before. (Higgs 2003:75.) 
 
5.2.2.3 The induction programme 
 
According to the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), 
an induction pack could be divided into three parts, of which the first part 
includes the essential material that should be provided on appointment and the 
second part includes material that should be made available over a three-month 
period from the date of appointment.  The last part should contain items or 
information that the audit committee members should be made aware of. (ICSA 
2005:1.)  The aforementioned could also form part of the professional 
development process and will therefore be dealt with under paragraph 5.2.3.5.   
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The induction programme should include the following aspects (Combined 
Code 2003:79-80; ICSA 2005:3-5): 
 
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED ON APPOINTMENT: 
 
1. The duties and responsibilities of the audit committee: 
• A brief outline of the role of an audit committee member and a summary 
of his/her responsibilities and ongoing obligation under legislation, 
regulations and best practice. 
• Details of the board and audit committee accountability and fiduciary 
responsibility to the company’s members. 
• The company’s constitution and guidelines on: 
 board procedures and matters reserved for the board 
 delegated authorities 
 the policy for obtaining independent professional advice 
 other standing orders, policies and procedures 
 ethics. 
 
2. The nature of the company, its business and the markets in which it 
operates: 
• The current strategic or business plan, market analysis and budgets for 
the year. 
• The company’s latest annual report and management accounts, and 
interims as appropriate. 
• The group structure, list of major domestic and overseas subsidiaries, 
associated companies and joint ventures, including parent 
company/companies. 
• Summary details of the company’s principal assets, liabilities, significant 
contracts and major competitors. 
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• The company’s major risks, risk management strategy and latest risk 
assessment report. 
• An explanation of key performance indicators (KPI). 
• Summary details of major group insurance policies, including directors’ 
and officers’ (D & O) liability insurance. 
• Details of any major litigation, either current or potential, being 
undertaken by the company or against the company. 
• Treasury issues in terms of funding position and arrangements, and the 
dividend and bonus policy of the organisation. 
• The corporate brochure, mission statement and other relevant reports 
and summary of main events over the last three years. 
• Regulatory constraints. 
 
3. Audit committee issues: 
• Up-to-date copy of the company’s Memorandum and Articles of 
Association/Constitution/Rules, with a summary of the most important 
provisions. 
• The board resolution creating the audit committee (Burke and Guy 
2002:79). 
• The audit committee charter, which outlines the audit committee’s key 
responsibilities and any limits to its authority. 
• Minutes of the last three to six audit committee meetings. 
• Schedule of the dates of future audit committee meetings, meeting 
schedules and agendas, meeting frequency, length and the normal 
location of meetings (Steinberg & Bromilow 2000:43). 
• Description of audit committee procedures covering details regarding 
meetings, such as when documents are sent out and the expected 
coverage in terms of the normal agenda followed. 
• Brief biographical sketches and contact details of all directors of the 
company, audit committee members, internal audit staff, the company 
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secretary and other key executives.  This should include any executive 
responsibilities of directors and audit committee members, their dates of 
appointment, any board committees upon which individuals sit and the 
background and qualifications of senior management (Apostolou & 
Jeffords 1990:31). 
• Details of board subcommittees together with terms of reference. 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED DURING THE FIRST 
THREE MONTHS: 
 
• Copies of the company's main product/services brochures. 
• Copies of recent press cuttings, reports and articles concerning the 
company. 
• Details of the company's advisers (lawyers, bankers, auditors etc), both 
internal and external, with the name of the partner dealing with the 
company's affairs. 
• The company's risk management procedures and relevant disaster 
recovery plans. 
• An outline of the provisions of the King II Report together with details of 
the company's own corporate governance guidelines and any other 
corporate governance guidelines which the company seeks to follow. 
• Brief history of the company, including when formed and any significant 
events during its history. 
• Notices of any general meetings held in the last three years, and 
accompanying circulars as appropriate. 
• Company organisational chart and management succession plans. 
• Details of the five largest suppliers to the company. 
• Policies with regard to: 
 health & safety 
 environmental matters 
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 ethics and whistleblowing 
 charitable & political donations. 
• Internal company telephone directory. 
 
5.2.3 Fulfilling the audit committee’s professional development 
requirements 
 
5.2.3.1 A shared responsibility 
 
To ensure the effectiveness of audit committee members the organisation 
should make professional development opportunities available to the members 
of the committee.  From the empirical study (Addendum C), respondents 
indicated that only 47.8% had received past training in the business or 
operations of the organisation where they served as audit committee members. 
Those respondents who did receive training indicated that 75% of the training 
was performed internally.  Only 43.5% received training with regard to the 
financial and/or other regulations impacting their organisation. Of this training, 
71.4% was provided by an external training provider or consultant.  The results 
also indicated that 47.8% received training regarding their duties as an audit 
committee member, of which 75% was also done externally.     
 
Members should take responsibility for their own professional development in 
areas in which they have identified a need to update their knowledge.  The 
importance of continuous professional development was also highlighted by the 
survey results, which revealed that 58.1% of the respondents considered 
continuous education to be “very important” as reflected in chart 5.1 below.  
However, 71% of the respondents indicated that their companies do not have a 
continuous education programme for their audit committee members.  
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Chart 5.1: Importance of continuous education  
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The responsibility for developing and implementing a professional development 
programme normally lies with the board of directors or the company secretary.  
It is therefore very important that there should be a commitment from individual 
audit committee members and the board of directors in this regard.  It is 
furthermore important that the professional development process should be an 
ongoing process and that it should be provided in a timely manner. (Martinelli 
2000:1.) 
 
According to KPMG’s Audit Committee Forum (ACF 2006b:8) and Bromilow 
and Berlin (2005:119-120), the following aspects should be taken into 
consideration in respect of professional development opportunities and 
information provided to audit committee members to ensure an effective and 
proactive audit committee: 
 
• Audit committee members should have the opportunity to participate in 
some form of continuing education to stay abreast of changes in the 
financial accounting and reporting, regulatory and ethics areas. 
• Committee members are provided with continuing information and 
training on business and accounting developments and other matters 
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relevant to new responsibilities or changes in the business on the 
organisation’s expense. 
• Committee members should be comfortable that formal education 
programmes, management and auditor briefings, independent member 
reading and formal training sessions combine to provide all required 
development that members need to be effective. 
• The audit committee sets specific educational and training objectives for 
members, meeting any needs identified in performance evaluations and 
committee discussions. 
• Audit committee members engage in independent counsel and 
commands adequate resources in terms of professional development to 
support them in accomplishing objectives. 
 
5.2.3.2 Specific professional development needs of audit committee 
members 
 
Audit committee members need to acquire knowledge of matters that relate to 
the nature of the entity’s business, its organisation and its operations.  They 
also require ongoing professional development to remain current on regulatory 
standards and developments, business activities and changes. (Bromilow & 
Berlin 2005:79.)   
 
In general the following aspects are of importance for audit committees’ 
professional development (Braiotta 2004:220; Bromilow & Berlin 2005:79): 
 
• Accounting and financial reporting developments (especially IFRS), 
accounting practices common to the industry, competitive conditions, 
financial trends and ratios (61.9% of survey respondents (Addendum C)). 
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• The business environment, for example economic conditions, 
government regulations, and changes in technology and matters 
affecting the industry in which the entity operates. 
• Key information systems, processes, and controls in the company. 
• Risk identification and risk management (71.4% of respondents 
(Addendum C)). 
• Corporate governance. 
• Emerging audit committee responsibilities. 
• The company’s business, for example, the type of business, type of 
products and services, capital structure, related parties, location, and 
production, distribution, and compensation methods. 
• Legal and regulatory developments. 
 
In the empirical study (Addendum C), the following aspects were also 
mentioned as professional development areas: 
 
• Industry laws and regulations (57.1%). 
• Operational skills (28.6%). 
• Internal and external audit responsibilities (19%). 
• Information technology (9.5%). 
• Health, safety and the environment (4.8%). 
• Strategic management (4.8%). 
• Outsourcing (4.8%). 
• Taxation (4.8%). 
• Problem solving skills (4.8%). 
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5.2.3.3 Sources available to provide professional development 
 
In South Africa, the following sources are available for providing education to 
new and existing audit committee members (Tyson 2003:18): 
 
• Introductory seminars, conferences and courses offered by the Institute 
of Directors in Johannesburg, South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (SAICA), business schools and consultancies. 
• Induction or orientation training (firm specific – Deloitte & Touche, 
NTSILU). 
• General training or executive sessions. 
• Customised in-house sessions, professional development and evaluation 
programmes (human resources, company secretary, internal audit). 
• Interfacing with other directors, management, internal and external 
auditors. 
• Independent reading or research. 
 
The results of the empirical study (Addendum C) showed workshops and 
seminars to be the most preferred method of training and in-house training to be 
the least preferred. 
 
5.2.3.4 Designing the professional development programme 
 
In designing audit committee professional development programmes the 
internal audit activity needs to consider the audit committee charter, the 
available training providers, and the composition, qualifications and experience 
of committee members.  The available time and the specific professional 
development requirements indicated by members should also be taken into 
account.  The evaluation of audit committee performance through self-
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assessment or peer reviews can be used as a source from which to develop the 
professional development programme.   
 
Standard induction or orientation programmes for new members elected to the 
audit committee should, however, be designed and tailored to meet the needs 
of the specific company.  Terrell and Reed (2003a:68) comment on the KPMG’s 
Audit Committee Institute (ACI) Roundtable of 2003 where there were over 
2400 participants at which most attendees indicated that company-specific 
professional development programmes provide an opportunity for “audit 
committee members to identify and focus on issues that may need to be 
addressed in future meetings”. 
 
5.2.3.5 Information to be provided to audit committee members 
 
Literature suggests the following information that should be made available to 
audit committee members.  This information could be provided by the internal 
audit activity, along with any other industry or regulatory changes that might be 
important to new and existing members: 
 
• Information about the business and industry in which the company 
operates and any changes thereto (Braiotta 2004:87) for instance – 
 competitive and economic conditions 
 government regulations 
 foreign operations 
 new technological advancements 
 industry accounting practices 
 changes in social attitudes 
 management’s risk assessment process. 
• Insight into strategy, competitive positioning, operations, sales channels, 
supply chain and other business issues, as a basis for recognising and 
 151
analysing controls and reported results as well as the company’s 
products and services (Steinberg & Bromilow 2000a:43). 
• Information with regard to the formal and informal communications 
channels, staffing policies, reporting relationships, and reward systems 
(Swanson 1998:2). 
• Interim financial reports of the company for the last four quarters and the 
earnings trends per line of business (Apostolou & Jeffords 1990:31). 
• Copies of communications between the audit committee and the external 
auditors during the past three years and communications between the 
internal auditor and the audit committee for the same period (Burke & 
Guy 2002:79). 
• Internal auditing matters for instance – 
 the nature and function of the internal audit activity and a copy of 
the internal audit charter 
 general information about the size and scope of activities of the 
internal audit function and staff characteristics 
 a copy of the current year’s internal audit plan and reports 
 results of quality assurance reviews and monitoring activities 
(Braiotta 2005:223). 
• External auditing matters for instance – 
 the current engagement letter of the external auditor 
 a list of types of reports to be issued by the external auditor and the 
timing of the reports 
 a summary of work performed by the external auditor other than the 
annual audit and quarterly reviews (that is, non-audit services) 
(Burke & Guy 2002:79). 
• Results of the most recent audit committee self-assessment and the 
charter review process (Burke & Guy 2002:79). 
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• Key risks in both the business and the financial reporting process 
(Steinberg & Bromilow 2000a:43), and areas of high audit risk (Apostolou 
& Jeffords 1990:31). 
• Weaknesses identified in the internal control structure (Apostolou & 
Jeffords 1990:31). 
• Recent or planned changes in organisational policies or operations 
(Apostolou & Jeffords 1990:31). 
• Significant accounting policies or changes in such policies (Apostolou & 
Jeffords 1990:31). 
 
 
5.3 A PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
The professional development framework set out in Addendum D serves as a 
guideline for audit committees to use in their professional development process 
or for use by internal auditors in assisting the audit committee with regard to this 
process. 
 
For audit committees to effectively discharge their oversight responsibility,  a 
framework is required that coordinates their activities and the professional 
development and information they need to understand and monitor the 
company’s financial reporting, risk management, governance and control 
processes. 
 
The framework suggests best practices or principles components for effective 
audit committee performance and performance enhancement through 
benchmarking current performance against leading practices.  The framework 
could also be used to continuously monitor and evaluate progress.  
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The framework does not provide a comprehensive model however, but rather a 
conceptual outline that could be adopted by a variety of organisations and 
should be adapted to ensure the practical and ongoing implementation thereof.  
The framework may also help audit committees with little formal training or 
experience in performance evaluation to develop their own assessment. 
 
The framework (Addendum D) consists of the following: 
1. Terms of reference, roles and responsibilities  
2. Audit committee composition 
3. Principles of good governance 
4. Performance evaluation 
5. Induction 
6. Professional development 
 
 
5.4 SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter the author attempted to determine the professional development 
needs and requirements of the audit committee members through a literature 
review and a survey among audit committee members.  It also became 
apparent that the internal audit activity is well equipped to contribute towards 
providing the audit committee with an induction or professional development 
programme. 
 
The author further attempted to develop a generic framework for the induction 
and professional development services the internal audit activity could provide 
to the audit committee.  In developing the framework to be used by the internal 
audit activity, emphasis was placed on the fact that such a framework should be 
customised for specific organisations and tailored to meet the needs of 
individual audit committees. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSED 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
“All men who have turned out worth anything have had the chief 
hand in their own education.” 
 (Sir Walter Scott in Quoteland.com 2005) 
 
6.1 SUMMARY 
 
The study focused inter alia on the proposed role of the internal audit activity in 
the induction and professional development process of audit committee 
members and in the development of a framework for educating audit committee 
members per se, to improve the effectiveness of their oversight of financial 
reporting and corporate governance. 
 
The study firstly embarked on an examination of the history of the establishment 
of audit committees and an exploration of their current role and responsibilities 
as indicated by applicable regulations, especially those issued recently, such as 
the King II Report, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Corporate Laws 
Amendment Bill.   
 
How audit committee performance could be enhanced through the adoption of 
good governance principles and the benchmarking of their performance against 
global trends and best practices, was emphasised.  The principles of good 
governance and best practices were considered and examined for the purpose 
of discovering the role of the audit committee and the internal audit activity in 
ensuring a transparent and objective governance process within an organisation 
and in ascertaining whether it was possible to improve the current relationship 
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through the provision, by the internal audit activity, of a more extensive level of 
support to the audit committee.   
 
The study examined best practices with regard to audit committee charters and 
the importance of the initial establishment and maintenance of a charter to 
guide the committee in achieving its objectives as well as indicating aspects that 
could improve its performance.  In determining the possible role of the internal 
audit activity in the induction and professional development of audit committee 
members, the internal audit activity should assess the audit committee’s needs 
and requirements based on the requirements of its charter in order to address 
the identified needs.  The audit committee charter (Addendum A) is considered 
to be the “heart of an audit committee” (IIA 2005:3), and this document or terms 
of reference should be used as the basis in identifying the responsibilities of a 
specific audit committee in an organisation.   
 
Emphasis was also placed on the importance of complying with the composition 
requirements and the ideal structure for the committee in order to ensure 
effective and efficient performance of their oversight responsibilities.  Selecting 
qualified and independent members to the audit committee will not necessarily 
ensure optimal performance and therefore the study emphasised the 
significance of the induction and professional development process of new and 
existing audit committee members.  The resources currently available to the 
audit committee as well as the importance of the committee’s reliance on 
sufficient resources to assist them to perform their responsibilities were 
considered, together with the current role of the internal audit activity in this 
regard.      
 
The importance of selecting audit committee members who are professional, 
properly qualified, independent, experienced, informed, and able to make a 
valuable contribution right from the beginning when performing their oversight 
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responsibilities and to be effective at the same time was highlighted.  The 
personal attributes of an ideal audit committee member were therefore 
discussed in great detail.  Some of the most important attributes mentioned 
were integrity, commitment, an enquiring mind and sound judgment.  The 
matter of recruiting audit committee members and the process by which audit 
committees are selected and appointed were also addressed.  The need for a 
“standard” or a curriculum to be introduced for non-executive board members in 
terms of their qualifications, skills and experience was also considered.  The 
study further considered the internal auditor’s role in ensuring a formal, 
transparent, objective and effective process of recruitment and selection of new 
audit committee members.   
 
The importance of having a proper induction process for new audit committee 
members was further explored, as were the professional development 
programmes to ensure the ongoing professional development of existing or 
seasoned audit committee members. The author also investigated audit 
committee compensation and the importance of the evaluation of individual 
members to improve the effectiveness of the audit committee. 
 
In discharging their oversight responsibilities, audit committees need to evaluate 
and improve their performance and they need to be empowered with the 
authority and necessary resources to protect stakeholder interests in terms of 
financial reporting, internal control, risk management and governance 
processes.   
 
The need for a framework for audit committee development was considered in 
order to establish best practices and adopt good governance principles within 
all organisations in South Africa.  Because no formal guideline currently exists 
for the selection or professional development of audit committee members, the 
study attempted to determine the role that the internal audit activity can accept 
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in assisting audit committees to meet their objectives and improve performance, 
without suggesting a conflict of interest or compromising the independence of 
the internal auditor. 
 
By using a questionnaire distributed among audit committee members and 
internal auditors the author attempted to establish the current composition, 
qualifications and experience of audit committees in South Africa, their 
professional development needs and whether there is any opportunity for the 
internal audit activity to provide induction and professional development 
services to audit committees.   
 
The study attempted to ascertain whether the internal audit activity could make 
a positive contribution in the selection and professional development of audit 
committees and whether taking on such a role could affect the internal auditor’s 
independence or even suggest a conflict of interest.  The methods available to 
the internal auditors to provide a value-added service were explored, as were 
the different ways in which the internal audit activity and the chief audit 
executive can sell these services to the audit committee.  The author also 
considered what would be required of internal auditors if they are to embark on 
such role and undertake to provide better services to the audit committee. 
 
The study attempted to develop a framework for the value-added services the 
internal audit activity is in a position to provide to audit committees.  In order to 
determine whether this is a role that can be accepted by the internal audit 
activity, the relationship between internal auditors and the audit committee was 
considered, along with the role of the internal audit activity in providing 
consulting services to audit committees. 
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In developing the framework to be used by the internal audit activity in providing 
consulting services to the audit committee, emphasis was placed on the fact 
that such a framework should be customised for specific organisations and 
tailored to meet the needs of individual audit committees. 
 
 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS 
 
From the survey conducted one can conclude that although many organisations 
expose newly appointed audit committee members to an induction programme, 
only a few continue with professional development of its members thereafter; 
even though the members would prefer to be trained through a continuous 
training programme. 
 
Committee members in general prefer in-house workshops especially on topics 
like risk management, finance and the laws and regulations that govern their 
particular organisation.   
 
One can therefore conclude that there is definitely a scope for the internal audit 
activity to provide such a service to audit committee members without 
compromising its independence.  A framework to assist the internal audit 
activity inter alia in determining professional development needs of audit 
committee members was developed and is provided in Addendum D of this 
study. 
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6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The internal audit activity can only be of service to the audit committee if it 
possesses the necessary knowledge, skills and experience.  The internal audit 
activity must therefore stay current on the latest developments, new regulations, 
trends and best practices.   
 
The framework developed in this study as set out in Addendum D should be 
adapted and customised for individual organisations so that it reflects the 
uniqueness of each organisation.  The framework is recommended for use by 
the internal audit activities of organisations in order to establish the extent of 
compliance of the audit committees with their charter.  Similarly, the internal 
audit activity could assess deficiencies and, on the basis of its findings, 
determine what scope there is for the audit committee to improve compliance 
where necessary, inter alia through the professional development of its 
members.  The framework could also be used by audit committees to 
continuously monitor performance and evaluate progress. 
 
Addendum D contains an example of a framework for use in the selection and 
recruitment of audit committee members as well as in the proposed induction 
and professional development process. 
 
It covers the following aspects: 
1. Terms of reference, roles and responsibilities  
2. Audit committee composition 
3. Principles of good governance 
4. Performance evaluation 
5. Induction 
6. Professional development 
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6.4 PROPOSED FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
The author is of opinion that further research is necessary in terms of the 
professional development of audit committees and also the process of 
evaluating the performance of individual audit committee members to enable 
the committee to contribute positively and proactively to the organisation they 
are appointed to.   
 
The envisaged further study will attempt to elaborate on the framework 
developed to contain the evaluation process of the audit committee.  
Consideration of the balanced scorecard approach in the evaluation process 
can be further explored.  The possible role of the internal audit activity in this 
regard, can be examined in further detail. 
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ADDENDUM A 
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARTER 
 
PURPOSE 
To assist the board of directors in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities for the 
financial reporting process, the system of internal control, the audit process, and 
the company's process for monitoring compliance with laws and regulations and 
the code of conduct. 
 
AUTHORITY 
The audit committee has authority to conduct or authorize investigations into 
any matters within its scope of responsibility. It is empowered to: 
 
• Appoint, compensate, and oversee the work of any registered public 
accounting firm employed by the organization.  
• Resolve any disagreements between management and the auditor 
regarding financial reporting.  
• Pre-approve all auditing and non-audit services.  
• Retain independent counsel, accountants, or others to advise the 
committee or assist in the conduct of an investigation.  
• Seek any information it requires from employees - all of whom are 
directed to cooperate with the committee's requests - or external parties.  
• Meet with company officers, external auditors, or outside counsel, as 
necessary. 
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COMPOSITION 
The audit committee will consist of at least three and no more than six members 
of the board of directors. The board or its nominating committee will appoint 
committee members and the committee chair. 
Each committee member will be both independent and financially literate. At 
least one member shall be designated as the “financial expert”, as defined by 
applicable legislation and regulation. 
 
MEETINGS 
The committee will meet at least four times a year, with authority to convene 
additional meetings, as circumstances require. All committee members are 
expected to attend each meeting, in person or via tele- or video-conference. 
The committee will invite members of management, auditors or others to attend 
meetings and provide pertinent information, as necessary. It will hold private 
meetings with auditors (see below) and executive sessions. Meeting agendas 
will be prepared and provided in advance to members, along with appropriate 
briefing materials. Minutes will be prepared. 
 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
The committee will carry out the following responsibilities: 
 
Financial Statements 
 
• Ensuring that financial statements are understandable, transparent, and 
reliable (IIA 2005:3). 
• Review significant accounting and reporting issues, including complex or 
unusual transactions and highly judgmental areas, and recent 
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professional and regulatory pronouncements, and understand their 
impact on the financial statements.  
• Review with management and the external auditors the results of the 
audit, including any difficulties encountered.  
• Review the annual financial statements, and consider whether they are 
complete, consistent with information known to committee members, and 
reflect appropriate accounting principles.  
• Review other sections of the annual report and related regulatory filings 
before release and consider the accuracy and completeness of the 
information.  
• Review with management and the external auditors all matters required 
to be communicated to the committee under generally accepted auditing 
Standards.  
• Understand how management develops interim financial information, 
and the nature and extent of internal and external auditor involvement.  
• Review interim financial reports with management and the external 
auditors before filing with regulators, and consider whether they are 
complete and consistent with the information known to committee 
members. 
 
Internal Control and Risk Management 
 
• Ensuring the risk management process is comprehensive and ongoing, 
rather than partial and periodic (IIA 2005:3). 
• Helping achieve an organization-wide commitment to strong and 
effective internal controls, emanating from the tone at the top (IIA 
2005:3). 
• Inquire of management, the internal auditor, and the external auditor 
about significant risks and exposures and assess the steps management 
has taken to monitor and control such risks (Burke & Guy 2002:285). 
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• Consider the effectiveness of the company's internal control system, 
including information technology security and control.  
• Understand the scope of internal and external auditors' review of internal 
control over financial reporting, and obtain reports on significant findings 
and recommendations, together with management's responses. 
 
Internal Audit 
 
• Ensuring the internal auditors’ access to the audit committee, 
encouraging communication beyond scheduled committee meetings (IIA 
2005:3). 
• Review with management and the chief audit executive the charter, 
plans, activities, staffing, budget, reports and organizational structure of 
the internal audit function (Burke & Guy 2002:285). 
• Ensure there are no unjustified restrictions or limitations, and review and 
concur in the appointment, replacement, reassignment or dismissal of 
the chief audit executive (Burke & Guy 2002:285). 
• Review the effectiveness of the internal audit function, including 
compliance with The Institute of Internal Auditors' International Standards 
for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.  
• On a regular basis, meet separately with the chief audit executive to 
discuss any matters that the committee or internal audit believes should 
be discussed privately. 
• Consider and discuss with management and the internal auditor 
significant internal audit findings during the year, including 
management’s responses thereto (Burke & Guy 2002:285). 
• Consider and discuss with management and the internal auditor 
significant changes in the scope of the internal audit plans or activities 
(Burke & Guy 2002:285). 
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External Audit 
 
• Establishing a direct reporting relationship with the external auditors (IIA 
2005:3). 
• Review the external auditors' proposed audit scope and approach. 
• Discuss the coordination of audit effort with the internal audit activity and 
the external auditor to assure completeness of coverage, reduction of 
redundant work, and the effective use of audit resources (Burke & Guy 
2002:285). 
• Review the performance of the external auditors, and exercise final 
approval on the appointment or discharge of the auditors.  
• Review and confirm the independence of the external auditors by 
obtaining statements from the auditors on relationships between the 
auditors and the company, including non-audit services, and discussing 
the relationships with the auditors.  
• On a regular basis, meet separately with the external auditors to discuss 
any matters that the committee or auditors believe should be discussed 
privately. 
• Review and approve all consulting (non-audit) services and related fees 
to be provided by the external auditor, and consider the impact of such 
services on the independence of the auditor (Burke & Guy 2002:285). 
• Discuss with management and the external auditor the rationale for 
employing external auditors other than the principle external auditor 
(Burke & Guy 2002:285). 
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Compliance and Corporate Governance 
 
• Reviewing corporate policies relating to compliance with laws and 
regulations, ethics, conflicts of interest, and the investigation of 
misconduct and fraud (IIA 2005:3). 
• Reviewing current and pending corporate-governance-related litigation or 
regulatory proceedings to which the organization is a party (IIA 2005:3). 
• Review the effectiveness of the system for monitoring compliance with 
laws and regulations and the results of management's investigation and 
follow-up (including disciplinary action) of any instances of non-
compliance.  
• Review the findings of any examinations by regulatory agencies, and any 
auditor observations.  
• Review the process for communicating the code of conduct to company 
personnel, and for monitoring compliance therewith.  
• Obtain regular updates from management and company legal counsel 
regarding compliance matters. 
 
Reporting Responsibilities 
 
• Continually communicating with senior management regarding status, 
progress, and new developments, as well as problematic areas (IIA 
2005:3). 
• Regularly report to the board of directors about committee activities, 
issues, and related recommendations.  
• Provide an open avenue of communication between internal audit, the 
external auditors, and the board of directors.  
• Report annually to the shareholders, describing the committee's 
composition, responsibilities and how they were discharged, and any 
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other information required by rule, including approval of non-audit 
services.  
• Review any other reports the company issues that relate to committee 
responsibilities. 
 
Other Responsibilities 
 
• Perform other activities related to this charter as requested by the board 
of directors.  
• Institute and oversee special investigations as needed.  
• Review and assess the adequacy of the committee charter annually, 
requesting board approval for proposed changes, and ensure 
appropriate disclosure as may be required by law or regulation.  
• Confirm annually that all responsibilities outlined in this charter have 
been carried out.  
• Evaluate the committee's and individual members' performance on a 
regular basis. 
 
Extracted from the Institute of Internal Auditor’s Web site at www.theiia.org on 
July 07, 2003. 
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ADDENDUM B 
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE NEEDS SURVEY 
 
 
WORKER PROFILE 
 
 
1. In what capacity are you responding to this survey? 
  
1.1 Audit committee member designated an ‘audit committee financial expert’ 
1.2 Audit committee member not designated an ‘audit committee financial expert’  
1.3 Board member not on the audit committee  
1.4 Chief audit executive (Internal auditor)  
1.5 Other  
 If other, specify:  
 
 
2. What are your professional qualifications? 
    
 CA (SA)      CFA / CPA     Other  
 CIA      CIMA    
       
 If other, specify:  
 
 
3. What is your highest academic qualification? 
  
          
 
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE PROFILING 
 
 
4. Do you currently serve on an audit committee? 
 
 Yes  No      
 
 
If yes, continue with question 5 - 23 
If no, continue from question 17-19; 21-22 
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5. What is your status/position on the audit committee? 
  
 Chairman        
 Non-executive director        
 Executive director       
 Other       
 
If other, specify:  
 
 
6. What is your company’s / organisation’s status on which you serve as an audit 
committee member? 
  
 Private company        
 Public company       
 Non-profit organisation       
 Mutual fund       
 Other       
 
If other, specify:  
 
 
7. How many years of audit committee experience do you have? 
  
   Year(s)      
 
 
8. How many audit committees do you serve on? 
  
         
 
 
9. In your opinion, is there enough ‘skilled/qualified’ members serving on your 
audit committee? 
  
 Yes  No  Not sure    
 
 
10. What is your understanding of the audit committee’s responsibility in your 
organisation? 
 With 1 as no understanding and 5 as sufficient understanding. 
  
 1  2  3  4  5  
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11. Do you have an understanding of the key accounting and financial rules and 
regulations affecting your company’s financial statements? 
 With 1 as no understanding and 5 as sufficient understanding. 
 
 1  2  3  4  5  
 
 
 
12. How many times a year does your audit committee meet? 
  
   Times / year      
 
 
13. Is periodic performance evaluation of individual audit committee members 
conducted? 
  
 Yes  No      
  
 If yes, how often:      
 
 Please indicate the type of evaluation your audit committee use:   
 
TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
 
 
14. Have you ever received any training in the business/operations of the 
organisation where you serve as an audit committee member? 
 
 Yes  No      
  
 If yes, by whom? 
  
 
 
15. Have you ever received any training regarding the financial and/or other 
regulations impacting the organisation where you serve as an audit 
committee member? 
 
 Yes  No      
  
 If yes, by whom? 
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16. Have you ever received any training regarding your duties as an audit 
committee member? 
 
 Yes  No      
  
 If yes, by whom? 
  
 
 
17. How important do you consider continuous education for audit committee 
members? 
 With 1 as not important and 5 as very important. 
  
 1  2  3  4  5   
 
 
18. Has your company developed a continuous education programme for audit 
committee members? 
 
 Yes  No  Not sure    
 
 
19. Should training be presented by your internal auditing department, what 
would be your preferred method of training? 
 1 is the most preferred and 3 the least preferred 
 Workshops   
 Seminars   
 In-house training   
 
 
20. List the four most important aspects you as an audit committee member 
need training in: 
 
20.1  
20.2  
20.3  
20.4  
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INDUCTION PROGRAMMES 
 
 
21. Do you consider an induction programme for new audit committee 
members a necessity? 
 
 Yes  No  Not sure    
 
 
22. Has the audit committee on which you serve introduced an induction 
programme for new audit committee members? 
 
 Yes  No  Not sure    
 
 
23. Would you as an audit committee member agree to such an induction 
programme? 
 
 Yes  No  Not sure    
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ADDENDUM C 
 
RESEARCH REPORT FROM THE AUDIT COMMITTEE NEEDS SURVEY 
 
 
Design of the empirical study to establish the current composition, 
qualifications and experience of audit committees in South Africa as well 
as their professional development needs 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A literature review was conducted to determine what research has been carried 
out regarding the current composition, qualifications and experience of audit 
committees in South Africa.  The author consulted research conducted by Ernst 
& Young (SA), KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute (ACI) and Deloitte.  Ernst & 
Young (SA) conducted an audit committee benchmarking survey in 2005 
among audit committee members in South Africa and KPMG’s Audit Committee 
Institute (ACI) conducted an international survey during 2005 and 2006 among 
ACI members in the Americas, Europe, South Africa, Asia, Australia and other 
unspecified countries (Ernst & Young 2005; KPMG 2006b).  Deloitte has also 
conducted a survey in 2003 with regard to the audit committee financial expert 
designation and disclosure practices (Deloitte 2003).   
 
The author designed a questionnaire that firstly attempted to determine the 
current composition of audit committees in South Africa with regard to their 
qualifications and experience.  Secondly, the author tried to establish whether a 
proper induction and professional development process exists for audit 
committee members within organisations and what their professional 
development requirements are.  Lastly the questionnaire attempted to establish 
whether the respondents feel that there is any opportunity for the internal audit 
activity to embark on providing such a service. 
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Addendum C provides an overview of the research results among 31 
respondents who participated in the study out of a total of 53 questionnaires 
that were distributed either by electronic mail or by hand.  The response rate 
was therefore 58.5%.  The analysis approach used is descriptive in nature.  The 
views of the three groups from which the sample was taken, were not split due 
of the relatively small sample that was taken.  Given the size of the sample, the 
research design is qualitative in nature.  Consequently, caution should be 
exercised not to over generalise the research results.  Given the nature of the 
respondents participating in this survey in terms of their years of experience and 
the senior positions they hold within financial/accounting departments of the 
various companies (sample units), the outcome of the study reflects an 
objective view of the research questions investigated.  In the analysis that 
follows, the research results will be presented in frequency table format, 
although some measures of central tendency and dispersion are also applied in 
analysing the salient findings resulting from the survey. 
 
2. METHOD 
 
The survey population constitutes all audit committee members within public 
companies, government, non-profit organisations and private companies in 
South Africa.  The research design of this study is qualitative, owing to the size 
of the sample.  Given the research was dependent upon the cooperation of a 
relatively small number of available participants due to their high profile 
positions within their organisations and the availability of contact details, the 
sample cannot be considered as a representative sample.  Empirical data were 
collected through a self-administered questionnaire that was distributed by 
means of computerised electronic mail delivery to various audit committee 
members, chief audit executives and internal auditors in South Africa and also 
by hand.  The choice of a standardised questionnaire was based on the number 
of questions that had to be answered as well as the availability of the target 
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group.  A judgmental sampling method was used as the respondents needed to 
conform to a specific criterion – audit committee members, and also considering 
the availability of contact details.  The survey was distributed during the period 
July to November 2006.  Given the nature of the respondents participating in 
this survey in terms of their years of experience and senior positions in 
financial/accounting or internal auditing departments of the various companies, 
the outcome of the study reflects an objective view on the research questions 
investigated and should be considered as non-scientific as the sample was not 
controlled. 
 
The survey method is described by Babbie (1998:256) as the best method of 
“collecting data for describing a population too large to observe directly”. 
 
3. PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS 
 
A total of 53 questionnaires were sent out to audit committee members and 
internal auditors, out of which 31 replies were received from public companies 
(50%), government (40.9%), non-profit organisations (22.7%) and private 
companies (13.6%).    
Table 1: Question 1:  Worker profile - capacity of person responding to 
survey 
 Frequency Percentage 
Designated member (ACFE) 14 45.2 
Non-designated member (ACFE) 5 16.1 
Board member not on audit committee 1 3.2 
Chief audit executive 6 19.4 
Other 5 16.1 
Total 31 100.0 
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Table 1 shows that 45.2% of the respondents (14 respondents) were audit 
committee members designated as “audit committee financial experts (ACFE)” 
within the organisation they are appointed to. This indicates that almost 50% of 
the sample consisted of designated members. The second highest group, 
namely chief audit executives (CAE), comprised 19.4% (six respondents) of the 
respondents. In this sample there were five (16.1%) audit committee members 
not designated as “audit committee financial experts” and five (16.1%) other 
members. Board members not on the audit committee formed the smallest part 
of the sample, with one respondent (3.2%).   
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis of the research is presented in tables 2 – 28.  For each of the 
tables presented, the data reflected are interpreted. 
 
Table 2: Question 2a: Professional qualification 
 
Professional 
qualification 
  
CA (SA) Count 13 
  Column % 44.8 
CIA Count 15 
  Column % 51.7 
CFA/CPA Count 1 
  Column % 3.4 
Other Count 10 
  Column % 34.5 
 
Question 2 asked: “What are your professional qualifications?” - thus indicating 
that respondents could choose more than one of the options, therefore making 
this question a multiple response question.  For this reason the total count of 
respondents (13 + 15 + 1 + 10) will not equal 31 (number of respondents) and 
the column percentage (44.8% + 51.7% + 3.4% + 34.5%) will exceed 100%.  
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It is important to note that the table only reflects the responses from those who 
indicated that they held a professional qualification.  The proportion of 
respondents who indicated that they possess a specific qualification is 
expressed in relation to the total number of respondents who listed their 
professional qualifications (see column percentage in table 2).  This implies that 
only 29 respondents listed a professional qualification, which explains the 
finding that 44.8% of the respondents have a CA qualification, as reflected in 
table 2.  
 
Table 2 indicates that most of the respondents have a CIA qualification (51.7%), 
followed by a CA (SA) (44.8%), other (34.5%) and CFA/CPA (3.4%).  
Table 3:  Question 2b:  Professional qualification - specify other 
 
1.   BA, LLB 
2.   BCom, B(Acc), FCMA 
3.   BSc (Eng) Pr. Eng 
4.   CCSA 
5.   CISM 
6.   GIA 
7.   IAC 
8.   MBA 
9.   MBL 
10. PhD in accounting 
 
Table 3 specifies the “other” category. “Other” refers to qualifications additional 
to CA (SA), CIA, and CFA/CPA. 
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Table 4:  Question 3:  Highest academic qualification 
 
 Frequency 
BCom (Hons) Internal Auditing 1 
BCom 3 
BCom (Accountancy) 1 
BCom (Hons) 6 
BCom Accounting 1 
BSc (Eng) 1 
CA(SA) 1 
CFA 1 
DCom 1 
LLB 1 
Master’s Business Education 1 
MBA 3 
MBL 1 
MCom 4 
National Diploma in Accounting and Auditing 1 
PhD 1 
Postgraduate 2 
Total 30 
 
Table 4 specifies the highest academic qualification of each of the 31 
respondents.  The following can be derived from the above information:   
 
 One of the respondents did not answer this question. 
 One of the respondent’s highest qualification is a diploma. 
 Seven of the respondents’ highest qualification is an undergraduate 
qualification, of which most were BCom degrees. 
 22 of the respondents’ highest qualification is a postgraduate qualification, of 
which most were BCom (Hons) degrees. 
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Table 5:  Question 4: Audit committee profiling: Do you currently 
serve on an audit committee? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 23 74.2 
No 8 25.8 
Total 31 100.0 
 
Table 5 indicates that 23 respondents (74.2% of the sample) currently serve on 
an audit committee and eight respondents (25.8% of the sample) do not 
currently serve on an audit committee. This was a filter question and people 
who answered “Yes” continued with questions 5-23. Respondents who 
answered “No” to this question, only had to answer questions 17-19 and 
questions 21-22.  
 
Table 6:  Question 5: Audit committee profiling: What is your 
status/position on the audit committee? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Chairman 14 45.2 
Non-executive director 5 16.1 
Other 4 12.9 
Total 23 74.2 
System 8 25.8 
Total 31 100.0 
 
Table 6 gives an indication of the status or the position of the respondents on 
the audit committee. Of the 23 respondents that are currently serving on an 
audit committee, 14 respondents (45.2%) are serving in the capacity of 
chairman. Five of the respondents (16.1%) are non-executive directors and four 
respondents (12.9%) have other positions not specified in this question. Of the 
total sample of 31 respondents, 23 respondents (74.2%) were eligible to answer 
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this question and eight respondents (25.8%) were not eligible to answer this 
question, owing to the filter question (See Table 5). 
 
Table 7:  Question 6: Audit committee profiling: What is the status of 
the company/ organisation on which you serve as an audit 
committee member?  
 
Private company Count 3 
  Column % 13.6 
Public company Count 11 
  Column % 50.0 
Non-profit organisation Count 5 
  Column % 22.7 
Government Count 9 
  Column % 40.9 
 
Question 6 asked: “What is the status of the company/organisation on which 
you serve as an audit committee member?”  Respondents could choose more 
than one of the options, therefore making this question a multiple-response 
question.  For this reason the total count of respondents (3 + 11 + 5 + 9) will not 
equal 23 (number of respondents) and the column percentage (13.6% + 50% + 
22.7% + 40.9%) will exceed 100% (only 22 of the 23 respondents who currently 
serve on an audit committee responded to this question).  Table 7 indicates that 
most of the respondents serve on an audit committee of a public company 
(50%), followed by government (40.9%), non-profit organisations (22.7%) and 
private companies (13.6%).  
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Table 8:  Questions 7 & 8:  Descriptive statistics 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Audit committee profiling: How 
many years of audit committee 
experience do you have? 23 1 25 8.17 6.597 
Audit committee profiling: How 
many audit committees do you 
serve on? 23 1 15 3.87 3.507 
 
Table 8 indicates that the respondent with the least audit committee experience 
has one year’s experience (minimum) and the respondent with the most 
experience has been on audit committees for 25 years (maximum).  On average 
respondents have approximately eight years of audit committee experience.  
The minimum number of committees that any respondent serves on is one, and 
the maximum number of committees that any respondent serves on is 15 
committees. On average respondents serve on approximately four committees.  
 
Table 9:  Question 9: Audit committee profiling: In your opinion, are 
there enough “skilled/qualified” members serving on your 
audit committee? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 13 41.9 
No 9 29.0 
Not sure 1 3.2 
Total 23 74.2 
System 8 25.8 
Total 31 100.0 
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Table 9 indicates that 13 respondents (41.9%) said that there are enough 
skilled/qualified members serving on the audit committee.  Nine respondents 
(29%) indicated, however, that there are not enough skilled/qualified members 
serving on the audit committee and one of the respondents (3.2%) was not 
sure.  Of the total sample of 31 respondents, 23 respondents (74.2%) were 
eligible to answer this question and eight respondents (25.8%) could not answer 
this question, owing to the filter question (see table 5). 
 
Table 10:  Question 10: Audit committee profiling: What is your 
understanding of the audit committee's responsibility in your 
organisation? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Little understanding 1 3.2 4.3 4.3 
Some understanding 4 12.9 17.4 21.7 
Sufficient 
understanding 18 58.1 78.3 100.0 
Total 23 74.2 100.0  
System 8 25.8   
Total 31 100.0   
 
From Table 10 it is clear that almost eight out of every 10 of the respondents 
who currently serve on an audit committee (78.3%) do have sufficient 
understanding of the responsibilities designated to an audit committee.  
Furthermore, just less than one-fifth of the respondents who currently serve on 
an audit committee (17.1%) have some understanding of an audit committee’s 
responsibilities.  Once again, it should be noted that of the total sample of 31 
respondents, 23 respondents (74.2%) were eligible to answer this question and 
eight respondents (25.8%) were not eligible to answer this question, owing to 
the filter question (see table 5). 
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Table 11:  Question 11: Audit committee profiling: Do you have an 
understanding of the key accounting and financial rules and 
regulations affecting your company's financial statements? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Not sure 4 12.9 17.4 17.4 
Some understanding 3 9.7 13.0 30.4 
Sufficient 
understanding 16 51.6 69.6 100.0 
Total 23 74.2 100.0  
System 8 25.8   
Total 31 100.0   
 
It is clear from Table 11 that almost 70% of the respondents who are currently 
serving on an audit committee (69.6%) have a sufficient understanding of the 
key accounting and financial rules and regulations affecting their company’s 
financial statements.  Just more than 10% of the respondents have some 
understanding, while almost two out of every five respondents who serve on an 
audit committee are uncertain.  Of the total sample of 31 respondents, 23 
respondents (74.2%) were eligible to answer this question and eight 
respondents (25.8%) were not eligible to answer this question, owing to the filter 
question (see table 5). 
 
Table 12:  Question 12:   Descriptive statistics 
 
 N Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Audit committee profiling:  
How many times a year does your 
audit committee meet? 
22 3 6 4.14 0.889 
 
Table 12 indicates the following:  
 Audit committees meet at least three times per annum. 
 Audit committees meet at most six times per annum. 
 On average, audit committees meet approximately four times a year. 
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Table 13:  Question 12: Audit committee profiling: How many times a 
year does your audit committee meet? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
3 4 12.9 18.2 18.2 
4 14 45.2 63.6 81.8 
5 1 3.2 4.5 86.4 
6 3 9.7 13.6 100.0 
Total 22 71.0 100.0  
System 9 29.0   
Total 31 100.0   
 
Table 13 gives a breakdown of the information provided in table 12. From table 
13 the following can be derived: 
• Four of the respondents’ audit committees meet three times a year.  This 
represents almost 18.2% of the respondents who answered this 
question. 
• 14 of the respondents’ audit committees meet four times a year.  This 
represents just more than 60% of the respondents who answered this 
question.  At least 81.8% of the audit committees meet at least 4 times 
per annum. 
• One of the respondents’ audit committees meets five times a year.  At 
least 86.4% of those who participated in this study indicated that their 
company meets at least 5 times a year. 
• Three of the respondents’ audit committees meet six times a year. 
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Table 14:  Question 13: Audit committee profiling: Is periodic 
performance evaluation of individual audit committee members 
conducted? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Yes 8 25.8 34.8 
No 15 48.4 65.2 
Total 23 74.2 100.0 
System 8 25.8  
Total 31 100.0  
 
 
It is clear from table 14 that one-third (34.8%) of the respondents who answered 
the question indicated that a periodic performance evaluation of individual audit 
committee members is conducted. 
 
Table 15:  Question 13b: Audit committee profiling: Is periodic 
performance evaluation of individual audit committee members 
conducted? How often? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Bi-annually 1 3.2 16.7 16.7 
Annually 4 12.9 66.7 83.3 
Don't know 1 3.2 16.7 100.0 
Total 6 19.4 100.0  
System 25 80.6   
Total 31 100.0   
 
It is important to note that only six of the eight respondents who indicated that 
periodic performance evaluation of individual audit committee members is 
required were able to say how often such an evaluation is performed.  Of those 
respondents who indicated how often such an evaluation is performed, 
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approximately two-thirds (66.7%) indicated that such evaluations are conducted 
annually. 
 
Table 16:  Question 13c: Audit committee profiling: Is periodic 
performance evaluation of individual audit committee members 
conducted? What type of evaluation is conducted? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Surveys 2 6.5 
Self evaluation 2 6.5 
Self and external evaluation 2 6.5 
Total 6 19.4 
System 25 80.6 
Total 31 100.0 
 
The respondents who indicated how often performance evaluations are required 
also provided an indication of the type of performance evaluation.  Although no 
consensus response resulted, preference was expressed for the following types 
of performance evaluations: 
• Surveys  
• Self evaluations 
• Self and external evaluations 
 
 188
Table 17:  Question 14: Training and education: Have you ever received 
any training in the business/operations of the organisation 
where you serve as an audit committee member? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Yes 11 35.5 47.8 47.8 
No 12 38.7 52.2 100.0 
Total 23 74.2 100.0  
System 8 25.8   
Total  31 100.0   
 
Of the respondents who stated that they currently serve on an audit committee 
(23 respondents), more than half (52.2%) said that they have not received 
training in the past in the business/operations of the organisation where they 
serve as audit committee members.  
 
Table 18:  Question 14b: Training and education: Have you ever received 
any training in the business/operations of the organisation 
where you serve as an audit committee member? By whom? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Internal 6 19.4 75.0 
External 2 6.5 25.0 
Total 8 25.8 100.0 
System 23 74.2  
Total 31 100.0  
 
It is important to note that only eight of the 11 respondents who had received 
training in the past (72.2%) provided an indication of whether the training was 
received internally or externally.  This outcome is reflected in table 18, which 
indicates that three-quarters (75%) of the respondents who answered this 
question received training internally. 
 
 189
Table 19:  Question 15: Training and Education: Have you ever received 
any training regarding the financial and/or other regulations 
impacting the organisation where you serve as an audit 
committee member? 
  
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Yes 10 32.3 43.5 43.5 
No 13 41.9 56.5 100.0 
Total 23 74.2 100.0  
System 8 25.8   
Total 31 100.0   
 
The information reflected in table 19 shows the outcome for the 23 respondents 
who currently serve on an audit committee.  It is clear from table 19 that almost 
six out of every ten respondents (56.5%) who answered this question indicated 
that they have not received training regarding financial and/or other regulations 
impacting on the organisation where they serve as an audit committee member.  
 
Table 20:  Question 15b: Training and education: Have you ever received 
any training regarding the financial and/or other regulations 
impacting the organisation where you serve as an audit 
committee member? By whom? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Internal 2 6.5 28.6 28.6 
External 5 16.1 71.4 100.0 
Total 7 22.6 100.0  
System 24 77.4   
Total 31 100.0   
 
Of the ten respondents who indicated that they had received training on 
financial and/or other regulations impacting on the organisation, only seven 
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indicated whether this training was conducted internally or externally.  The 
outcome of this finding is reflected in table 20.  From this table it is clear that 
almost 72% of the respondents who participated in this question indicated that 
the training on financial and other regulations impacting on the organisations 
was conducted by external consultants/organisations. 
 
Table 21:  Question 16: Training and education: Have you ever received 
any training regarding your duties as an audit committee 
member? 
  Frequency 
 
Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Yes 11 35.5 47.8 47.8 
No 12 38.7 52.2 100.0 
Total 23 74.2 100.0  
System 8 25.8   
Total 31 100.0   
 
Of the 23 respondents who are currently serving as audit committee members, 
only eleven indicated that they had ever received training regarding their duties 
as audit committee members.  This implies that approximately 47.8% of the 
respondents who answered this question did receive training regarding their 
duties as audit committee members. 
 
Table 22:  Question 16b: Training and education: Have you ever received 
any training regarding your duties as an audit committee 
member? By whom? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Internal 2 6.5 25.0 25.0 
External 6 19.4 75.0 100.0 
Total 8 25.8 100.0  
System 23 74.2   
Total  31 100.0   
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It is important to note that eight of the 11 respondents who did receive training 
regarding their duties as audit committee members also indicated whether such 
training was received externally or internally.  It is clear from table 22 that 75% 
of the respondents who answered this question were trained by outside 
consultants/organisations. 
 
Table 23:  Question 17: Training and education: How important do you 
consider continuous education for audit committee members? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Not important 1 3.2 
Not sure 4 12.9 
Important 8 25.8 
Very important 18 58.1 
Total 31 100.0 
 
The sections in the research questionnaire from question 23 onwards were 
directed to the total survey population.  Question 23 in particular measured the 
importance of continuous education for audit committee members.  The 
outcome of this research result is reflected in table 23.  It is clear from the table 
that almost six out of every 10 respondents (58.1%) indicated that continuous 
education of audit committee members is very important.  A further quarter 
(25.8%) of the respondents considered continuous education of audit committee 
members to be “important”. 
 
 192
Table 24:  Question 18: Training and education: Has your company 
developed a continuous education programme for audit 
committee members? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 6 19.4 
No 22 71.0 
Not sure 3 9.7 
Total 31 100.0 
 
Of all the respondents who participated in this study, it was clear that just less 
than 20% (19.4%) indicated that their companies had developed a continuous 
education programme for their audit committee members.   The vast majority 
(71%) of the respondents indicated that their companies had not done so.  
 
Question 19 measured the preferred method of training by an internal auditing 
department, listing workshops, seminars and in-house training as the desired 
options.  Given the nature of the response and the inability of the respondents 
to rate the importance of the listed training methods, the outcome of this survey 
finding is presented in index format.  This method of analysis offers an 
opportunity to measure the relative importance of each of the preferred training 
methods.  The construction of the indices was based on assigning multiplicator 
values to each of the training methods related to their specific preference.  The 
multiplicator values applied were as follows: 
 
       Multiplicator value 
 
Most preferred training method (first rating)   3 
Preferred (second rating)      2 
Least preferred (third rating)     1 
 
In instances where respondents were unable to rate the three training methods 
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in respect of importance, similar multiplicator values were applied when 
weighting the importance of a specific training method. 
 
The outcome of the index method explained above is presented in table 25. 
 
Table 25:  Question 19: Training and education: Workshop: Should 
training be presented by your internal auditing department? 
What would be your preferred method of training? 
Training method 
Weighted 
total Index score 
Workshops 46 100 
Seminars 38 83 
In-house training 35 76 
 
It is clear from table 25 that workshops are the most preferred (100%) method 
of training that internal auditing departments should consider presenting.  The 
least preferred (index score 76) is in-house training. 
The next table (table 26) reflects the training/education needs of audit 
committee members. 
 
Table 26: Question 20: Training and education needs of audit committee 
members 
Training/education needs n % 
Risk management 15 71.4 
Health, safety and environment 1 4.8 
Information technology 2 9.5 
Strategic management 1 4.8 
Operational skills 6 28.6 
Industry laws and regulations 12 57.1 
Financial/accounting skills 13 61.9 
Internal/external audit 4 19.0 
Corporate governance 3 14.3 
Outsourcing 1 4.8 
Taxation 1 4.8 
Problem-solving skills 1 4.8 
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The table reflects the type of training and education needs listed by the 
respondents (n-values).  Furthermore, the table also shows the percentage (%) 
of respondents who listed a specific need in proportion to all respondents who 
listed training/education needs.  It should be noted that only 21 respondents (or 
67.7% of the total sample) listed training and education needs.  A third of the 
respondents did not list any training or education needs, which implies that they 
are fairly confident that they are currently sufficiently skilled and need no further 
education/training. 
 
It is clear from the table that the most prominent training and education need is 
for risk management.  Just less than half of all respondents indicated that they 
need training/education in risk management.  Of those respondents who listed 
training and education needs, almost three out of every four (71.4%) listed risk 
management as a training/education need. 
 
Besides risk management, financial and accounting training and education were 
listed by just less than half the respondents.  In this regard particular mention 
was made of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
 
Improved knowledge of and updating on industry laws and regulations was 
positioned as the third education/training need. 
 
Table 27:  Question 21: Induction programmes: Do you consider an 
induction programme for new audit committee members a 
necessity? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 30 96.8 
No 1 3.2 
Total 31 100.0 
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It is clear from table 27 that almost all respondents (96.8%) consider an 
induction programme for new audit committee members to be a necessity. 
Table 28:  Question 22: Induction programmes: Has the audit committee 
on which you serve introduced an induction programme for 
new audit committee members? 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 16 51.6 
No 14 45.2 
Not sure 1 3.2 
Total 31 100.0 
 
Table 28 shows that just over half (51.6%) of the respondents indicated that the 
audit committees of their companies had introduced an induction programme for 
new audit committee members. This table suggests an interesting comparison 
with table 27, which shows that almost all the respondents considered such a 
programme a necessity. 
 
Table 29:  Question 23: Induction programmes: Would you as an audit 
committee member agree to such an induction programme? 
 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 26 83.9 
No 5 16.1 
Total 31 100.0 
 
It is clear from table 29 that almost all respondents (83.9%) would agree to an 
induction programme for new audit committee members. 
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5. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
1. Most respondents were designated as an audit committee financial 
expert (ACFE) of their respective audit committees. 
2. Most respondents were either CIA of CA qualified. 
3. The highest qualification of most respondents was B Com (Hons). 
4. Most respondents are currently serving on audit committees. 
5. Most respondents are appointed as chairmen of their respective audit 
committees. 
6. Most of the respondents serve on an audit committee of a public 
company. 
7. On average the respondents have approximately eight years of audit 
committee experience.   
8. On average respondents serve on approximately four committees. 
9. Respondents indicated that there are enough skilled/qualified members 
serving on the audit committee. 
10. Most of the respondents currently serving on an audit committee 
indicated that they have a sufficient understanding of the responsibilities 
designated to an audit committee. 
11. The respondents currently serving on an audit committee indicated that 
they have a sufficient understanding of the key accounting and financial 
rules and regulations affecting their company’s financial statements. 
12. On average, audit committees meet approximately four times a year. 
13. Most of the respondents indicated that a periodic performance evaluation 
of individual audit committee members is not conducted. 
14. Most of the respondents indicated that performance evaluations are 
conducted annually. 
15. The most preferred types of performance evaluations are surveys, self 
evaluations and a combination of self and external evaluations. 
16. Almost half of the respondents have received training in the past in the 
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business/operations of the organisation where they serve as audit 
committee members. 
17. Most of the respondents received internal training regarding the 
business/operations of the organisation where they serve as an audit 
committee member. 
18. Less than half of the respondents indicated that they had received 
training regarding financial and/or other regulations impacting on the 
organisation where they serve as an audit committee member. 
19. Most of the respondents indicated that the training on financial and other 
regulations impacting on the organisations was conducted by external 
consultants/organisations. 
20. Less than half of the respondents did receive training in respect of their 
duties as audit committee members. 
21. Most of the respondents were trained by outside 
consultants/organisations in respect of their duties as audit committee 
members. 
22. Most of the respondents indicated that continuous education of audit 
committee members is very important and most respondents indicated 
that their organisations did not develop a continuous education 
programme for audit committee members. 
23. The respondents indicated that workshops are the most preferred 
method of training internal auditing departments should consider 
presenting to audit committee members. 
24. The aspects that were listed by the respondents as most important 
training or education needs are risk management, financial and 
accounting skills and industry laws and regulations. 
25. Almost all respondents considered an induction programme for new audit 
committee members to be a necessity. 
26. Most of the respondents indicated that the audit committees of their 
companies had introduced an induction programme for new audit 
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committee members. 
27. A majority of respondents would agree to an induction programme 
presented to them. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
1. In all instances, less than 50% of respondents received training. 
2. Those who did receive training, received –  
• internal training in business 
• external training in finance and duties. 
3. Most respondents prefer workshops for training. 
4. Most respondents believe in continuous training programmes 
5. Most respondents did go through an induction programme or would 
agree to such a programme. 
 
  
   
ADDENDUM D 
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
Framework in assessing the audit committee in terms of composition and 
professional development 
 
The framework suggests all the requirements for audit committees that internal 
auditors could attend to.  It may be used by internal auditors to assist audit 
committee members in their professional development and to coordinate the 
activities of audit committees.  The framework could also be used as a 
performance measurement instrument by audit committees.  The framework, 
which is supported by the literature review carried out in chapters 2 to 5, 
consists of the following sections: 
 
1. Terms of reference, roles and responsibilities 
2. Audit committee composition 
3. Principles of good governance 
4. Performance evaluation 
5. Induction 
6. Professional development 
 
The framework consists of the following columns: the best practice/principle 
components of an effective audit committee, whether practice is followed, the 
effectiveness rating of performance, person responsible for addressing 
inefficiencies, and the follow-up steps necessary to ensure optimal performance 
of the audit committee and the individual committee members.  
199
 
 
 
 
 A
ud
it 
C
om
m
itt
ee
 P
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l D
ev
el
op
m
en
t F
ra
m
ew
or
k 
 Be
st
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
/ p
rin
ci
pl
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
Is
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
? 
Ye
s/
N
o/
N
A
 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
ra
tin
g 
1 
– 
5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
 1.
   
TE
R
M
S 
O
F 
R
EF
ER
EN
C
E,
 R
O
LE
S 
A
N
D
 
R
ES
PO
N
SI
B
IL
IT
IE
S 
 • 
Th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
’s
 re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
ar
e 
cl
ea
rly
 d
ef
in
ed
 
in
 a
 c
ha
rte
r o
r t
er
m
s 
of
 re
fe
re
nc
e 
•
 
A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
’ r
ol
es
 a
re
 d
ef
in
ite
 a
nd
 th
ei
r 
du
tie
s 
cl
ea
rly
 d
ef
in
ed
; t
he
y 
ar
e 
no
t m
er
el
y 
ob
se
rv
er
s 
•
 
Th
e 
ch
ar
te
r 
is
 
re
vi
ew
ed
 
an
d 
up
da
te
d 
an
nu
al
ly
 
an
d 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
of
 d
ire
ct
or
s 
•
 
Th
e 
ch
ar
te
r i
s 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
on
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 w
eb
si
te
  
•
 
Th
e 
ch
ar
te
r a
de
qu
at
el
y 
de
fin
es
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
’s
 ro
le
 a
nd
 
pr
ov
id
es
 i
t 
w
ith
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 m
em
be
rs
hi
p,
 a
ut
ho
rit
y,
 t
im
e 
an
d 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
to
 p
er
fo
rm
 it
s 
ro
le
 e
ffe
ct
iv
el
y 
•
 
A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 h
av
e 
eq
ua
l a
ut
ho
rit
y,
 w
ith
ou
t 
be
in
g 
do
m
in
at
ed
 b
y 
in
di
vi
du
al
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
•
 
A
 
su
ffi
ci
en
t 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
ar
e 
he
ld
, 
an
d 
th
e 
m
ee
tin
gs
 a
re
 o
f s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 le
ng
th
 a
nd
 d
ep
th
 to
 c
ov
er
 th
e 
ag
en
da
, a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
 h
ea
lth
y 
di
sc
us
si
on
 o
f i
ss
ue
s 
•
 
Th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
ei
r w
or
kl
oa
d 
of
 
ch
an
ge
s 
to
 th
ei
r r
ol
e 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 c
ha
rte
r 
is
 u
se
d 
as
 a
 d
oc
um
en
t 
to
 
gu
id
e 
th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 in
 it
s 
ef
fo
rts
, a
nd
 to
 h
el
p 
gu
id
e 
th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
’s
 a
ge
nd
a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200
 
 
 
 
 Be
st
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
/ p
rin
ci
pl
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
Is
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
? 
Ye
s/
N
o/
N
A
 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
ra
tin
g 
1 
– 
5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
R
eg
ul
ar
 m
ee
tin
gs
 a
re
 h
el
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
an
d 
th
e 
C
FO
 (
ch
ie
f 
fin
an
ci
al
 o
ffi
ce
r)
, 
th
e 
ch
ie
f 
au
di
t 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
(C
A
E
), 
ot
he
r 
ke
y 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
re
po
rti
ng
 t
ea
m
, 
an
d 
th
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
au
di
to
rs
 
•
 
E
xe
cu
tiv
e 
se
ss
io
ns
 a
re
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 o
n 
a 
re
gu
la
r b
as
is
 
 Th
e 
ro
le
 o
f t
he
 c
om
m
itt
ee
 in
cl
ud
es
: 
•
 
th
e 
re
vi
ew
 o
f b
us
in
es
s 
ris
ks
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
al
 c
on
tro
l  
•
 
as
su
rin
g 
th
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 a
nd
 e
ffe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 in
te
rn
al
 
an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
rs
; m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f p
ro
pe
r a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
re
co
rd
s 
an
d 
th
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
f f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
  
•
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
ag
ai
ns
t f
ra
ud
  
•
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 im
pr
ov
ed
 s
ys
te
m
s 
 
•
 
at
te
nd
in
g 
to
 
ta
x 
an
d 
lit
ig
at
io
n 
m
at
te
rs
 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
un
ce
rta
in
ty
  
•
 
as
su
rin
g 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
•
 
at
te
nd
in
g 
to
 c
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
 
  2.
  A
U
D
IT
 C
O
M
M
IT
TE
E
 C
O
M
P
O
S
IT
IO
N
 
 A
ss
es
s 
th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 i
n 
te
rm
s 
of
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
as
 fo
llo
w
s:
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 c
on
si
st
s 
of
 m
em
be
rs
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
of
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
nd
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
as
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
by
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 
re
gu
la
to
ry
/c
or
po
ra
te
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
de
fin
iti
on
s 
an
d 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 s
et
 b
y 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
201
 
 
 
 
 Be
st
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
/ p
rin
ci
pl
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
Is
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
? 
Ye
s/
N
o/
N
A
 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
ra
tin
g 
1 
– 
5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
N
ew
 
m
em
be
rs
 
ar
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 
by
 
an
 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
, i
de
nt
ify
in
g 
ne
ed
ed
 s
ki
lls
 a
nd
 a
ttr
ib
ut
es
 
•
 
A
 n
ee
d 
fo
r 
ba
la
nc
in
g 
co
nt
in
ui
ty
 w
ith
 fr
es
h 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e 
is
 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 w
ith
 t
he
 b
oa
rd
 w
he
n 
co
ns
id
er
in
g 
m
em
be
rs
’ 
te
rm
 o
f o
ffi
ce
.  
S
ta
gg
er
ed
 ro
ta
tio
n 
is
 u
se
d.
 
•
 
R
e-
el
ec
tio
n 
to
 t
he
 c
om
m
itt
ee
 i
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 m
em
be
rs
’ 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
, a
pp
ra
is
al
, i
nt
er
es
t, 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n,
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
an
d 
at
te
nd
an
ce
 a
t m
ee
tin
gs
 
•
 
D
ue
 
di
lig
en
ce
 
re
vi
ew
s 
ar
e 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
be
fo
re
 
ne
w
 
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
 a
re
 m
ad
e 
•
 
Th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
is
 
th
e 
rig
ht
 
si
ze
, 
br
in
gi
ng
 
re
qu
is
ite
 
di
ve
rs
ity
 i
n 
kn
ow
le
dg
e,
 a
ge
, 
ge
nd
er
, 
ra
ce
, 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e,
 
sk
ills
 i
n 
a 
gr
ou
p 
sm
al
l 
en
ou
gh
 t
o 
ac
t 
co
he
si
ve
ly
 a
nd
 
op
er
at
e 
ef
fic
ie
nt
ly
 
 M
em
be
rs
 
ha
ve
 
th
e 
re
qu
is
ite
 
le
ve
ls
 
of
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
po
rti
ng
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e,
 o
r 
ac
qu
ire
 s
uc
h 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
so
on
 a
fte
r 
jo
in
in
g 
th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
, 
en
su
rin
g 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 
“fi
na
nc
ia
l 
ex
pe
rti
se
” r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 a
re
 m
et
.  
A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 
ha
ve
 - 
 
•
 
su
ffi
ci
en
t 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 
th
e 
ke
y 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
ru
le
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
th
ei
r 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
, f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 g
en
er
al
ly
 a
cc
ep
te
d 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 
(G
A
A
P
), 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
po
rti
ng
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
(IF
R
S
) 
an
d 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 
au
di
tin
g 
st
an
da
rd
s 
(G
AA
S)
 
•
 
th
e 
ab
ilit
y 
to
 a
ss
es
s 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 s
uc
h 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 
an
d 
st
an
da
rd
s 
in
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 
th
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
fo
r e
st
im
at
es
, a
cc
ru
al
s,
 a
nd
 re
se
rv
es
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Ye
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N
o/
N
A
 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
ra
tin
g 
1 
– 
5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
in
 
pr
ep
ar
in
g,
 
an
al
yz
in
g,
 
or
 
ev
al
ua
tin
g 
fin
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 t
ha
t 
pr
es
en
t 
a 
br
ea
dt
h 
an
d 
le
ve
l o
f 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 o
f 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
is
su
es
 t
ha
t c
an
 r
ea
so
na
bl
y 
be
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 t
o 
be
 r
ai
se
d 
by
 t
he
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
n’
s 
fin
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
, 
or
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ac
tiv
el
y 
su
pe
rv
is
in
g 
(th
at
 i
s,
 
di
re
ct
 in
vo
lv
em
en
t w
ith
) o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
pe
rs
on
s 
en
ga
ge
d 
in
 
su
ch
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 
•
 
an
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f i
nt
er
na
l c
on
tro
ls
 a
nd
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
fo
r 
fin
an
ci
al
 re
po
rti
ng
 
•
 
a 
ge
ne
ra
l u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f n
on
pr
of
it 
fin
an
ci
al
 is
su
es
 a
nd
 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 
th
e 
no
t-f
or
-p
ro
fit
 
se
ct
or
 
(fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 
he
al
th
 
ca
re
 
or
 
ed
uc
at
io
n)
 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
pa
rti
ci
pa
te
s 
 A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 h
av
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
th
e 
fiv
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
at
tri
bu
te
s 
lis
te
d 
ab
ov
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
an
y 
on
e 
or
 
m
or
e 
of
 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g:
 
•
 
E
du
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
as
 a
 p
rin
ci
pa
l f
in
an
ci
al
 o
ffi
ce
r, 
pr
in
ci
pa
l a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
of
fic
er
, c
on
tro
lle
r, 
pu
bl
ic
 a
cc
ou
nt
an
t 
or
 a
ud
ito
r 
or
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
in
 o
ne
 o
r 
m
or
e 
po
si
tio
ns
 t
ha
t 
in
vo
lv
e 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f s
im
ila
r f
un
ct
io
ns
 
•
 
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ac
tiv
el
y 
su
pe
rv
is
in
g 
a 
pr
in
ci
pa
l 
fin
an
ci
al
 
of
fic
er
, 
pr
in
ci
pa
l 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
of
fic
er
, 
co
nt
ro
lle
r, 
pu
bl
ic
 
ac
co
un
ta
nt
, 
au
di
to
r 
or
 
pe
rs
on
 
pe
rfo
rm
in
g 
si
m
ila
r 
fu
nc
tio
ns
 
•
 
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ov
er
se
ei
ng
 o
r 
as
se
ss
in
g 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 o
r 
pu
bl
ic
 a
cc
ou
nt
an
ts
 w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
th
e 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n,
 
au
di
tin
g 
or
 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
of
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
; o
r 
•
 
O
th
er
 re
le
va
nt
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
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fe
ct
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ra
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– 
5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
 O
th
er
 q
ua
lif
ic
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 g
en
er
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
in
du
st
ry
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
of
 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
em
be
rs
 
to
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y 
fu
lfi
l t
he
ir 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
ar
e:
 
•
 
S
uf
fic
ie
nt
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
an
d 
fu
nc
tio
ns
, a
ls
o 
in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
ro
le
s 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
in
 th
e 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
co
nt
ro
l 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
  
•
 
G
en
er
al
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 i
nd
us
try
 a
nd
 
th
e 
so
ci
al
, p
ol
iti
ca
l, 
ec
on
om
ic
, a
nd
 le
ga
l f
or
ce
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 
•
 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
its
 h
is
to
ry
, 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n,
 a
nd
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l p
ol
ic
ie
s 
•
 
A
n 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 
th
e 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
of
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 a
nd
 c
on
tro
l, 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
ls
 o
f t
he
 
fu
nc
tio
na
l a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
, h
ow
 it
 m
ak
es
 m
on
ey
 
an
d 
ho
w
 it
 m
on
ito
rs
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
s 
su
cc
es
s 
•
 
A
n 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 t
he
 m
or
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 r
is
ks
 t
o 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
, 
its
 b
us
in
es
s 
an
d 
its
 
re
pu
ta
tio
n 
(e
co
no
m
ic
, o
pe
ra
tin
g 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 ri
sk
s)
  
•
 
S
uf
fic
ie
nt
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
to
 a
sk
 th
e 
rig
ht
 
qu
es
tio
ns
 a
nd
 t
o 
as
se
ss
 t
he
 a
de
qu
ac
y 
of
 t
he
 a
ns
w
er
s 
ob
ta
in
ed
 
•
 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 r
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
th
e 
w
or
k 
of
 t
he
 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
rs
 
•
 
A
n 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t 
fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 c
om
m
itt
ee
 a
nd
 t
he
 d
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 m
an
ag
em
en
t  
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es
s 
ra
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– 
5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
K
no
w
in
g 
w
ha
t 
fo
rm
al
 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
ch
an
ne
ls
, 
st
af
fin
g 
po
lic
ie
s,
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 a
nd
 
re
w
ar
d 
sy
st
em
s 
ex
is
t  
 A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 p
os
se
ss
 t
he
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
pe
rs
on
al
 
at
tri
bu
te
s 
an
d 
qu
al
iti
es
: 
 C
om
pe
te
nc
e 
 A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 a
re
 –
 
•
 
qu
al
ifi
ed
 w
ith
 a
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
an
d 
th
e 
ec
on
om
y,
 
so
 
as
 
to
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
th
ei
r 
du
tie
s 
pr
op
er
ly
 (i
nc
lu
di
ng
 re
lia
nc
e 
on
 e
xp
er
t a
dv
ic
e 
if 
ne
ed
ed
)  
•
 
in
fo
rm
ed
 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
, 
in
du
st
ria
l 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 
•
 
ab
le
 t
o 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
 a
 c
ap
ac
ity
 t
o 
m
ak
e 
in
fo
rm
ed
 a
nd
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
by
 o
ffe
rin
g 
ne
w
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
 a
nd
 
co
ns
tru
ct
iv
e 
su
gg
es
tio
ns
 a
nd
 e
xe
cu
te
 s
ou
nd
 ju
dg
em
en
t  
•
 
ab
le
 t
o 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
 a
n 
in
qu
iri
ng
 m
in
d 
an
d 
su
ffi
ci
en
t 
as
se
rti
ve
ne
ss
 to
 h
el
p 
a 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 to
 d
ea
l e
ffe
ct
iv
el
y 
w
ith
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
au
di
to
rs
  
 C
om
m
itm
en
t 
 A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 a
re
 –
  
•
 
ab
le
 t
o 
fin
d 
th
e 
tim
e 
an
d 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
 a
 c
om
m
itm
en
t 
to
 
pr
op
er
ly
 c
ar
ry
 o
ut
 th
ei
r d
ut
ie
s 
an
d 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
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ra
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5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
di
lig
en
t 
an
d 
m
ot
iv
at
ed
 
in
 
di
sc
ha
rg
in
g 
th
ei
r 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
by
 
re
gu
la
rly
 
at
te
nd
in
g 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
an
d 
co
nt
rib
ut
in
g 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's
 d
ire
ct
io
n 
 
•
 
st
riv
in
g 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s'
 v
al
ue
 w
ith
 d
ue
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
s 
of
 
ot
he
r 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 
an
d 
th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
’s
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t r
ol
e 
 Fi
du
ci
ar
y 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
 A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 –
 
•
 
ex
er
ci
se
 u
tm
os
t g
oo
d 
fa
ith
, h
on
es
ty
 a
nd
 in
te
gr
ity
, a
 h
ig
h 
le
ve
l 
of
 e
th
ic
al
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 a
nd
 a
ct
 i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
ly
 f
ro
m
 
an
y 
ou
ts
id
e 
fe
tte
r o
r i
ns
tru
ct
io
n 
 
•
 
al
w
ay
s 
ac
t i
n 
th
e 
be
st
 in
te
re
st
s 
of
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
nd
 n
ot
 
in
 ”s
ec
to
ra
l” 
in
te
re
st
s 
•
 
av
oi
d 
co
nf
lic
ts
 
of
 
du
tie
s 
an
d 
in
te
re
st
s,
 
di
sc
lo
si
ng
 
po
te
nt
ia
l c
on
fli
ct
s 
at
 th
e 
ea
rli
es
t p
os
si
bl
e 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
  
•
 
(if
 n
ee
d 
be
) 
di
sa
gr
ee
 w
ith
 c
ol
le
ag
ue
s 
on
 t
he
 b
oa
rd
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
ch
ai
rp
er
so
n 
an
d 
ch
ie
f 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e,
 
de
m
on
st
ra
tin
g 
a 
st
ro
ng
 
w
illi
ng
ne
ss
 
to
 
bo
th
 
qu
es
tio
n 
is
su
es
 a
nd
 to
 s
pe
ak
 o
ut
 a
t m
ee
tin
gs
  
 O
ve
rs
ig
ht
 
 A
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 –
 
•
 
en
su
re
 th
at
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
an
d 
sy
st
em
s 
ar
e 
in
 p
la
ce
 to
 a
ct
 
as
 
ch
ec
ks
 
an
d 
ba
la
nc
es
 
on
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
ce
iv
ed
, 
en
su
rin
g 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
of
 a
nn
ua
l 
bu
dg
et
s 
an
d 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
ag
ai
ns
t w
hi
ch
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 c
an
 b
e 
m
on
ito
re
d 
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Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
tre
at
 c
on
fid
en
tia
l m
at
te
rs
 a
s 
su
ch
 a
nd
 n
ot
 d
iv
ul
ge
 t
he
m
 
to
 a
ny
on
e 
w
ith
ou
t a
ut
ho
rit
y 
to
 d
o 
so
  
•
 
ob
ta
in
 i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l 
ad
vi
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
ea
rli
es
t 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
, w
he
n 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
 E
xi
st
in
g 
an
d 
ne
w
 a
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 d
is
pl
ay
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s:
  
•
 
be
 e
m
ot
io
na
lly
 in
te
llig
en
t, 
co
nf
id
en
t, 
in
flu
en
tia
l a
nd
 h
av
e 
go
od
 i
nt
er
ac
tiv
e 
sk
ills
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 t
he
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 h
an
dl
e 
co
nf
lic
t  
•
 
ha
ve
 a
na
ly
tic
al
 r
ea
so
ni
ng
 a
bi
lit
ie
s,
 n
at
ur
al
 c
ur
io
si
ty
, 
a 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
m
ea
su
re
 
of
 
he
al
th
y 
sc
ep
tic
is
m
, 
an
d 
a 
w
illi
ng
ne
ss
 to
 d
ev
ot
e 
th
e 
tim
e 
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 d
o 
th
e 
jo
b 
 
•
 
ha
ve
 s
ou
nd
 p
ro
ce
ss
 m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ki
lls
 a
nd
 th
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 
to
 a
bs
or
b 
a 
fa
ir 
de
gr
ee
 o
f d
et
ai
l  
•
 
be
 v
ig
ila
nt
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
ed
, w
ith
 a
 p
ro
bi
ng
 m
in
d,
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t o
f t
he
ir 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
 
  3.
  P
R
IN
C
IP
LE
S 
O
F 
G
O
O
D
 G
O
VE
R
N
A
N
C
E:
 
 Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 a
nd
 in
di
vi
du
al
 m
em
be
rs
 a
dh
er
e 
to
 t
he
 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f g
oo
d 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
: 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 a
cc
ep
t 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
dy
na
m
ic
s 
of
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
an
d 
its
 
un
iq
ue
ne
ss
 
an
d 
re
ve
al
 
di
sc
ip
lin
e 
an
d 
a 
co
m
m
itm
en
t t
o 
ex
ec
ut
e 
th
e 
ov
er
si
gh
t r
es
po
ns
ib
ilit
y 
of
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 a
 fo
rm
al
 c
ha
rte
r 
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t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
Is
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
? 
Ye
s/
N
o/
N
A
 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
ra
tin
g 
1 
– 
5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 is
 s
o 
st
ru
ct
ur
ed
 th
at
 it
 is
 a
 b
al
an
ce
d 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 c
om
pr
is
in
g 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
ith
 a
n 
ad
eq
ua
te
 le
ve
l o
f k
no
w
le
dg
e,
 s
ki
lls
 a
nd
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e;
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 is
 o
f t
he
 ri
gh
t s
iz
e 
to
 a
dd
 v
al
ue
 a
nd
 d
is
ch
ar
ge
 
its
 re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 p
ro
m
ot
es
 e
th
ic
al
 b
eh
av
io
ur
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
an
d 
th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
its
el
f 
an
d 
co
nt
in
uo
us
ly
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
th
e 
to
ne
 a
t 
to
p 
to
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
 t
he
 
in
te
gr
ity
 a
nd
 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
of
 fi
na
nc
ia
l r
ep
or
tin
g 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 c
om
m
its
 t
o 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 b
as
ed
 
re
m
un
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 o
f i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 i
ts
el
f 
ar
e 
re
gu
la
rly
 r
ev
ie
w
ed
 t
o 
en
ha
nc
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 a
ck
no
w
le
dg
es
 t
he
ir 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
re
co
gn
is
es
 t
he
ir 
le
ga
l 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 t
o 
al
l 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 a
nd
 re
sp
ec
t t
he
 ri
gh
ts
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
pr
om
ot
es
 
tra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
by
 
en
co
ur
ag
in
g 
th
e 
tim
el
y 
an
d 
ba
la
nc
ed
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 a
ll 
m
at
er
ia
l m
at
te
rs
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
pr
om
ot
es
 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
de
ci
si
on
-
m
ak
in
g 
by
 u
si
ng
 a
 r
is
k-
ba
se
d 
ov
er
si
gh
t 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 a
nd
 
es
ta
bl
is
hi
ng
 
so
un
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
in
te
rn
al
 
co
nt
ro
l 
sy
st
em
s 
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N
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N
A
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ct
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ra
tin
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1 
– 
5 
 
R
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pe
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on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
4.
  P
ER
FO
R
M
A
N
C
E 
EV
A
LU
A
TI
O
N
 
 A
ss
es
s 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
of
 
th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
an
d 
in
di
vi
du
al
 m
em
be
rs
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g:
 
•
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 f
ro
m
 e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
’s
 
ke
y 
ro
le
 
in
 
th
e 
ar
ea
s 
of
 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
on
, c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
ov
er
si
gh
t r
eg
ar
di
ng
 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
, 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
in
te
rn
al
 
co
nt
ro
ls
, 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e,
 
et
hi
cs
, 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
in
te
rn
al
 
au
di
tin
g,
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
tin
g,
 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
sp
ec
ia
l 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
ns
 
•
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
flo
w
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 a
nd
 t
he
 in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
r 
– 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 in
te
rn
al
 c
on
tro
ls
 
•
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
flo
w
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 a
nd
 th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
r 
– 
fre
e 
fro
m
 a
ny
 th
re
at
s 
to
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 o
bj
ec
tiv
ity
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
’s
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f t
he
 c
om
m
itt
ee
’s
 
m
is
si
on
, 
ro
le
s 
an
d 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s,
 a
nd
 t
he
 c
om
m
itt
ee
 
di
re
ct
io
n 
as
 o
ut
lin
ed
 in
 th
e 
ch
ar
te
r  
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
’s
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 a
nd
 a
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
of
 
th
e 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
ro
le
 a
nd
 r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
of
 th
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 in
 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
bo
ar
d 
w
ith
 n
o 
ov
er
la
p 
w
ith
 th
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r b
oa
rd
 c
om
m
itt
ee
s 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
’s
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
in
cl
ud
es
 a
 p
ro
pe
r m
ix
 
of
 
fin
an
ci
al
, 
le
ga
l 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e,
 
or
 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
re
cr
ui
ts
 t
he
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 t
al
en
t 
to
 s
tre
ng
th
en
 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
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ra
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N
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N
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ra
tin
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1 
– 
5 
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
N
ew
 a
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 a
re
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
w
ith
 a
 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 in
du
ct
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
•
 
A
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
of
 m
ut
ua
l t
ru
st
 a
nd
 re
sp
ec
t e
xi
st
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 a
nd
 a
ll 
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ar
tie
s,
 w
hi
le
 
at
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e 
a 
sp
iri
t 
of
 
he
al
th
y 
sc
ep
tic
is
m
 
is
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
’s
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
an
d 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t 
w
ith
 
th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
rs
, i
nt
er
na
l a
ud
ito
rs
 a
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
’s
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 k
ey
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
fin
an
ci
al
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
C
FO
 a
nd
 t
he
 c
hi
ef
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
of
fic
er
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
ra
is
es
 
th
e 
rig
ht
 
qu
es
tio
ns
 
an
d 
pu
rs
ue
s 
th
e 
an
sw
er
s 
w
ith
 m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
au
di
to
rs
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
qu
es
tio
ns
 t
ha
t 
in
di
ca
te
 a
n 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 
cr
iti
ca
l 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
ju
dg
m
en
ta
l 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
es
tim
at
es
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
’s
 r
es
po
ns
iv
en
es
s 
to
 t
he
 i
ss
ue
s 
ra
is
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 e
xt
er
na
l a
ud
ito
rs
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
em
be
rs
 
re
ce
iv
e 
ad
eq
ua
te
 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
nd
 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
by
 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 p
ar
tie
s 
to
 
en
ab
le
 
th
em
 
to
 
st
ay
 
cu
rr
en
t 
on
 
al
l 
bu
si
ne
ss
, 
fin
an
ci
al
, o
pe
ra
tio
na
l a
nd
 re
gu
la
to
ry
 m
at
te
rs
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
no
tic
e 
of
 m
ee
tin
gs
 w
el
l i
n 
ad
va
nc
e,
 w
ith
 c
om
pl
et
e,
 c
le
ar
 a
nd
 c
on
ci
se
 a
ge
nd
as
 a
nd
 
su
pp
or
tin
g 
m
at
er
ia
ls
  
•
 
A
ll 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
em
be
rs
 
ha
ve
 
ad
eq
ua
te
 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s 
to
 d
is
cu
ss
 is
su
es
 o
f i
m
po
rta
nc
e 
an
d 
to
 a
sk
 
pr
ob
in
g 
or
 c
ha
lle
ng
in
g 
qu
es
tio
ns
 o
f r
el
ev
an
t p
ar
tie
s 
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ra
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– 
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R
es
po
ns
ib
le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
s 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
is
 
ke
pt
 
in
fo
rm
ed
 
of
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
m
at
te
rs
, 
w
he
th
er
 
th
ey
 
ar
e 
op
er
at
io
na
l, 
fin
an
ci
al
 
or
 
re
gu
la
to
ry
, t
ha
t a
ffe
ct
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
ai
nt
ai
ns
 a
n 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 b
al
an
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
ee
tin
g 
tim
e,
 p
re
pa
ra
tio
n 
tim
e 
an
d 
di
sc
us
si
on
s 
on
 is
su
es
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 r
ep
or
ts
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l 
re
su
lts
 t
o 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
in
 a
 c
le
ar
, c
on
ci
se
 a
nd
 ti
m
el
y 
m
an
ne
r 
•
 
E
xe
cu
tiv
e 
se
ss
io
ns
 w
ith
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
it,
 
an
d 
th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
ud
it 
ar
e 
ke
pt
 c
on
fid
en
tia
l b
y 
al
l a
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
 
•
 
Th
e 
ou
tc
om
e 
of
 
pr
ev
io
us
 
se
lf-
as
se
ss
m
en
ts
 
an
d 
th
e 
st
ag
e 
of
 m
at
ur
ity
 o
f t
he
 a
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
•
 
Th
e 
ov
er
al
l 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
of
 
th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
em
be
rs
 
in
 
te
rm
s 
of
 
th
ei
r 
te
rm
s 
of
 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 
sa
tis
fa
ct
or
y 
an
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
is
 
ev
al
ua
te
d 
at
 
le
as
t 
an
nu
al
ly
 
  5.
  I
N
D
U
C
TI
O
N
  
 IN
FO
R
M
A
TI
O
N
 T
O
 B
E 
PR
O
VI
D
ED
 O
N
 A
PP
O
IN
TM
EN
T:
 
 Th
e 
du
tie
s 
an
d 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
: 
•
 
A
 b
rie
f o
ut
lin
e 
of
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f a
n 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
r 
an
d 
a 
su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 h
is
/h
er
 r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
an
d 
on
go
in
g 
ob
lig
at
io
n 
un
de
r l
eg
is
la
tio
n,
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 a
nd
 b
es
t p
ra
ct
ic
e 
•
 
D
et
ai
ls
 o
f 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
an
d 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ilit
y 
an
d 
fid
uc
ia
ry
 re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 m
em
be
rs
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ra
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R
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po
ns
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le
 
pe
rs
on
 
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
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 • 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 c
on
st
itu
tio
n 
an
d 
gu
id
el
in
es
 o
n:
 
- 
B
oa
rd
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
an
d 
m
at
te
rs
 re
se
rv
ed
 fo
r t
he
 
bo
ar
d 
- 
D
el
eg
at
ed
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
- 
Th
e 
po
lic
y 
fo
r o
bt
ai
ni
ng
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l 
ad
vi
ce
 
- 
O
th
er
 s
ta
nd
in
g 
or
de
rs
, p
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 
- 
Et
hi
cs
 
 Th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
, i
ts
 b
us
in
es
s 
an
d 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
ts
 in
 
w
hi
ch
 it
 o
pe
ra
te
s:
 
•
 
Th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
or
 b
us
in
es
s 
pl
an
, 
m
ar
ke
t 
an
al
ys
is
 
an
d 
bu
dg
et
s 
fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 
•
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 l
at
es
t 
an
nu
al
 r
ep
or
t 
an
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
ac
co
un
ts
, a
nd
 in
te
rim
s 
as
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 
•
 
Th
e 
gr
ou
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 li
st
 o
f m
aj
or
 d
om
es
tic
 a
nd
 o
ve
rs
ea
s 
su
bs
id
ia
rie
s,
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 a
nd
 j
oi
nt
 v
en
tu
re
s,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
pa
re
nt
 c
om
pa
ny
/c
om
pa
ni
es
 
•
 
S
um
m
ar
y 
de
ta
ils
 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 
pr
in
ci
pa
l 
as
se
ts
, 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s,
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t c
on
tra
ct
s 
an
d 
m
aj
or
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s 
•
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 m
aj
or
 r
is
ks
, 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
an
d 
la
te
st
 ri
sk
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t r
ep
or
t 
•
 
A
n 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
of
 k
ey
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 in
di
ca
to
rs
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ra
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pe
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Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
st
ep
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 • 
S
um
m
ar
y 
de
ta
ils
 
of
 
m
aj
or
 
gr
ou
p 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
po
lic
ie
s,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
di
re
ct
or
s’
 
an
d 
of
fic
er
s’
 
(D
 
&
 
O
) 
lia
bi
lit
y 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
•
 
D
et
ai
ls
 o
f a
ny
 m
aj
or
 li
tig
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 c
ur
re
nt
 o
r 
po
te
nt
ia
l, 
be
in
g 
un
de
rta
ke
n 
by
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
or
 
ag
ai
ns
t 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
•
 
Tr
ea
su
ry
 
is
su
es
 
in
 
te
rm
s 
of
 
fu
nd
in
g 
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
, 
an
d 
di
vi
de
nd
 a
nd
 b
on
us
 p
ol
ic
y 
of
 t
he
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
•
 
Th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
br
oc
hu
re
, 
m
is
si
on
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
re
le
va
nt
 r
ep
or
ts
 a
nd
 s
um
m
ar
y 
of
 m
ai
n 
ev
en
ts
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
la
st
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
•
 
R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
co
ns
tra
in
ts
 
 Is
su
es
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 th
e 
co
ns
tit
ut
io
n 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
: 
•
 
U
p-
to
-d
at
e 
co
py
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 M
em
or
an
du
m
 a
nd
 
A
rti
cl
es
 
of
 
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n/
C
on
st
itu
tio
n/
R
ul
es
, 
w
ith
 
a 
su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rta
nt
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
•
 
Th
e 
bo
ar
d 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
cr
ea
tin
g 
th
e 
au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
•
 
Th
e 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 c
ha
rte
r, 
w
hi
ch
 o
ut
lin
es
 t
he
 a
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
’s
 k
ey
 r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
tie
s 
an
d 
an
y 
lim
its
 t
o 
its
 
au
th
or
ity
 
•
 
M
in
ut
es
 o
f t
he
 la
st
 th
re
e 
to
 s
ix
 a
ud
it 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
ee
tin
gs
 
•
 
S
ch
ed
ul
e 
of
 
th
e 
da
te
s 
of
 
fu
tu
re
 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
ee
tin
gs
, 
m
ee
tin
g 
sc
he
du
le
s 
an
d 
ag
en
da
s,
 
m
ee
tin
g 
fre
qu
en
cy
, l
en
gt
h 
an
d 
th
e 
no
rm
al
 lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 m
ee
tin
gs
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m
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 m
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tin
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w
he
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m
en
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e 
se
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 o
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pe
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 c
ov
er
ag
e 
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 a
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w
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B
rie
f 
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ra
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de
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di
re
ct
or
s 
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 c
om
pa
ny
, 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
em
be
rs
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in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
it 
st
af
f, 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 s
ec
re
ta
ry
 a
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 o
th
er
 k
ey
 
ex
ec
ut
iv
es
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Th
is
 
sh
ou
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in
cl
ud
e 
an
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ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
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sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
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di
re
ct
or
s 
an
d 
au
di
t 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
em
be
rs
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ei
r 
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te
s 
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ap
po
in
tm
en
t, 
an
y 
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ar
d 
co
m
m
itt
ee
s 
up
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w
hi
ch
 
in
di
vi
du
al
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si
t 
an
d 
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e 
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ck
gr
ou
nd
 a
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ua
lif
ic
at
io
ns
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f s
en
io
r m
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em
en
t  
•
 
D
et
ai
ls
 o
f 
bo
ar
d 
su
bc
om
m
itt
ee
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to
ge
th
er
 w
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 t
er
m
s 
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re
fe
re
nc
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 A
D
D
IT
IO
N
A
L 
IN
FO
R
M
A
TI
O
N
 T
O
 B
E 
PR
O
VI
D
ED
 D
U
R
IN
G
 
TH
E 
FI
R
ST
 T
H
R
EE
 M
O
N
TH
S:
 
 • 
C
op
ie
s 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's
 
m
ai
n 
pr
od
uc
t/s
er
vi
ce
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oc
hu
re
s 
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ie
s 
of
 r
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en
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es
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tti
ng
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 r
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cl
es
 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
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er
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rs
 e
tc
), 
bo
th
 in
te
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 d
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 p
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l m
at
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l d
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rn
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 c
om
pa
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le
ph
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ct
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  6.
   
PR
O
FE
SS
IO
N
A
L 
D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
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ni
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tio
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d 
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t c
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m
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l d
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el
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f c
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tin
ui
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ca
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re
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ci
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tin
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ng
, r
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or
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re
as
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ra
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 c
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 b
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itt
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at
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, m
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tin
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pe
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itt
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 d
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M
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be
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t 
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se
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m
m
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de
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at
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 p
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fe
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de
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to
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pp
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ac
co
m
pl
is
hi
ng
 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 
 M
em
be
rs
 
ar
e 
pr
ov
id
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w
ith
 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
sp
ec
ts
: 
•
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
po
rti
ng
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
 
(e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 I
FR
S
), 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
pr
ac
tic
es
 c
om
m
on
 t
o 
th
e 
in
du
st
ry
, 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s,
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
tre
nd
s 
an
d 
ra
tio
s 
 
•
 
Th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
fo
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am
pl
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om
ic
 
co
nd
iti
on
s,
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
re
gu
la
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ns
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ch
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ge
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lo
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 m
at
te
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in
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at
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re
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ca
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an
d 
pr
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uc
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di
st
rib
ut
io
n,
 a
nd
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
m
et
ho
ds
 
•
 
Le
ga
l a
nd
 re
gu
la
to
ry
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
ts
 
 IN
FO
R
M
A
TI
O
N
 
TO
 
B
E 
PR
O
VI
D
ED
 
TO
 
A
U
D
IT
 
C
O
M
M
IT
TE
E 
M
EM
B
ER
S:
 
 • 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 b
us
in
es
s 
an
d 
in
du
st
ry
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
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pe
ra
te
s 
an
d 
an
y 
ch
an
ge
s 
th
er
et
o 
 
- 
C
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
an
d 
ec
on
om
ic
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 
- 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 
- 
Fo
re
ig
n 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
- 
N
ew
 te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l a
dv
an
ce
m
en
ts
 
- 
In
du
st
ry
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
- 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 s
oc
ia
l a
tti
tu
de
s 
- 
M
an
ag
em
en
t’s
 ri
sk
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t p
ro
ce
ss
 
•
 
In
si
gh
t i
nt
o 
st
ra
te
gy
, c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
po
si
tio
ni
ng
, o
pe
ra
tio
ns
, 
sa
le
s 
ch
an
ne
ls
, s
up
pl
y 
ch
ai
n 
an
d 
ot
he
r b
us
in
es
s 
is
su
es
, 
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 a
 b
as
is
 f
or
 r
ec
og
ni
si
ng
 a
nd
 a
na
ly
si
ng
 c
on
tro
ls
 a
nd
 
re
po
rte
d 
re
su
lts
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s 
w
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s 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
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 p
ro
du
ct
s 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
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 p
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 c
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io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
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t c
om
m
itt
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th
e 
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te
rn
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 a
ud
ito
rs
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pa
st
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
an
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co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
in
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rn
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 a
ud
ito
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an
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th
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au
di
t c
om
m
itt
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r t
he
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pe
rio
d 
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In
te
rn
al
 a
ud
iti
ng
 m
at
te
rs
 fo
r i
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nc
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Th
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na
tu
re
 a
nd
 fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
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ac
tiv
ity
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co
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 o
f t
he
 in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
it 
ch
ar
te
r 
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G
en
er
al
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
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co
pe
 o
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ac
tiv
iti
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tio
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ris
tic
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 c
op
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of
 t
he
 c
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nt
 y
ea
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te
rn
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 a
ud
it 
pl
an
 a
nd
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po
rts
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es
ul
ts
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f q
ua
lit
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as
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ra
nc
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re
vi
ew
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ito
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g 
ac
tiv
iti
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E
xt
er
na
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ng
 m
at
te
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 fo
r i
ns
ta
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cu
rr
en
t e
ng
ag
em
en
t l
et
te
r o
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er
na
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ud
ito
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 li
st
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ep
or
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 b
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ex
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di
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su
m
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ar
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w
or
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pe
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ed
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th
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te
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al
 
au
di
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nn
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au
di
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, n
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ud
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se
rv
ic
es
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